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ABSTRACT 
Betwixt a false reason and none at all 
 
This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then 
Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian 
scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non-
revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that 
Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute 
part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible 
situations. 
 
Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian 
scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two 
criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its 
doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire 
domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of 
our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of 
knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one 
commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second 
far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism 
claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian 
scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. 
On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. 
 
The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in 
what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. 
Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense 
Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are 
constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement 
to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement 
to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the 
content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant 
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the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled 
can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. 
 
I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common 
sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as 
Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also 
argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both 
logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of 
common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be 
entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content 
of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In 
fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can 
be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which 
Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these 
arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the 
relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 
2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given 
(Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the 
emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense.
PREFACE 
Outlining the Pyrrhonian project 
 
 Hume’s insight 
 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, what is offered here are several lessons that can 
be drawn from the tradition of Pyrrhonian scepticism on the topics of common sense 
and our natural commitments. In one sense these lessons could be taken separately, as 
each deals with a different aspect of the nature of and relationships between common 
sense and natural commitment. However, there is also a broader strategy at work 
directed towards an overall point. This overall conclusion is that respecting common 
sense presents us with a dilemma, specifically, a dilemma regarding our entitlement to 
that which we take to be commonsensical. In fact respecting common sense eventually 
leads us to that some conclusion Hume found himself drawing when he wrote in the 
Treatise of Human Nature that “[w]e have therefore no choice left, but betwixt a false 
reason and none at all”. The guiding principle of this dissertation is that Hume was on 
to something. 
 
The primary claim of this dissertation is that taking ourselves to have an entitlement to 
certain common sense ideas and an entitlement to respect certain common sense norms 
can lead us, seemingly inevitably, to the denial that we have any such entitlement. This 
leads to the secondary claim that the anti-sceptical adherent of common sense faces a 
dilemma. This dilemma runs as follows. Either we have an entitlement to common 
sense or we do not. If we do not have such an entitlement then we cannot appeal to 
common sense to refute scepticism. If we do have such an entitlement then this 
entitlement also entitles us to scepticism. So again, we cannot appeal to common sense 
to refute scepticism. So we cannot appeal to common sense as the basis for a refutation 
of scepticism. 
 
What then makes these claims distinctly Pyrrhonian in character? In one sense they are 
not Pyrrhonian as such, as one can draw lessons from a position without adhering to 
that position itself. As it turns out two aspects of Pyrrhonism are particularly relevant to 
drawing the lessons that follow. First, as conceived of here Pyrrhonism is common 
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sense scepticism and I take it that there is good historical warrant for making such a 
claim. Hence the scepticism to which our entitlement to common sense gives us a 
further entitlement is Pyrrhonian scepticism. Second, and more importantly, is the 
response that Pyrrhonism would have us make to this dilemma. Pyrrhonism would have 
this dilemma stand unresolved but avoid the force of the resulting paradox by refusing 
to continue to inquire into the structure of our everyday, commonsensical, 
commitments. There is in Pyrrhonism a deep suspicion towards the sense of continuing 
to engage in philosophical reflection, or indeed reflection of any kind. While refusing to 
engage in reflection is an effective way of dodging the paradox of having an 
entitlement to common sense I suggest that its consequences are worse than those of 
embracing the paradoxical character of common sense. While suspicion towards 
reflection is not wholly unwarranted I suggest that it is over-emphasised in Pyrrhonism. 
Granted, Pyrrhonism is false (in Hume’s sense) in that following its rules sometimes 
leads us onto the path to scepticism, just as Hume said. However these rules are 
genuinely rational and we have no choice but to follow them. Thus without these rules 
we would have no reason at all. Scepticism cannot be done away with for exactly the 
same reason that reason cannot be done away with. 
 
Preliminary definitions1 
 
At its most fundamental, scepticism questions our entitlement to a given commitment 
(where ‘commitment’ is understood to be a generic term for a range of propositional 
attitudes including belief, knowledge, fear, suspicion, trust etc) or to a domain of 
commitments. It is of course possible to further specify scepticism both in terms of 
what type of commitment it targets (where knowledge and belief are the most common 
alternatives but not the only alternatives) or what domain of commitment it targets (all 
commitments derived from the senses for instance, or all commitments regarding 
climate change, or only the commitment that the climate is actually changing). Related 
to distinguishing varieties of scepticism relative to the domain they target is 
                                                 
1 An important caveat must be introduced at this stage, for these definitions are strictly preliminary and 
shall be extended early in chapter 2. While nothing said in these preliminary definition is strictly 
speaking false what is said is undoubtedly incomplete, especially as regards whether Pyrrhonian 
scepticism targets knowledge or belief. While it is here described as knowledge scepticism, and while 
Pyrrhonian scepticism does target knowledge, it will be shown in chapter 2 that there is a tendency in 
Pyrrhonian scepticism to extend this scope to include at least reasonable belief and possibly much else 
besides. Thus these preliminary definitions capture Pyrrhonism only in its most conservative guise. 
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distinguishing scepticism by how fundamental its targets are. Abstracted scepticism 
will target commitments that serve to provide the grounds for a very large number of 
further commitments. Were it to turn out that we have no entitlement to these abstract 
commitments then we would also lack entitlement to a whole host of other 
commitments. Abstract scepticism is of greatest interest to the foundationalist as 
foundationalism is at its strongest taken to be a refutation of this sort of scepticism. 
Particular scepticism will target commitments that do not carry such wide-ranging 
implications for other commitments were they to turn out to be false. For instance, were 
we to lack any entitlement to the abstract commitment that the senses are generally 
reliable we would also lack an entitlement to take any particular commitment relying on 
the senses as its ground. However lacking entitlement to believe on the basis of my 
senses that it is my car parked in the driveway rather than another car which is similar 
to mine does not imply that I am unentitled to believe on the basis of my senses that my 
computer is sitting on the desk in front of me. 
 
To add a further complication, scepticism is often conflated with negative dogmatism, 
which is the claim that we definitely do not have an entitlement to a given (domain of 
and type of) commitment. Properly understood, scepticism is a challenge to an 
entitlement to some commitment(s) x, not the negative claim that we have no 
entitlement to x. Finally, we can identify scepticism according to the range of 
commitment to which it questions our entitlement. We can signify the extent to which 
this range has been expanded or restricted by referring to the generality of a form of 
scepticism. Of course this criterion is a matter of degree, and hence we can call 
scepticism fully general if it challenges our entitlement to all of our commitments, and 
highly generalised if it challenges our entitlement to a very large proportion of our 
commitments. The scepticism Descartes develops in the Meditations (particularly the 
first two meditations) is on this reading highly generalised but not fully general as 
Descartes does not question his entitlement to first-person present tense judgment about 
the contents of his own mind. Given that most contemporary versions of scepticism 
make the same concessions as did Descartes regarding what we know, most 
contemporary versions of scepticism would have to be called highly generalised but not 
fully general. 
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Before applying this basic framework to classify the version of scepticism of 
importance here it must be emphasised that we must be careful not to conflate 
abstractness with generality. While a direct means to developing a fully general or at 
least highly generalised scepticism might well be through a sustained attack on abstract 
principles thought to ground all other commitments this does not imply that 
abstractness is the only means to develop general or at least highly generalised 
scepticism. Just as it could turn out that, upon reflection, we have no entitlement to any 
one of our commitments so it could also turn out that upon reflecting upon all of our 
commitments iteratively we are actually unentitled to any of our commitments. 
Granted, there are significant practical difficulties associated with examining each of 
our commitments one at a time but we should not confuse a practical difficulty with a 
conceptual one.2 There is no conceptual difficulty with developing general (or at least 
highly generalised) yet particular scepticism.  
 
With this established, it can be said that the scepticism which is of concern in this 
dissertation is generalised particular scepticism which challenges our entitlement to 
those items of supposed knowledge (or belief, although knowledge shall be our 
immediate concern) that constitute the content of common sense. When scepticism is 
mentioned without clarification it will be to this form of scepticism that I refer. The 
term Pyrrhonian scepticism will stand for generalised particular entitlement knowledge 
scepticism.3 The most obvious contrasts between this Pyrrhonian scepticism and 
Cartesian scepticism are over abstractness vs. particularity. Cartesian scepticism, as it 
appears in contemporary epistemology is abstract, knowledge scepticism.4 
                                                 
2 Descartes stated reason for not verifying his entitlement to his beliefs by simply examining each in turn 
is to avoid precisely these practical problems. See Rene Descartes et al., Descartes: Selected 
Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1988) AT VII 18. However whether these 
practical problems can legitimately be avoided remains unclear. Williams has argued that they cannot be. 
See his analysis of what he calls the ‘Best-Case Argument’ in Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: 
Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Philosophical Theory. (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, 
USA: B. Blackwell, 1991) pp.135-139. 
3 In the ancient world Pyrrhonian scepticism was belief scepticism, with questions over exactly what kind 
or range of belief was included. Part of the problem is that the Greek term for belief (dogma) does not 
always map directly onto the English term. 
4 There is an interesting debate over the radicalness of Pyrrhonian scepticism relative to Descartes’ 
scepticism both in terms of whether these scepticisms question both beliefs and knowledge and also 
which of the scepticism is more radical. An important contributor to these debates has been Gail Fine, 
and her views deserve special mention due to both the cogency of her arguments and the extent to which 
they disagree with mine. Fine has argued that Descartes’ scepticism is in fact both knowledge and belief 
scepticism in Gail Fine, “Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?,” Philosophical Review 
109, no. 2 (2000): pp.228-234. In this paper Fine has particularly in mind the distinction between 
Pyrrhonian scepticism and that of Descartes that is drawn in Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek 
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 However, this clarification is insufficient by itself to make sense of why Pyrrhonian 
scepticism features so prominently in the central claim of this dissertation. Recall that 
the central claim of this dissertation is that an appeal to our entitlement to common 
sense cannot feature in a refutation of Pyrrhonian scepticism. That Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is generalised, particular, entitlement, knowledge scepticism does not shed 
any light on why appeals to entitlement to common sense would be powerless against 
Pyrrhonian scepticism. The key to understanding why Pyrrhonian scepticism does 
feature so heavily here is grasping that Pyrrhonian scepticism is here being taken as 
derivable from common sense itself. Common sense cannot refute Pyrrhonian 
scepticism because common sense is inherently Pyrrhonian, and is so in a way that 
Cartesian scepticism is not. This places the reading of Pyrrhonism provided here in 
direct conflict with the important exposition of both Cartesian and Pyrrhonian 
scepticism given by Janet Broughton. We shall shortly have occasion to return to 
Broughton’s analysis. However before we can fully comprehend the sense in which 
Pyrrhonism is commonsensical and common sense is Pyrrhonian we need to first 
                                                                                                                                              
Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” Philosophical Review 90 (1982). So far as a 
strict interpretation of Descartes goes I take Fine to have comprehensively shown that Burnyeat gets 
things wrong. However, despite first appearances this carries few implications for the present analysis for 
we must distinguish between the scepticism of Descartes and Cartesian scepticism. As used here, 
‘Cartesian’ scepticism refers to what goes under that name in contemporary epistemological investigation 
and does not need to accurately reflect what Descartes actually thought. In contemporary epistemology, 
Cartesian scepticism surely is knowledge scepticism. Regarding the radicalness of Descartes’ scepticism 
compared to Pyrrhonism, again Fine has made a controversial claim that could be taken to contradict the 
thrust of the above preliminary classifications. Fine has claimed that Descartes may not have introduced 
external world scepticism but that Sextus may have. See Gail Fine, “Sextus and External World 
Scepticism,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume XXIV, Summer 2003, Sedley, David (Ed), 
341- 385 (Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2003). In one sense I have no quibble with the claim that Descartes 
may not have intended to develop external world scepticism, for surely Cartesian scepticism, as that 
exists in contemporary epistemology, does so. However, Fine’s claim could create difficulties for my 
preferred interpretation of Pyrrhonism if Fine can successfully show that Sextus’ scepticism is abstract. 
Where I do not disagree with Fine is in the idea, also presented in this paper, that Sextus’ scepticism 
could be more radical than that of Descartes even if it does not amount to external world scepticism by 
being sceptical about subjective states. This view on whether the Pyrrhonian has beliefs (one version of 
what Fine calls the No Belief view according to which one cannot privilege first person claims) is the one 
I take, and if given this reading Sextus is not an external world sceptic but is extremely radical. Thus this 
issue of the radicalness of Pyrrhonism hangs on what beliefs the Pyrrhonian has, which is discussed 
further below. For the two most important papers directed solely towards the way subjective states in 
ancient philosophy see Stephen Everson, “The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism,” in Psychology, ed. 
Stephen Everson, Companions to Ancient Thought (New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1991), Gail Fine, 
“Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes,” in Hellenistic and Early 
Modern Philosophy, Miller, Jon (Ed), 192-231 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Pr, 2003).There is also an 
interesting discussion of Sextus’ use of Cyrenaic ways of understanding  subjective states in Voula 
Tsouna-McKirahan, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). This discussion is useful because Sextus’ phrasing in PH 1.13 has a 
distinctly Cyrenaic cast to it. 
 Page 11  
clarify the way in which Pyrrhonian scepticism goes about challenging an appeal to our 
entitlement to common sense. This challenge comes in the form of a dilemma. 
 
The basic strategy of Pyrrhonian scepticism is to argue that common sense is inherently 
sceptical in the sense that reflection on common sense is prone to lead us, 
paradoxically, into scepticism about not just about what we might commonsensically 
take ourselves to know but to any reputed article of knowledge. Even without the 
presence of general scepticism, if an appeal to our entitlement to common sense leads 
us to Pyrrhonian scepticism then the original appeal to common sense as an anti-
sceptical strategy turns out to be ultimately self-defeating. This presents a dilemma for 
anyone supposing that an appeal to common sense can be deployed anti-sceptically on 
the basis of our entitlement to common sense. Either we have an entitlement to 
common sense or we do not. If we do not have such an entitlement then we cannot 
appeal to common sense to refute scepticism. If we do have such an entitlement then 
this entitlement also entitles us to Pyrrhonian scepticism. So again, we cannot appeal to 
common sense to refute scepticism. So we cannot appeal to common sense as the basis 
for a refutation of scepticism. 
 
 Why ought we care about commonsensical scepticism? 
 
By itself the claim that we cannot appeal to our entitlement to common sense as a 
foundation for a refutation of scepticism is not a uniquely Pyrrhonian point. Indeed, it 
could even be incorporated into a non-sceptical framework. For instance one may well 
be sceptical of the fitness of common sense to form the foundation for a refutation of 
scepticism but still hold the view that accurate, settled and wide-ranging knowledge of 
the world is still possible. Such could be the result of taking a revisionary attitude 
towards common sense itself. According to such an attitude common sense does not 
accurately represent the real world, and hence it would be on no great concern that 
taking ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense would lead us to scepticism. 
 
Why then ought we care about the claim that common sense cannot be used as the basis 
for a refutation of scepticism? Of course there is no reason that everyone ought to care 
about the relationship between common sense and scepticism, as taking a revisionary 
attitude towards common sense is a perfectly legitimate attitude to take. However, not 
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everyone does take a revisionary attitude towards common sense, and anyone who does 
take a non-revisionary attitude to common sense must be concerned with the outcome 
of an analysis into the relationship between common sense and scepticism. 
 
In fact there are among contemporary epistemologists those who take it that scepticism 
can be refuted by showing that it conflicts with common sense. Clearly such a way of 
dealing with scepticism presupposes that we are entitled to common sense, and further 
that we are under no requirement to demonstrate that we have such an entitlement. We 
could well call our entitlement to common sense, according to this method, a default 
entitlement. I have in mind here John Greco, although with the recent growth in interest 
in Thomas Reid I expect that this approach to attempting to refute scepticism will grow 
in popularity. 
 
Greco employs an epistemological method he calls strong particularism, which is an 
extension of the particularism originally developed by Chisholm. This method can be 
summarised as an adherence to the following three principles: 
 
1) Theories of knowledge ought to be tested against what we commonsensically know and against 
our best empirical knowledge 
 
2) Theories of knowledge that conflict with either what we commonsensically know or our best 
empirical knowledge ought to be given up 
 
3) Sceptical arguments should be used to bring out the counter-intuitive results of theories of 
knowledge 5 
 
Greco is unashamed by the fact these principles will strike many as hopelessly 
question-begging especially in relation to scepticism. To this Greco has a two pronged 
response. First, he insists that in fact there really are no sceptics and so no one against 
whom he can beg any questions. He states that  
 
‘[i]f we think of skeptical arguments as coming from real people whom we are to engage as opponents in 
a debate, then the use of our own intuitions will be contested and the use of empirical psychology will 
                                                 
5 See John Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place : The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in 
Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) p.20-21. 
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seem question begging. So will the use of these seem pointless if we think that our project is to persuade 
someone out of her skepticism by mounting a convincing argument…There are no real skeptics, either to 
be debated or persuaded out of their scepticism. In other words, there is no one who actually lives out the 
skeptical position, or even believes it outside the study or the classroom.’6 
 
This is fortunate, as he concedes that a debate with a consistent sceptic could not be 
won as the sceptic will not accept any of the first principles necessary to carry this 
argument to its conclusion.7 However, Greco also notes that even if there were real 
sceptics then strong particularism would still be acceptable because the epistemological 
project is not to answer the sceptic but to construct the ‘most plausible account of 
knowledge and evidence by our own lights’.8 
 
So far as it goes this sounds like it could be acceptable. The point of examining 
sceptical arguments is indeed to account for our pre-philosophical commonsensical 
views, and there really is no such thing as a consistent sceptic in the modern sense. 
However I would contend that there are inconsistent sceptics even in the modern sense, 
and further that when pressed our pre-philosophical commonsensical views can incline 
us to scepticism. Indeed establishing these contentions provides the primary focus of 
much of this dissertation. 
 
If I am right then Greco’s strong particularism is not so much question-begging as it is 
hopelessly parochial and dogmatic. Yes, we must account for our commonsensical 
views, but we must take into account all our commonsensical views and not just the 
comfortably anti-sceptical views. From the perspective of our more sceptical intuitions, 
choosing only to attend to our anti-sceptical intuitions is hopelessly parochial. More 
generally, even if our commonsensical views were consistently anti-sceptical (which 
they are not) then strong particularism would still be unacceptable because it flatly 
refuses to answer a legitimate question about our entitlement to any particular article of 
common sense. That is, it is always legitimate to ask ourselves whether we are in fact 
entitled to any article of common sense, and when we do ask ourselves this question the 
only proper response is to present some reason, some justification, for our supposed 
entitlement. While it may be acceptable to default to our supposed entitlement before 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p.22. 
7 Ibid. p.23 
8 Ibid. p.22-23. 
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any questions are raised, to continue to insist on this entitlement after questions over 
this entitlement have been raised is dogmatism unworthy of a philosopher. While 
making this point does not require that common sense can push us towards scepticism, 
if it can then the sense that Greco’s strong particularism is hopelessly dogmatic can 
only be heightened. 
 
Thus we have an answer to the question of why we ought to care about the claim that 
common sense cannot be used as a basis for the refutation of scepticism. This answer is 
that taking ourselves to have a default entitlement to common sense can very quickly 
degenerate into parochialism and dogmatism unless we provide some justification for 
this entitlement to common sense when so required. Considering the possibility of 
common sense scepticism provides one such occasion to provide such justifications, 
and providing such justifications requires that we refute, answer, diagnose or in some 
other way explain why scepticism does not after all challenge our common sense views. 
Obviously, we cannot just appeal to our entitlement to common sense to provide this 
explanation, and this is the mistake that Greco makes. 
 
Common Sense Naturalism and dialogue with scepticism 
 
So then, if we are to salvage anything of Greco’s strong particularism then we must 
include in it some explanation of why we are in fact entitled to common sense. Making 
these changes leads us to the development of a position which shall be called Common 
Sense Naturalism (abbreviated as CSN). Like what we see in Greco’s application of 
strong particularism, CSN also takes us to have an entitlement to our common sense 
views. Like strong particularism, CSN takes this entitlement to be a default entitlement. 
Unlike Greco’s position, CSN recognises a requirement to provide justifications for this 
entitlement on the appropriate occasion, and further recognises that the possibility that 
scepticism could be developed from these same common sense views as an occasion on 
which the presentation of such justifications is required. Thus before using an appeal to 
common sense to refute or in some other way answer (or explain why we do not need to 
answer) the sceptical challenge CSN first explains why we are in fact entitled to 
common sense in the first place. 
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Before moving on to very briefly outline how CSN goes about explaining that we are 
entitled to common sense it must be emphasised that CSN as introduced above is in fact 
quite misguided. Common sense cannot provide the basis for a refutation of scepticism 
for the simple reason that common sense is inherently sceptical. By this I mean that 
reflecting on common sense in commonsensical ways is prone, paradoxically, to 
undermine our entitlement to common sense. However, CSN as introduced above is not 
nearly as hopelessly flawed as the position Greco defends, for while CSN misidentifies 
the relationship between common sense and scepticism it at least avoids indefensible 
dogmatism. 
 
Continuing with the analysis of CSN itself, we quickly see that CSN quite rightly 
separates issues of entitlement from issues concerning rational justification. Hence CSN 
refuses to conclude merely from the fact that no rational justification exists for some 
commitment that this commitment is unjustified simpliciter and hence is unwarranted. 
Instead CSN raises the possibility that we can have an entitlement to some commitment 
even where we cannot provide any rational justification for this commitment. To the 
extent that any form of scepticism focuses purely on the notion of rational justification 
whilst merely assuming that such a focus is sufficient to end any debate over 
entitlement it is an impoverished form of scepticism. An appropriately developed 
scepticism needs to retain a focus on claims to entitlement. The importance of rational 
justification is that it is entitlement conferring, but there may be other paths to 
entitlement beyond this. At least such shall be the supposition upon which this 
dissertation proceeds. 
 
How then can we have an entitlement to a commitment if it is not rationally justified? 
The basic answer given by CSN to this question is that we are entitled to our natural 
commitments, where two distinctly different ways of cashing out what it is for 
something to be natural are provided. On one account a commitment is natural if it is 
forced on us as a consequence of our natural (read psychological) constitution. On the 
other account, a commitment is natural if it is a condition for the possibility of engaging 
in those (uniquely human) activities (especially social and rational activities) through 
which we fully express the essence of what it is to be human. In neither account of what 
it is to be natural is it possible to simply provide reasons for natural commitments. In 
fact the general thrust of the response of CSN to questions of our entitlement to 
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common sense it to point out that it is a mistake to think that we need to provide 
reasons for this entitlement. That is, CSN attempts to point out that while questions of 
entitlement to common sense do not seem to be obviously unreasonable they are subtly 
misguided in that they misidentify the special status held by common sense. Thus while 
CSN does not provide us with rational justifications for our entitlement to common 
sense it does at least provide us with an account of how we can hold this entitlement 
regardless. Thus CSN does engage appropriately with the question of entitlement the 
sceptic asks (or ought to ask). However I shall leave any further clarification of what 
each of these readings of the natural mean when the details are fully spelled out in 
chapter 1. 
 
We see then that CSN avoids the unwarranted dogmatism which emerged as being an 
essential feature of Greco’s application of strong particularism, and does so by 
providing an account of how we come to have entitlement to common sense. In this 
respect CSN provides a serious response to a sceptical challenge to our entitlement to 
common sense in the way that strong particularism does not. As such, CSN is a position 
which is worthy of analysis as it may provide a means of answering the sceptical 
challenge to our entitlement to common sense. Further, if common sense is inherently 
anti-sceptical as CSN (quite incorrectly) assumes then a defender of CSN might be in a 
position to enter a refutation of scepticism more generally by appealing to common 
sense. As such, CSN then is directly opposed to the central claim of this dissertation. 
 
 Reading Sextus: the apraxia challenge and debates over dogmata 
 
As has been indicated above, Pyrrhonism plays an important part in the development of 
the argument of this thesis. Thus something must be said about how Pyrrhonism is 
being understood here, with special reference to the historical sources from which 
Pyrrhonism derives. The reading of Pyrrhonism adopted in this thesis takes the apraxia 
challenge to be the primary concern of the Pyrrhonian. According to this challenge the 
Pyrrhonians apparently make life impossible by suggesting that we abandon all our 
beliefs and meeting this challenge provides the criterion against which his broader 
philosophical efforts are to be judged. The idea behind the apraxia challenge is that it 
seems that to act coherently requires that we have at least some beliefs. This challenge 
is of course only effective if we suppose that the only way of making action possible is 
 Page 17  
by holding beliefs, where the concept of a belief used in this argument is a ‘thick’ 
concept.9 Naturally enough, it is to the concept of belief that the Pyrrhonians turned 
their attention. In particular, it was important to the Pyrrhonians that they establish the 
minimum conditions required for action to be possible. The essence of the Pyrrhonian 
argument is that their opponents misunderstand the structure of our actual commitments 
and so misunderstand the Pyrrhonian when he says something like ‘I have no beliefs’.10 
Hence what the Pyrrhonians try to demonstrate is that there is more than one plausible 
way of understanding the concept of belief, which is why reading Sextus is still of 
value even though contemporary epistemology does not share all of Sextus’ more 
practical concerns. In fact Sextus is of particular importance in this dissertation as the 
immediate concern here is to explain how it comes about that scepticism can be derived 
from our actual, everyday, commitments. Unsurprisingly, this is an issue to which 
Sextus gave considerable attention. While I think that Sextus’ final position on this is 
not quite right I do take him to have pointed us in the direction in which this discussion 
must be developed. 
 
The Pyrrhonian approach to the apraxia challenge results in a distinction between two 
ways of understanding what a belief is. The important distinction is found most clearly 
in those passages in which Sextus clarifies whether or not the Pyrrhonian holds beliefs 
(dogmata), especially in PH 1.13-15 and 19-20. 11 Hence we find the Pyrrhonian 
drawing the relevant distinction in the following way. 
 
‘When we say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize [i.e., hold dogmata] we are not using the term 
“dogma” as some do, in its more common meaning, “something that one merely agrees to”, for the 
Skeptic does give assent to the pathē forced upon him by his phantasia…But when we assert that he does 
                                                 
9 Note for instance that defining a belief merely as a ‘taking-as-true’ does not of itself provide any clear 
answer to why adopting a particular belief and acting in a particular way should have any specific 
relationship. 
10 Or so Sextus supposes. Many have noted the oddly ahistorical character of Sextus’ work and hence 
there must be some doubt as to whether any philosophers of Sextus’ own time (whatever that may have 
been) actually thought this. See Everard Flintoff, “Pyrrho and India,” Phronesis 25 (1980), Tsouna-
McKirahan, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School. 
11 ‘dogma’ (pl. dogmata) is conventionally translated as ‘belief’, although this can be misleading as it is 
not entirely obvious that Sextus means by dogma what we mean by belief. That these two terms can at 
times come apart is in fact indicated in PH 1.13 itself, for where Sextus distinguishes two senses, in the 
process indicating that by the Hellenistic era the terms had become semi-technical. Hence I will leave 
‘dogma’ untranslated until after Sextus arguments have been examined in greater detail. 
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not dogmatize, we use “dogma” in the sense, which others give it, of assent to one of he non-evident 
matters investigates by the sciences.’12 
 
The import of Sextus statement is that he does not accept the application of an everyday 
sense to Pyrrhonian claims regarding dogmata but does accept the Pyrrhonians being 
understood in accordance with the dominant philosophical theory of the day. Hence 
when he says that the Pyrrhonian ‘has no beliefs’ (dogmata) he must be understood as 
meaning that he has no beliefs in the sense in which his opponents understand that 
term. This is exactly what we should expect, for it is a special case of Sextus’ more 
general adherence to common practice, including linguistic practice.13  
 
While Sextus is in general keen to avoid using terms in a special sense, it turns out that 
the unusual dialectical context of the apraxia argument mandates that he temporarily 
engage in distinctly philosophical language in order to explain that he actually adheres 
to everyday practice. The special feature of Sextus’ context is that he is being accused 
of abandoning everyday practice in saying that he has no dogmata. However Sextus has 
originally made the claim that he has no dogmata in the context of a philosophical 
debate. The point of his engagement in this ongoing debate at this particular time is, 
paradoxically perhaps, to point out that Sextus wants no part of such debates.14 He 
makes this quite clear just a few paragraphs after the topic of how to deal with 
Pyrrhonian dogmata is first raised, when Sextus provides a statement on whether the 
                                                 
12 The following passage is found in Mates’ excellent translation, which makes up significant of Benson 
Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) p.127. Hereafter I shall use the abbreviation PH for the Outlines and include references to 
Book and paragraph numbers, placing the reference in the main body of the text. Hence this reference 
would appear as [PH 1.13]. While Mates’ translation is very good, unless otherwise stated reference will 
be made to the more recent and more widely used translation found in Sextus, Julia Annas, and Jonathan 
Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
13 Sextus has at this stage already explained that the Pyrrhonians does not use the term ‘ability’ in a 
technical or special sense but rather in its common everyday sense (PH 1. 9). The same looseness of 
usage applies also to the sceptical sayings (‘no more’, ‘everything is indeterminate’, ‘I have no 
apprehension’ etc). As Sextus says: 
 
Also, we do not put [sceptical sayings] forward as sharply expressing the points with which they 
have to do, but employ them imprecisely and, if you like, not strictly correctly, for it does not 
befit the Skeptic to fight about slogans, and besides it works in our favour that not even these 
slogans are said to have significance absolutely, but only relatively, that is, relative to the 
Skeptics. [PH 1. 207-208 Mates trans.] 
14 I suppose that this is roughly equivalent to walking into a casino only to announce that one opposes 
gambling. 
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Pyrrhonian adheres to any philosophical (or scientific) theories. Here he notes the 
possibility that 
 
‘…if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from our very eyes, should we 
not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgements?’ 
[PH I.20 Mates trans.] 
 
However to be taken seriously in the context of such a debate one must use the 
language appropriate to this debate.15 Yet we must always keep in mind that Sextus has 
nothing particularly invested in this debate, and we must be careful to properly interpret 
his comments when taken out of their original context.  
 
Returning now to the point at hand, and with Sextus’ statements now placed in their 
proper context, we are well placed to consider more closely why Sextus accepts some 
dogmata and not others. On the one hand this debate could be reduced to the issue of 
whether there actually is a conception of belief other than that proposed by the 
opponents of the Pyrrhonians. If there is, and if it is as the Pyrrhonians claim, then the 
Pyrrhonians have a coherent response to the apraxia challenge. 
 
This debate quickly becomes both complicated and intractable, and as a result the 
passages in Sextus relevant to this discussion are the most contested in his entire 
oeuvre. Much of this debate concerns whether or not Sextus incorporates some sort of 
insulating device into Pyrrhonian scepticism that would remove some beliefs from the 
range of his scepticism. If insulation is possible then this would show that there is a 
coherent conception of belief separate from the theoretically-laden conception favoured 
by the Pyrrhonian’s opponents. For instance some have argued that Sextus limits his 
sceptical attacks to a specific kind of belief and hence holds some beliefs that do not 
                                                 
15 That Sextus must use this language has been turned into an argument against the coherence of 
Pyrrhonism by Cahoone. See Lawrence E. Cahoone, “The Consolation of Antiphilosophy: Scepticism, 
Common Sense Pragmatism, and Rorty,” Philosophy Today 38, no. 2 (1994). Cahoone suggestion is that 
to use this language as the philosopher uses it requires that some substantive beliefs are held, which 
thereby commits the Pyrrhonian to an unacceptable dogmatism. I think this is wrong, in that the 
Pyrrhonian can temporarily occupy the mental space of a dogmatist to make a point that the dogmatist 
without thereby committing himself to the dogmatism implicit in the mental space he occupies at the 
time. To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that an actor playing the role of a murderer should be 
thrown in gaol. 
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fall into this category.16 Others have argued that Sextus leaves no room for any such 
insulating device given his description of Pyrrhonian arguments themselves.17 
 
My concern here is what Sextus’ response to the apraxia challenge teaches us about our 
natural commitments, and working out the full details of Sextus own solution is not of 
immediate relevance. Thus, I turn now to Sextus’ general treatment of the apraxia 
challenge itself, where this challenge seems to be particularly in view when Sextus 
describes the overall structure of the Pyrrhonian’s life. 
 
‘And this ordinary regimen of life is fourfold: one part has to do with the guidance of nature, another 
with the compulsion of the pathē, another with the handing down of laws and customs, and a fourth with 
instruction in the arts and crafts. Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation 
and thought; compulsion of the pathē is that by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us drink; 
the handing down of customs and laws is that by which we accept that piety in the conduct of life is good 
                                                 
16 See Gail Fine, “Sceptical Dogmata; Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13,” Methexis 13 (2000), Michael Frede, 
“The Skeptic's Beliefs,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pr, 
1987), Michael Frede, “The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of 
Knowledge,” in Essays on Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pr, 1987). Note 
however that Frede and Fine agree neither about which beliefs Sextus exempts from the range of his 
sceptical arguments nor about what constitutes a belief. Striker also concedes that Sextus allows for the 
Pyrrhonian to have beliefs of some sort, although she differs again on what beliefs these might be. See 
Gisela Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) ch.4, Gisela Striker, “Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism,” in 
Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Sinnott Armstrong, Walter (Ed) (Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2004), pp.16-20. 
Although all these authors concede that Sextus can sensibly be read as allowing the Pyrrhonian to have 
some ‘beliefs’ (or similar commitments that may not be properly be called a belief) few are wiling to 
argue that the resultant mental state would be a good state in which to exist. In fact the perceived 
unattractiveness or incoherence of following Frede’s interpretation has been a reason to reject Frede’s 
interpretation. However, some have argued that even if it is not the best way of behaving the Pyrrhonian 
mental state (as represented by Frede) is at least achievable. See R. J. Hankinson, The Sceptics, 
Arguments of the Philosophers. (London; New York: Routledge, 1995) pp.280-292, Mark L. McPherran, 
“"Ataraxia" And "Eudaimonia" In Ancient Pyrrhonism: Is the Skeptic Really Happy?,” Proceedings of 
the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1989). A slightly different tack has been taken by 
Ribeiro in arguing that while the Pyrrhonian’s goal is not psychologically achievable this does not 
amount to any general criticism of Sextus’ position as his goal out to be taken as aspirational. See Brian 
Ribeiro, “Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?,” Ancient Philosophy 22, no. 2 (2002). I take it that 
Frede comes closest to capturing the point that Sextus is trying to make, as should be obvious from the 
exposition that follows. However, like many other readers of Sextus I have significant doubts as to the 
ultimate coherence of the position Sextus favours. However the final coherence of Sextus response to the 
apraxia challenge is less important than what that response teaches us about our natural commitments. 
17 Myles Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticsm?,” in The Skepical Tradition, ed. M. F. 
Burnyeat (London: University of California Press, 1983), Myles Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in His Place and 
Time,” in Philosophy in History, ed. Richard Rorty and et al. (Cambridge Univ Pr : New York, 1984). 
Burnyeat’s argument is that Setxus’ position when taken on its own terms logically implies that all 
beliefs must be abandoned. For Sextus to claim otherwise must then be interpreted as an instance of self-
contradiction on Sextus’ part. Interestingly, Burnyeat’s interpretation allows for the possibility of 
allowing that Frede et al are right to interpret Sextus as intending to exclude some beliefs from the scope 
of his sceptical arguments but fail to recognise that Sextus’ system is incoherent if read in this way. In an 
attempt to avoid imputing a logical incoherence to Sextus, Burnyeat must read him as having no beliefs 
at all, which creates practical problems for Sextus but not logical problems. 
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and impiety bad; and instruction in the arts and crafts is that by which we are not inactive in whichever of 
these we acquire. And we say all these things without beliefs (adoxastōs).’ [PH 1.23-24 Mates trans.] 
 
First, we must assume that when Sextus says he is here speaking ‘without beliefs 
(adoxastōs)’ he is intending to speak in the special, philosophical, sense that he 
clarified at PH I.13.18 Further, we can also safely suggest that the commitments Sextus 
does accept must be capable of guiding action, else he will have no answer to the 
apraxia challenge. In addition to the minimum requirement that these commitments be 
action-guiding Sextus also needs to establish that these are different from what his 
opponents suppose. I suggest that the distinguishing feature of the commitments that 
Sextus does adopt is that they are acquired and acted upon entirely unreflectively. 
Moreover, I also suggest that on Sextus’ account were we to begin to reflect on these 
commitments we would not be able to act on them. That is, for an as yet unknown 
reason the commitments that Sextus is happy to characterise the Pyrrhonian as holding 
are hostile to reflection. In Sextus’ mind the reason for this seems to be that as soon as 
we begin to reflect on these commitments we place ourselves in a position of being able 
to ask questions such as ‘why do I hold this commitment?’, ‘what is the justification for 
this commitment?’, ‘is this commitment true or false?’ and it may well emerge that 
these questions do not have answers. Yet according to Sextus we cannot responsibly 
continue to act on a commitment until answers to such legitimate questions have been 
given. 
 
Frede expended considerable effort deriving a similar thesis from Sextus’ work, and it 
is difficult to improve on his discussion, so far as it goes. Those familiar with Frede’s 
work will recognise my obvious indebtedness to him when the topic turns to the 
interpretation of Sextus. Nonetheless I will ultimately need to diverge from Frede over 
the place of reflection in Sextus’ Pyrrhonian scepticism. At the centre of Frede’s 
exposition is the distinction between having a view and taking a position, between ‘just 
going by an impression and going by an impression because one takes it to be true.’19 
On this account having a view involves having a propositional attitude that does not 
amount to taking the propositional content towards which this attitude is directed to be 
true. Having a view does not even require that we bring the content of this view into 
                                                 
18 Note that the term adoxastōs derives from dogma, being a negated adverbial form of that term. 
19 Frede 137-138 
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explicit consideration. In particular, Frede is at pains to point out that views are 
sufficient to account for our actions, and that having a view does not require that we 
reflect on that view in any way. He says that 
 
‘[i]t might be the case that action does not, in addition to the impression that p, require a positive act of 
assent or the further thought that it is true that p. All that may be needed is one’s acquiescence in the 
impression, and all this may amount to is that in the series of impressions one has reached an impression 
which produces an action rather than the kind of disquiet which would make one go on to consider the 
matter further till one reached an impression which one no longer resists and which produces an action. 
Indeed, one may have the view that p without even entertaining the thought that p, let alone the further 
thought that p is true… An expert craftsman is still acting on his expert beliefs, even though he is not 
actually thinking of what he is doing when he is acting on them. Indeed, thinking of them might interfere 
with his activity. But having finished his work he might well explain to us which views guided his 
activity. And for some of these views it might be true that this is the first time he ever formulated them, 
either to himself or to somebody else.’20 
 
The difficulty with which Frede’s account presents us centres on the relationship 
between holding views and reflection. The moment the expert craftsman in the above 
example begins to reflect on the views he held when exercising his craft he must 
inevitably transmute those views into positions. For, as has been said above, the 
moment we make a commitment explicit in reflection we can reasonably be asked to 
provide justification for that commitment. All of a sudden we are required to state 
whether we take this commitment to be true or false, justified or unjustified. However if 
we are answering these questions then the commitment in question cannot be a view. 
Frede’s account complicates matters by allowing that views can be reflected upon 
without doing any fundamental damage to their status as views. This does not seem 
plausible. We would do better to avoid this complication by not assuming that 
reflection is innocuous when applied to views. 
 
In addition, Frede’s account takes us only a little way towards addressing the apraxia 
challenge. Suggesting that the impression that p is sufficient to account for action does 
not help if we define having the impression that p as acquiescing in the impression 
where acquiescing is explained as having an impression that produces an action. Taking 
this together, Frede has said no more than that having a view is sufficient to account for 
                                                 
20 Frere 135 
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an action because having a view is to have an impression that produces an action. 
However, saying that having an impression that produces an action is sufficient to 
account for that action tells us only that the propositional attitude involved in having a 
view is inherently motivating for action. Yet even if this is the case we have no way of 
understanding why it is the case, in that Sextus has not on this account told us why the 
propositional attitude involved in having a view is inherently motivating. As a response 
to the apraxia problem, Frede’s reading of Sextus is inadequate. What the apraxia 
argument requires is that Sextus explain why the taking of a position is not required to 
account for action. It is not enough to suggest that this may possibly be the case. In fact 
what Sextus requires, and never adequately supplies, is a more developed account of 
the structure of our commitments. 
 
The closest that Sextus comes to dealing with this inadequacy is in his discussion of 
what has come to be called the commemorative or recollective sign. In this discussion 
Sextus distinguishes between two kinds of sign, the indicative which he rejects and the 
recollective which he accepts. The indicative sign directs us from an observed 
phenomena to one which has never been observed, either because it cannot even in 
theory be observed or because of some contingent circumstance.21 The recollective sign 
differs in that it directs us from an observed phenomena to another phenomena which 
could be observed and has in the past been observed but which due to some contingent 
circumstance is not currently being observed. It is important in Sextus’ discussion of 
the recollective sign that the unobserved phenomena has always or almost always been 
observed to appear whenever the observed phenomena does.22 
 
Sextus takes it that all normal people (i.e., non-philosophers) require in their everyday 
life is the recollective sign, and that the indicative sign is at best an unnecessary 
philosophical invention, and at worst a distracting fiction. The important point for 
present purposes is that those commitments that structure or everyday activities are not 
derived through hypothesising unobserved phenomena to explain our observations. As 
we shall see, this is a consequence of the idea that the commitments that guide our 
everyday activities are not derived through a process of reflection at all. He notes that 
                                                 
21 For instance, the existence of sweat on the skin is taken to be an indicative sign of the existence of 
invisible pores in the skin through which sweat is secreted. 
22 For instance, the existence of smoke is a recollective sign for the existence of a fire, given that 
whenever smoke is observed fire has also been observed. 
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 ‘[t]here being two different kinds of signs, as we have said, we argue not against all signs but only 
against indicative signs, which seem to be a fiction of the Dogmatists. For recollective signs are found 
convincing by everyday life: seeing smoke, someone diagnoses fire; having observed a scar, he says that 
a wound was inflicted. Hence not only do we not conflict with everyday life, but we actually join the 
struggle on its side, assenting without opinion to what has been found convincing and taking a stand 
against the private fictions of the Dogmatists.’ (PH II.102 Annas and Barnes trans.) 
 
‘Hence we are not in conflict with the common preconceptions of humanity, nor are we throwing life into 
confusion, saying that nothing is a sign, as some people falsely accuse us of doing. For if we were doing 
away with every sign, perhaps we would be in conflict with life and with all humanity. But in fact we 
ourselves judge this way, assuming fire from smoke, a previous wound from a scar, death from previous 
trauma to the heart, and oil from a previous headband. Since, then, we do in fact posit the recollective 
sign, which is used in everyday life, but do away with the one falsely believed by the dogmatists, in 
addition to our not being in conflict with everyday life we actually even speak on its side…’(M 8.157-
158 Bett trans.) 
 
It should be fairly clear from the comments above that being led by a recollective sign 
to form a given commitment, for instance the commitment that there is a fire, does not 
require that the person so committed engage in the construction of any theoretical 
apparatus to explain this commitment. Indeed, reflective activity of any sort seems to be 
quite unnecessary. Commitments formed under the guidance of the recollective sign are 
most akin to conditioned responses, and note that while we might be able to provide a 
causal account of how we come to have such-and-such a conditioned response we do 
not think of conditioned responses as the kinds of things for which we could have 
reasons. In fact it is not at all obvious that reasons of any sort are relevant when we 
form commitments under the guidance of the recollective sign, at least as Sextus 
understands that process. 
 
It is also of relevance that, strictly speaking, the process that Sextus envisages as 
occurring when someone operates under the guidance of a recollective sign is not one 
of induction. It is not as if upon seeing smoke we recall that on previous occasions 
when smoke has been observed a fire has been present and hence appeal to the principle 
of induction to warrant the conclusion that a fire exists in the vicinity of the perceived 
smoke. No such recollection and appeal occur. Rather, upon perceiving smoke we 
immediately think that there is a fire. That is, according to Sextus the mental process 
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that occurs when we encounter smoke and conclude that there is a fire is the same 
process that would have occurred if we had encountered an actual fire. But this is not a 
process of induction. It is better thought of as a process of perception.23 
 
In fact being guided by a recollective sign does not require that we reflect at all, and as 
with Frede’s exposition of what distinguishes a view from a position, reflection may 
even interfere with being guided by the recollective sign. This all adds up to the 
suggestion that the Pyrrhonians take the commitments they are happy to adopt as 
coming upon them passively. They also suppose that reflection upon these 
commitments is unnecessary, and leave open the possibility that reflection in this 
context may even be hostile to these commitments playing their normal action-guiding 
role. As a result we would also expect to find that the Pyrrhonians deny any 
responsibility for these commitments and have nothing particularly invested in the 
holding of them.24  
 
Having grasped Sextus’ point in introducing the recollective sign we can say that even 
animals can be guided by a recollective sign. For instance, after experiencing the same 
feeding routine over a long period of time a dog will commonly begin salivating when 
they hear their owner place a food bowl on the ground. While we should not say that 
the dog has any beliefs as such, in the sense of having reason-sensitive propositional 
attitudes, we can say that for the dog the rattle of the food bowl functions as a 
recollective sign for the presence of food. Reserving the term ‘belief’ for humans, we 
must conclude that commitments other than belief are those to which we should appeal 
in order to account for the efficacy of the recollective sign. Thus we can at least 
conclude that the commitments with which Sextus is most directly concerned in his 
answer to the apraxia challenge, and the commitments he thinks the Pyrrhonians are 
free to hold, are not beliefs in the sense we would understand that term. This is an idea 
                                                 
23 Bailey reads the Pyrrhonian use of the recollective sign in much the same way, although note that he 
uses the terms ‘commemorative’ instead of ‘recollective’ in his discussion. One reservation one might 
have about Bailey’s discussion is the frequent use of the term ‘inference’, which can be unhelpful by 
leading to an unhelpfully intellectualised reading of the function of the recollective sign. See Alan 
Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) pp.276-279. 
24 This does not mean that they will simply be abandoned of course. As these commitments are acquired 
as a direct consequence of the natural operation of the Pyrrhonians rational faculties and without any 
active input on behalf of the Pyrrhonians it may be beyond their power to abandon them, or at least to 
abandon them permanently. For instance, the Pyrrhonian may be able to abandon the commitment that a 
fire exists only to find that a similar commitment appears the next time the Pyrrhonian encounters smoke. 
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that shall be explored throughout this dissertation, although not always with direct 
reference to Sextus. Reflection on this topic will eventually lead to the conclusion that 
common sense is partially composed of norms, although this conclusion will not be 
introduced until the end of chapter 2 and not fully explained until the end of chapter 3. 
 
 Pyrrhonism and common sense: against Broughton 
 
Why then can’t it be the case that common sense is inherently anti-sceptical? 
Answering this question actually takes a considerable amount of argumentation, much 
of which is provided in chapter 2. However, the basic reason is that Pyrrhonism is 
commonsensical. Now, this claim requires defence in at least two different ways. First, 
it must of course be explained in detail how Pyrrhonism develops from common sense. 
Second, the view that Pyrrhonism, at least historically, is not commonsensical must also 
be addressed. That is, Broughton’s analysis must be addressed, for what is said in this 
dissertation regarding the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonism is 
diametrically opposed to what Broughton has argued. 
 
Broughton’s position is that we must attribute to Descartes the philosophically 
important move of attributing to common sense a prima facie authority and then 
explicitly developing his Cartesian form of scepticism on that basis.25 In this respect 
Broughton sees a sharp distinction between Descartes and his Greek forbears over the 
authority of common sense, in that according to her reading neither school of Ancient 
scepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) showed any real interest in arguing that 
scepticism could draw some authority from common sense.26 Regarding ancient 
Academic scepticism I do not wish to contest Broughton’s conclusions. The Academics 
                                                 
25 At least, that is what Broughton argues that Descartes is attempting to do, although she also argues that 
Descartes is importantly mistaken in his characterisation of common sense. In particular Broughton 
argues that Descartes needs to attribute to his imagined man of common sense a philosophically loaded 
conception of our cognitive development that undermines our sense that we are in fact entitled to those 
commitments we come to hold in childhood. Broughton points out that the man of common sense need 
not adopt this conception, and that the dispensability of this conception undermines Descartes attempt to 
draw the man of common sense to his side. See Janet Broughton, Descartes's Method of Doubt 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) pp.22-32. 
26 Broughton also draws an interesting but not immediately relevant distinction between Descartes and 
modern philosophers in that Descartes only wants to attribute a prima facie authority to common so that 
he can ultimately undermine that authority and convert the man of common sense to his own 
philosophical position that is itself highly revisionary of common sense. Thus for Descartes, and unlike 
what we often find with modern philosophers, the prima facie authority of common sense actually 
evaporates under the pressure of philosophical reflection. See Ibid. pp.82-89. 
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were solely concerned to arguing against a particular Stoic conception of the criteria for 
knowledge which is not itself commonsensical.27 Yet in regarding ancient Pyrrhonians 
as having no real interest in common sense I believe that Broughton errs. Making this 
claim stick requires some support in the form of a lengthy engagement in the correct 
interpretation of Ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
 
 i) Sextus’ perception of his reader. 
 
Many important details of the relationship between common sense can be clarified by 
determining who the implied reader of Sextus works might be, and where Sextus wants 
to take this reader. Thus, we ought to apply the same method of analysis to Sextus that 
Broughton has applied to the analysis of Descartes. I will argue that Sextus’ implied 
reader is someone who is deeply concerned with the notion of entitlement and takes it 
that entitlement to a commitment only comes through showing that a commitment is 
clearly superior to any alternatives. The implied reader is further specified as someone 
in search of some distinctly philosophical position to which he feels entitled. The 
implied reader is also pictured as being still uncommitted to any particular 
philosophical position, despite all his inquisitive activity. This means that while the 
implied reader is clearly on the path to what Sextus would call dogmatism he is not as 
yet a dogmatist.28 Sextus’ lesson to such a reader is that they need to rediscover their 
original more commonsensical views if they are to ever find satisfaction. However, that 
Sextus envisages a return to common sense implies that he must not be as disconnected 
from common sense as Broughton supposes. In the process of demonstrating this we 
shall also have opportunity to shed some further light on the character of Pyrrhonism 
itself. 
 
However, before beginning even a moderately detailed analysis of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism 
it would be best to acknowledge a word of warning about our main source. Sextus’ 
work on Pyrrhonian scepticism has come to us in two main sources, neither of which 
                                                 
27 Ibid. pp.34-37, 81-82. 
28 Sextus has a rather stricter understanding of what makes someone a dogmatist than exists in current 
usage and so this requires some further thought. For Sextus to count as a dogmatist all one need do is 
take oneself to have a justified belief about anything at all. It need not matter that the justification 
involved be a good one, or that one has given due time to refuting all conflicting view to one’s own. As 
such dogmatism, for Sextus, does not require certainty or an unwillingness to revise one’s views. It 
requires only commitment to the justification of one’s beliefs.  
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contains any great marks indicating when or where its was written.29 The first, more 
accessible, better known and arguably more important, is the Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
(often referred to by its abbreviated Latin title PH).30 The second, less well known and 
only recently available in a good modern translation is generally known as Against the 
Professors VII-XI, referred to by its abbreviated Latin title M VII-XI.31 In general these 
texts are used interchangeably in the literature, although there is a preference for PH.32 
 
Returning to Sextus’ implied reader, we can go about determining who this might be by 
determining what questions the implied reader is asking, where this will track the 
questions that the text can most reasonably be taken as answering. It should be 
reasonably clear that one of the key questions the text answers is whether any of the 
available philosophical positions is able to gain an acceptably wide range of agreement 
over key areas of philosophical debate. Again and again and almost ad nauseam Sextus 
summarises the details of the competing positions so as to place the claims of some 
                                                 
29 Dennis K House, “The Life of Sextus Empiricus,” The Classical Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1980). This paper 
ought to be read by anyone who foolishly believes they can be certain of anything about the life of 
Sextus. In reality we know next to nothing beyond that Sextus was a doctor of the Empiric school, and 
even his allegiance has been questioned based on what Sextus has to say at PH 1.236-241. 
30 This work now exists in two good modern translations. Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus, Annas, and Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism. I shall use both translations 
throughout the dissertation as each has its own strengths and weaknesses.  
31 The first two chapters of this work, titled Against the Logicians (M VII-VIII) is now available in Sextus 
and Richard Bett, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, trans. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ Pr, 2005). The final chapter, Against the Ethicists (M XI) now exists in a good translation in Sextus 
and Richard Bett, Against the Ethicists : (Adversus Mathematicos XI), Clarendon Later Ancient 
Philosophers. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1997). The final section of 
this work, Against the Physcists, is currently only available in English in the Loeb translation Sextus and 
Robert Gregg Bury, Sextus Empiricus, Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard 
University Press; William Heinemann, 1933). 
32 Until recently it was taken that PH was the earlier work and that M represented the later more fully 
developed views of Sextus. However Bett has recently challenged this orthodox approach by arguing that 
the final chapter of Against the Professors, titled Against the Ethicists, represents an earlier and less 
rigorously sceptical form of scepticism than that found in PH and the earlier chapters of M. I side with 
Bett regarding the order in which Sextus’ surviving works were written. While Bett’s arguments are not 
conclusive they are worth taking seriously, with the result that one must be careful in using statements 
found in Against the Ethicists in support of interpretations of PH. See Richard Bett, Pyrrho, His 
Antecedents, and His Legacy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Richard Bett, “Sextus' 
against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism or Both?,” Apeiron 27 (1994). One notable point which is 
lacking in Bett’s argument is a fully developed explanation of why the differences between PH and M are 
only visible in Against the Ethicists but not in the earlier chapters of M, as Bett is aware, see Bett, 
“Sextus' against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism or Both?”, n 63. Appealing to numerous sources 
and historical development can conveniently explain this, although evidence itself is scarce in this 
particular debate. 
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former group against the contradictory claims of some latter group as evidence to show 
that neither group can present a view that is clearly superior to its alternatives.33  
 
Of course, considered in itself the lack of a clearly superior philosophical position does 
not reveal anything of interest to someone inquiring into philosophical positions. Yet all 
we need do to convert the observation that no philosophical position is clearly superior 
into something of great interest is to connect superiority with entitlement. This is not 
terribly difficult as it is in fact as widely accepted a view now and as it was in antiquity. 
To see this we can recall the story of the Senator Cato and the philosopher Carneades. 
 
It is said that the sceptical philosopher Carneades was with two other philosophers sent 
to Rome from Athens as an ambassador. While in Rome he powerfully argued, on 
successive days, both for justice and for injustice. This reportedly created such a 
commotion that the moralist Senator Cato took the extraordinary step of sending the 
ambassadors home. Why would Carneades arguments generate such a commotion and 
result in such an impolitic response on the part of Cato? The answer is that the moralist 
Cato wished always to argue in favour of justice, and was unable to so long as he was 
unable to defeat the arguments of Carnaedes in favour in injustice. Note that this does 
not provide a connection between the demonstration of superiority and mere belief. 
Cato would still have been free to merely believe that justice is better than injustice. 
What he would not have been able to do in this context is pretend that anyone else had 
to so believe. That is, Cato’s belief is robbed of normativity so long as anyone with 
whom Cato might wish to debate can help themselves to arguments which Cato cannot 
show to be inferior to his own. Put another way, Cato has no entitlement to the idea that 
justice is superior to injustice for entitlement requires at least the possibility of being 
able to present justification for this entitlement when so required. Carneades robbed 
Cato of the ability to do precisely this. Superiority creates entitlement, its absence 
removes entitlement; at least that is what the implied reader must be taken to believe.  
From this we can conclude that the implied reader ask of Sextus ‘To which is the 
                                                 
33 Superiority is understood in familiar terms of explanatory power, coherence, consistency, plausibility 
of foundational premises etc. Whether or not Pyrrhonism is contingent upon a particular dispensable 
view of rational superiority is an interesting point. It could be shown that it is so by providing a plausible 
alternate account of rationality which can ground judgements of rational superiority without generating 
Pyrrhonism.  
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available philosophical positions am I entitled on the basis of superiority?’ to which 
Sextus replies ‘None, as none can be shown to be superior to any others.’ 
 
Interestingly the notion of ‘availability’ must sometimes be understood to be 
surprisingly broad. While Sextus usually restricts his attention to the major Hellenistic 
schools (Stoics, Peripatetics, Epicureans and Platonists) at times he expands this view 
in quite unusual ways, bordering on anachronism in fact, and this tells us something 
else about our implied reader. For instance, by the Hellenistic era Cyrenaicism was 
surely a spent force and yet it still draws the attention of Sextus at the end of Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism.1 This is also true of Heracliteanism (PH 1. 210-212), Democriteanism 
(PH 1.213-214), Protagoreanism (PH 1.216-219), all of which also draw Sextus 
attention. While part of the reason Sextus would bother with such expositions is that 
these positions display some affinity with Pyrrhonism this cannot be the total 
explanation. It must also be assumed either that Sextus’ implied reader is searching for 
plausible positions from the history of philosophy or that he has some passing 
familiarity with these historical positions.34 Either way, Sextus’ implied reader cannot 
be taken to be committed to any one philosophical position or even any one kind of 
position, either contemporary or historical. 
 
So far then, we know that the implied reader is an inquisitive but philosophically 
uncommitted person who takes himself to be unentitled to any position which cannot be 
demonstrated to be superior to its alternatives. The implied reader is not one of 
Pyrrhonisms dogmatic opponents, at least not yet. This is important to note, because if 
we were to read Sextus as attempting to argue such an opponent out of his dogmatism 
his arguments would have to be taken to be unconvincing and historically ineffectual. 
 
Yet while Sextus’ implied reader is not what Sextus would call a philosophical 
dogmatist nor is the implied reader at this stage being understood to be Everyman, the 
representative of the common sense perspective. While this tells us something valuable 
about Sextus’ implied reader this characterisation is not yet sufficient. We still need to 
determine the precise relationship between Sextus’ implied reader and Everyman. 
Fortunately, further headway in this regard can be made by considering what Sextus 
                                                 
34 Another possible reason is that at least some of these historical positions provide the inspiration for 
later positions, much as Democritean atomism did for Epicureanism for instance. 
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has to say about the proto-Pyrrhonian. If Sextus intends to gain converts to Pyrrhonism 
then Sextus would presumably cast the proto-Pyrrhonian as his implied reader. Else the 
implied reader would rightly wonder how he might ever become a Pyrrhonian. Sextus 
begins has characterisation in the early passages of the Outlines, where he gives the 
following description. 
 
‘Men of talent (megalophueis), troubled by the anomaly in things and puzzled as to which of them they 
should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things are true and what false, thinking that by 
deciding these issues they would become tranquil.’ (PH 1.12. Annas and Barnes trans.) 
 
The question here is whether the qualifier megalophueis (megalophuēs) indicates some 
initial opposition to common sense uncharacteristic of Everyman. Certainly most 
people do not become particularly bothered by ‘the anomaly in things’ and it may well 
be suspected that we are here dealing with someone who has already lost their 
connection with common-sense. According to the LSJ the term megalophuēs often 
means ‘of a noble nature’ or ‘having a great genius’ which is not immediately helpful. 
More useful is that Epictetus uses the term, and while Sextus never references Epictetus 
he is concerned to engage with Stoic ideas. It may well be that Sextus’ usage is 
informed by that of Epictetus, or that they have a common source. Given the absence of 
any other help let us proceed on this supposition.35 
 
Epictetus does not attribute the characteristic of megalophuēs to the Stoic sage, which 
is itself illuminating, in that we should not assume that being a ‘man of talent’ makes 
one a philosopher, let alone a philosopher of the Stoic persuasion. In one instance it is 
applied (adverbially) to Medea’s acts of homicide.36 In another it is applied (ironically) 
to those of who love to listen to fine oratory but have no concern for living well.37 Let 
us consider Medea case first, and ask whether it must be conceived of as being totally 
opposed to common sense. I believe that it need not. Medea’s extraordinary activity is 
                                                 
35 Although we can be unsure of the exact date of Sextus life, it is possible that Sextus and Epictetus may 
have been near-contemporaries. Of course two things need to be kept in mind here. One is that Epictetus 
did not write the work we have in his name. Like Socrates and Pyrrho he wrote nothing but was 
represented in a written form by a disciple, in this case a pupil by the name of Arrian. So we may not 
have Epictetus’ usage here at all. Further, it seems that megalophuēs is not itself a technical term, and so 
there may be no ‘Stoic’ usage to speak of as such. However in this case Epictetus’ (reported) usage 
would at least be a guide to general usage and should not be discarded. 
36 Epictetus, Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments / Translated with Notes, a 
Life of Epictetus, and a View of His Philosophy, by George Long (London: George Bell and sons, 1887). 
37 Ibid. 3.23, p.266. 
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explained as flowing directly from a keen appreciation of the tragedy of her situation. 
Medea may have seen further or more clearly into the nature of tragedy than most in 
that situation, but she did not see something a normal person would not see if guided 
appropriately. After all, Medea’s situation was genuinely tragic and that is why her 
story has the enduring power that it does. With this in mind let us consider the ironic 
usage, and observe that just because it is an ironic usage there must be an implicit 
respect for the real men of talent. How then must we understand the real mean of 
talent? If the false version craves reputation then the genuine article must crave truth. I 
think that what separates the men of talent from their more ordinary cousins is that they 
care very deeply about truth, whereas ordinary people only care about truth. 
 
If these ‘men of talent’ seem to be directing their talents towards the truth this would 
explain why they are concerned to discover the superior philosophical position. Indeed 
the attribute of being megalophuēs can most sensibly be read as attributing to Sextus’ 
implied reader a greater than normal sensitivity to the demands of superiority in 
philosophical theory. That is, if two theories have equal plausibility then it is not good 
enough just to pick one for the sake of having a position. Only a position which can be 
taken to be genuinely superior will do. That explains why these ‘men of talent’ 
ultimately became puzzled regarding the unending debates about the ‘anomaly in 
things’. 
 
Note that these puzzling anomalies are not restricted to distinctly philosophical topics. 
While Sextus does engage in such philosophical topics these are not the only things he 
addressed.38 What does this tell us about the relationship between Sextus’ implied 
reader and common sense? Is Sextus’ implied reader Everyman? Does Sextus take his 
implied reader to be Everyman? The second question is of greater immediate relevance. 
I believe he does not, in that Sextus does not take it that Everyman does become 
troubled by the ‘anomaly in things’. At least, Everyman does not make this trouble the 
defining feature of his existence and organise his life around its resolution as does 
Sextus’ implied reader. Interestingly, neither does the Pyrrhonian become troubled by 
the anomaly in things and in this the Pyrrhonians and Everyman have something 
                                                 
38 Instances of such debated philosophical topics include the existence of a criterion of truth (M 7.25-
442), the nature of proof (M 8.300-478), and the reality of place (PH 3.119-134) and motion (PH 3.63-
81). Note however that Sextus penned an entire book about debates in non-philosophical professions (M. 
I-VI). 
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important in common. In fact I believe that Sextus pictures the Pyrrhonians as the 
reformed Everyman, an Everyman who has returned from the edges of philosophical 
commitment to a more commonsensical perspective. From here he is well able to 
defend the common sense perspective against the claims of philosophical dogmatism. 
This can be demonstrated by considering the ways in which Sextus’ (self-)description 
of the Pyrrhonians differs from his description of the proto-Pyrrhonians and the implied 
reader. 
 
 ii) Sextus’ perception of his own project regarding common sense 
 
There are two made points to be made here. First are Sextus’ explicit statements 
describing how the Pyrrhonian regards common sense. Second is Sextus’ account of 
inquiry, which differs markedly from that attributed to the implied reader and presents a 
serious problem with his project. 
 
a) Sextus’ explicit statements on common sense. 
 
Sextus refers to bios, roughly translated as common sense, common life (in the sense of 
conventional procedure or custom), ordinary life or even Everyman, throughout the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians. My focus here will be on the 
references from the former work. These references fall into three broad categories. First 
are the references in which Sextus claims that the Pyrrhonians follow bios without any 
explicit contrast being drawn to what the Pyrrhonians by contrast do not follow (PH 
1.17, 21-24, 226, 237, 2.15, 246). Second are those references in which Sextus does 
provide a contrast (PH 2.102, 229, 244, 254, 257, 3.2, 151, 235). In each case the 
contrast is to the claims of philosophy, and in the section on sophisms in Book 2 of the 
Outlines Sextus is particularly scathing of such claims. The final category, which is 
quite small, represents those cases in which bios  is grouped with the claims of 
philosophy rather than being contrasted with these claims (PH 1.165, 211, 3.65, 219).39 
 
                                                 
39 However beyond this small number of references one must remember that the Aenesideman Modes 
repeatedly treat what are essentially common sense observations in the same way that philosophical 
claims are treated. 
 Page 34  
The first and second categories lead to the conclusion that Sextus views the Pyrrhonian 
as being a defender of common sense against the ridiculous claims of the dogmatists. 
And indeed this is exactly what Sextus says. 
 
‘Hence, not only do we not fight against the normal course if life, but we are allied with it in that we 
assent undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing the peculiar creations of the Dogmatists.’ 
(PH 2.102. Mates trans.)40 
 
As a result of this claim and others like it, in addition to the frequent distinction Sextus 
draws between philosophy and common sense, I take it that we must interpret Sextus as 
genuinely meaning his claim to be a defender of common sense (bios). The only other 
way of reading Sextus would be as intentionally deceptive, and that is unacceptable. 
 
However if Sextus is genuine about being a defender of common sense this raises 
difficulties about how to understand the third category of statements concerning 
common sense. In these statements Sextus treats common sense in the same way in 
which he treats the claims of philosophy. In particular he is concerned to demonstrate 
that both common sense and philosophy are subject to internal contradiction and lead to 
irresolvable difficulties as they stand. Introducing the Mode of Dispute (one of the 
Modes of Agrippa which seems to draw upon observations from the Modes of 
Anesidmus) Sextus says the following. 
 
‘According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter 
proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able 
to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement.’ (PH 1.165. Annas and 
Barnes trans., emphasis mine) 
 
The difficulty is that we already know that Sextus has placed a primacy on the 
achievement of tranquillity (ataraxia), and it is difficult to see how he could truly be 
supportive of common sense if it is subject to precisely the kinds of difficulties the 
Pyrrhonian explicitly tries to avoid. Indeed, Bailey is quite right to observe that while 
the common sense perspective is devoid of trouble and debate over the theoretical 
issues with which philosophers are concerned it is still riddled with troubles of a more 
                                                 
40 See also PH 2.246 and M 8.158 for similar statements. 
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practical kind. As a result the common sense perspective can hardly be considered to be 
a tranquil one.41 Why then would Sextus cast himself as a defender of a perspective that 
lacks that criterion that he finds most important? 
 
If the Pyrrhonian really means his claim to be supporting common sense then this claim 
can only be taken as saying more than it seems. I suggest that there are two plausible 
ways of reading Sextus at this point. First, Sextus’ intention could be understood as 
defending some reconstructed and corrected form of common sense. Second, Sextus 
could understand common sense (bios) as only rarely existing in a pure form. This view 
would then be that in practice common sense exists in a form that is sullied by 
philosophical commitments that go well beyond what is required for everyday life. It is 
this second view that I will defend. That Sextus takes such a view of common sense can 
be shown be examining closely those places in which he is most clearly supportive of 
common sense and placing them against those (few) passages in which Sextus takes a 
more critical stance towards common sense. The question will be to determine what 
feature is evident in the former set and lacking in the latter set. Here I limit my 
comments to those passages in which Sextus explicitly discusses common sense (bios), 
although I believe that the same conclusion would be reached through an extended 
analysis. 
 
Those passages in which Sextus is most clearly positive of common sense are: PH 
2.102, 244, 254 and 3.235. In each passage Sextus recommends adherence to common 
sense (bios) in unambiguous terms and claims that the Pyrrhonian himself follows this 
recommendation. In each case a sharp contrast to what Sextus in one place calls the 
‘fictions of the dogmatists’ is made. By ‘fictions of the dogmatists’ Sextus seems to 
mean concepts invented by philosophers purely to resolve problems created by their 
own theories but are unnecessary to the concerns of those that don’t accept (or are even 
aware of) these theories. That is, the fictions with which Sextus are concerned are 
distinctions purely internal to philosophical theory. Noting this allows us to say that the 
feature of common sense (bios) of which Sextus is most approving is that it is free of 
                                                 
41 Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism p.212. 
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distinctions that are internal to philosophy, which is to say that it is free of 
philosophical theory itself.42 
 
Keeping this in mind, if we look to passages at which Sextus unambiguously opposes 
common sense we only find two instances, one of which is in fact difficult to 
understand. Turning first to the clearer passage we find Sextus noting that common 
sense (bios) involves the acceptance of all manner of religious superstitions, with 
special reference made to the religious opinions of Egypt (PH 3.219). How are we to 
understand this? I suggest that we understand this as common sense falling prey to an 
essentially philosophical (or in this case religious – which for Sextus is cut from the 
same cloth) set of ideas. A few further points are also relevant here. The broader section 
in which Sextus appeals to common life is devoted to variety in broadly religious views 
and here we see the whole idea of a ‘common’ sense begins to break down such is the 
incredible variety of positions that normal people actually hold under the influence to 
particular religious ideologies. It is reasonable to suppose from this that Sextus 
supposed that philosophical imposition on common sense is destructive to common 
sense by undermining its universality. 
 
The only other passage in which Sextus takes an explicitly critical attitude to common 
sense is PH 3.65. Here Sextus is critical of common sense because he perceives it to be 
too dogmatic in granting that motion exists despite (apparently) strong philosophical 
arguments against the possibility of motion. First, this seems a very forced statement 
from Sextus, and is inconsistent with other statements he makes. At PH 2.244 for 
instance Sextus is scathing of those philosophers who would deny motion and 
seemingly supportive of more commonsensical views that accept motion to be real. 
Second, at PH 3.151 Sextus is not critical of common sense regarding the existence of 
numbers despite the philosophical and dialectic context being virtually identical to that 
of PH 3.65. For these reasons I believe that PH 3.65 can be disregarded as an anomaly. 
 
Thus the conclusion we must reach is that Sextus defends common sense where it is 
devoid of philosophical commitment and critical of it where it breaks down into a 
disguised form of philosophical commitment. This suggests that common sense cannot 
                                                 
42 Note that the one passage in which the place of distinctions in common sense attains a prominent place 
(PH 2.257) is where these distinctions are of significant practical value, even practical necessity.  
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for Sextus be defined as what any one normal person adheres to, for especially in 
religious (and also ethical) matters this will include large sections of philosophical 
commitment. Common sense, to be truly commonsensical, must be truly common and 
so for Sextus, given the dizzying variety of available philosophical positions, must be 
truly free of philosophical commitment. What counts as common sense for Sextus then 
is only that which is strictly necessary for everyday life, which he supposes does not 
include any philosophical theory. Thus Sextus trades on a sharp 
commonsensical/philosophical distinction that the implied reader is in danger of 
violating, and this must be considered to be a central distinction between the implied 
reader and the Pyrrhonian. Thus for the implied reader to become a Pyrrhonian he must 
presumably come to recognise, or perhaps remember, a sharp 
commonsensical/philosophical distinction.  
 
b) Sextus’ account of inquiry 
 
The second important distinction between the Pyrrhonian and Sextus’ implied reader 
concerns the motivation of inquiry. We have already established that the implied reader 
inquires because he wishes to discover the superior philosophical position, where this 
can only be understood as being a pursuit after the truth. Yet this motivation must be 
unacceptable for the Pyrrhonian as it implies an unacceptable dogmatism regarding the 
place held by true beliefs. In fact Sextus goes so far in his avoidance of being 
committed to any theories that he seems to make any form of inquiry genuinely 
impossible. For instance we have the following odd passage. 
 
‘For example, when someone propounds to us an argument we cannot refute, we say to him: ‘Before the 
founder of the school to which you adhere was born, the argument of the school, which is no doubt 
sound, was not yet apparent, although it is really there in nature. In the same way, it is possible that the 
argument opposing the one you have just propounded is really there is nature but is not yet apparent to 
us; so we should not yet assent to what is now thought to be a powerful argument’.’ (PH 1.33-34, Annas 
and Barnes trans.)43 
 
                                                 
43 John A. Palmer, “Skeptical Investigation,” Ancient Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2000), Gisela Striker, 
“Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy,” Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie 83, no. 2 (2001). Both 
these papers make explicit appeal to this unusual argument to support the conclusion that Sextus cannot 
be understood as genuinely inquiring. 
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If no theory will ever satisfy, what then would motivate one to continue to inquire? 
Despite obvious problems here Sextus chooses to make inquiry the defining mark of the 
Pyrrhonian in the opening sentences of the Outlines. How can this be explained? 
 
Beginning with the motivation of Pyrrhonian inquiry, our starting point is the following 
passage in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 
 
‘These everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by 
feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. By nature’s guidance we 
are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking.’ (PH 1.23-24 Annas and Barnes trans.) 
 
Of particular interest here is the claim that we are naturally capable of perceiving and 
thinking. If humans are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking they would be 
naturally capable of inquiry. After all inquiry is nothing but a mode of thinking, in this 
case a mode directed towards discovery.44 Of course a capability for inquiry does not 
explain a motivation to put that capacity to use. It does however provide a hint that the 
motivation should also be sought in some appeal to those activities towards which 
humans are ‘naturally’ inclined. So the question then becomes; is there a natural 
inclination to inquire? If there is, then of the four categories Sextus lists above it is most 
likely to be found in the necessitation of feeling (pathē). 
 
Further useful suggestions concerning inquiry are found in Frede’s comments on the 
Methodic school of medicine, summarised below. 
 
‘Soranus also tells us both of anatomy and physiology that, though they are useless, one should take 
account of them ‘pros chrestomathein’ (Gyn. 4, 6ff.; 6, 6ff. 1 1b.). This suggest that knowledge of these 
theories satisfies learned curiosity, is, as it were, an amenity of life, a decorative ornament of the 
educated person.’45 
 
If Frede is right about the Methodic school of medicine’s view of the place of inquiry 
as satisfying learned curiosity, then we can draw from this the idea that it is this same 
                                                 
44 If we take this idea seriously then we must also suppose that the Pyrrhonian does indeed have some 
beliefs, and this is indeed the view of Pyrrhonism taken here. 
45 Michael Frede, “The Method of the So-Called Methodical School of Medicine,” in Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
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learned curiosity which at least in part motivates engagement in the construction of 
theory and hence inquiry more generally. However, for this suggestion to be of any 
great use a connection between Methodism and Pyrrhonism needs to be traced. 
Fortunately, Sextus has helpful things to say at this point, for when discussing the 
relationship between the Pyrrhonians and the Methodic school he seems favourably 
inclined to the stance towards theory taken by the Methodics, and especially because of 
their reliance on the pathē. Comparing Pyrrhonism to the Empiric and Methodic 
schools Sextus clearly comes down on the side of the Methodics in the passage below. 
 
‘He might better adopt the so-called Method, it seems to me, for it alone of the medical systems seems 
not to make precipitate assertions about non-evident things by self-assuredly telling us whether they are 
apprehensible or not apprehensible; and following the appearances, it takes from them what seems 
beneficial, in accord with the Skeptic practice.’ (PH 1.236-237, Mates trans.) 
 
True, Sextus’ primary concern in this excerpt is to affirm not the Methodic view of 
theory as such but rather the Methodic unwillingness to make statements about non-
evident matters. Yet the passage in question, I addition to the following passage, does 
affirm Methodic practice in so far as it derives from the necessitation of the pathē. 
 
‘And so in sum –in order not to depart from the outline form by taking up each point individually – I 
consider all the things thus said by the Methodics can be classed as instances of the compulsion of the 
pathē, whether these pathē are natural or unnatural.’ (PH 1.239 Mates trans.) 
 
Putting together Frede’s suggestion with the idea that the Methodics (at least often) 
base their practice solely around the pathē leads to the interesting thought that curiosity 
moving one to the construction of entertaining theories could be taken to be a pathē-
driven practice. Thus Sextus may here have in mind to also affirm the practice of theory 
construction and inquiry more generally just to the extent that it is genuinely pathē-
driven.46 
                                                 
46 This conclusion has implications for how we ought to read Sextus statements at PH 1.19-20. Here 
Sextus makes the following claim. 
‘When we investigate whether existing things are such as they appear, we grant that they 
appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about the apparent – 
and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. For example, it appears to us that 
honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a perceptual way), but 
whether (as far as the argument goes) it is actually sweet is something we investigate – and this 
is not what is apparent but something said about what is apparent.’ 
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 The moral of the story then is that inquiry can be motivated for an individual if their 
reasoning faculties are so structured as to provide them with an agreeable feeling when 
they do inquire. Inquiry then is motivated then in exactly the same way that eating is 
motivated, except that the motivation is far more moderate than hunger. In this story no 
belief in the worthiness of truth as a goal of inquiry is mentioned. In fact no beliefs are 
mentioned at all, in the same way that we might explain why a dog eats his food by 
mentioning the dogs instincts but not his ‘beliefs’ because a dog has no beliefs as such. 
So the Pyrrhonian can inquiry after all, whenever he is naturally motivated to inquire.47 
 
The distinction between the way the Pyrrhonian goes about his inquiries and the way 
Sextus’ implied readers go about their inquiry is clearly quite different. However the 
real question is whether the implied reader could be converted to this account of inquiry 
and simultaneously take himself to be adhering to common sense against philosophy as 
that distinction was described in the previous section. Yet surely taking inquiry to be 
motivated by pleasure is a piece of complex philosophical theorising and not 
representative of common sense. This is a genuine problem for Sextus, although the 
presence of this problem can be taken as reinforcing the idea that Sextus sees himself as 
commonsensical. The simplest way of avoiding this problem would be to withdraw the 
claim that the Pyrrhonian inquiries in a commonsensical sort of way, and this is 
something that Sextus does clearly not say. The only way to account for this is to say 
that it was very important to the Pyrrhonians that they be seen to be genuine defenders 
                                                                                                                                              
Despite this passage leaving us with the general impression that Sextus focuses his particular attention on 
theoretical accounts of experience (‘what might be said about the apparent’) this cannot be Sextus 
intention, in that at times Sextus allows for theoretical constructions of just this sort. Thus the real focus 
on Sextus attention must in fact be the defence of such constructions as anything other than an innocent 
pastime. Such theoretical accounts, while entertaining, are not to be taken as a serious attempt to account 
for experience or get at the ‘true nature of reality’ or some such. However since even taking such theories 
as true would commit one to conclusions further commitments regarding the ‘true nature of reality’ we 
must also conclude that Sextus must not even go as far as taking those theories he finds entertaining to be 
true, which is to say that Sextus must not believe these theories. Sextus’ point in PH1.19-20 would then 
have to be taken to be that we ought not commit ourselves to the truth of any of our theories, not that we 
ought not hold such theories absolutely. If is possible to be committed to a theory without this 
commitment amounting to belief, and I think both that it is and that Sextus’ account of entertaining 
theories shows us how it is, then presumably Sextus would be happy with such a commitment. 
47 Harald Thorsrud takes a rather different view of Pyrrhonian inquiry than that taken above, attributing 
to Sextus a view in which Pyrrhonian inquiry plays only a negative function in preventing them from 
coming to believe that the examined life – in the Socratic sense – is a good life. On this reading even 
inquiring for the pleasure this brings would be at best a dangerous use of the Pyrrhonian’s time. See 
Harald Thorsrud, “Is the Examined Life Worth Living? A Pyrrhonian Alternative,” Apeiron 36, no. 3 
(2003). 
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of common sense, so important that it would ultimately lead Sextus to say something 
quite uncommonsensical. 
 
 iii) The commonsensical response to philosophical theory 
 
The third and final set of observations to which we might appeal to reinforce the claim 
that Sextus established himself as a defender of common sense comes in the way he 
characterises the response we ought to make to some of the more counter-intuitive 
claims made by philosophers. This characterisation creates a sharp distinction between 
common sense and philosophy, and Sextus clearly comes down on the side of common 
sense. The relevant distinction emerges in Sextus’ discussion of the way we ought to 
respond to sophisms, and in this discussion the role of the philosopher (or more 
correctly the logician/epistemologist) is played by the dialectician. However before 
moving directly to this point we need to understand what Sextus means by dialectic and 
sophisms. Sextus defines a sophism in the following way. 
 
‘They say that a sophism is a plausible and treacherous argument leading one to accept the consequence 
which is either false or similar to something false or unclear or in some other way unacceptable.’         
[PH II.229] 
 
At this point we may well wonder what the distinction between a sophistic argument 
and a sound argument really amounts to. The answer, according to Sextus, is that a 
sophistic argument is unacceptable for one reason or another, where this acceptability 
or otherwise cannot be couched in terms of plausibility, for even a sophistic argument 
can be plausible. Dialectic would then have to be the science by which we determine 
whether an argument is acceptable, regardless of its plausibility. That is, dialectic is that 
process in which we apply the laws of logic to arguments, accepting only those 
arguments that adhere to these laws. Interestingly though, this is not exactly what 
Sextus says, for he defines dialectic in terms of truth rather than conformity to the laws 
of logic as we see below. 
 
‘For, they say, if dialectic is the science which distinguished between true and false arguments, then 
dialectic will be capable of discriminating these things which sully the truth with apparent plausibility. 
That is why dialecticians, as though coming to the aid of tottering common sense, earnestly try to teach 
us the concept and the varieties and the resolutions of sophisms.’ [PH II.229] 
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 The reason Sextus would define dialectic in this way can be understood if we suppose 
that Sextus takes the dialecticians (with whom he disagrees) to presume a connection 
between truth and the laws of logic. Given such a connection dialectic would provide a 
method of determining truth. What this does not explain however is why the 
dialecticians would go about this task so earnestly. That is, why do the dialecticians 
engage in dialectic at all? The answer must be that the dialecticians must think that our 
everyday commitments are in need of their support, that they are ‘tottering’. But why 
do they suppose that common sense is ‘tottering’ in the first place? 
 
This question becomes more pressing when we observe that at least according to Sextus 
(and in keeping with his exposition of the place of the recollective sign in everyday life) 
normal people do not engage in dialectic in this way. In fact normal people make fun of 
the dialecticians for speaking as they do. Indeed, speaking on behalf of all ‘normal’ 
people Sextus likens the dialecticians to conjurors48, suggests that the babble like 
children49 and accuses them of unjustifiably accepting absurdities in the name of 
logical consistency.50 Most entertainingly he also tells the following story. 
                                                
 
‘A witty anecdote is told about Herophilus the doctor. He was a contemporary of Diodorus, who 
vulgarised dialectic and used to run through sophistical arguments on many topics including motion. 
Now one day Diodorus dislocated his shoulder and went to Herophilus to be treated. Herophilus wittily 
said to him: “Your shoulder was dislocated either in a place in which it was or in a place in which it 
wasn’t. But neither in which it was nor in which it wasn’t. Therefore it is not dislocated.” So the sophist 
begged him to leave such arguments alone and to apply the medical treatment suitable to his case.’      
[PH II.245] 
 
Finally, after they have had their fun by making a joke of the dialecticians, Sextus 
describes ordinary people as proceeding to ignore all the arguments brought forward by 
the dialecticians without making any attempt to show why ignoring these arguments is 
warranted. 
 
‘Having accumulated rubbish of this sort [i.e., various sophisms], he [i.e., the dialectician] frowns and 
takes out his dialectic and solemnly tries to establish for us by deductive proofs that some things come 
 
48 PH II. 250 
49 PH II. 251 
50 PH II. 252 
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into being, and that some things move, and that snow is white, and that we do not have horns …And 
ordinary men set out on journeys by land and sea, and construct ships and houses, and produce children, 
without paying any attention to the arguments against motion and coming into being.’ (PH II.244 Annas 
and Barnes trans.) 
 
Observe that the idea that common sense is ‘tottering’ is introduced in the context of 
defining the nature of dialectic, and in particular the role played by the concept of truth 
in dialectic. Yet according to Sextus, even if there is some connection between truth 
and logical laws (and Sextus does not concede that there is, rather foolishly) dialectic is 
not capable of resolving any practical issues arising from sophistic arguments. So for 
instance we have the following sequence. 
 
‘Thus – to recall one or two examples – suppose the following sophism is propounded by a doctor: 
 
 In diseases a varied diet and wine are to be recommended at the abatement 
 But in every type of disease, abatement usually occurs before the first third day. 
 Therefore, it is necessary that a varied diet and wine be usually taken before the first third day. 
 
A dialectician would have nothing to say towards the resolution of this argument, useful though one 
would be; but a doctor will resolve the sophism. For he knows that there are two sorts of abatement…’ 
[PH II. 237-238] 
 
If dialectic can resolve anything (and Sextus is not convinced that it can) then it can 
only resolve theoretical issues and not practical ones. However ‘normal’ people seem to 
show no interest in theoretical issues of the sort examined by the dialectician. 
Remember that according to Sextus, when normal people are presented with sophistic 
arguments they simply continue about their lives and even make fun of the dialecticians 
for concerning themselves with such arguments.51 
 
However it cannot be the attempt to resolve sophisms itself which draws such a 
negative response from normal people, for doctors can and do resolve some sophisms 
without drawing such a response. The feature of the dialectician’s practice that draws 
such a negative response must be that he engages with certain sorts of sophisms. In 
particular the dialectician engages in sophisms in which the conclusion is, from the 
                                                 
51 In fact the case of Herophilus demonstrates that if anyone is going to have practical problems with 
enacting their view then it will be the dialectician, not the man of common sense. 
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point of view of the ‘normal’ person, obviously false. So for instance Sextus provides 
the following example. 
 
‘If anything moves, it moves either in a place in which it is or in a place in which it is not. 
But neither in a place in which it is (for there it is at rest) nor in a place in which it is not (for 
how could it do anything in a place in which it simply is not?). 
 Therefore, it is not the case that anything moves.’ 
 
That is to say, the dialectician attempts to resolve arguments in which the conclusion is 
commonsensically false. But just because the conclusion for this argument is 
commonsensically false there is no need to resolve this argument. This would explain 
why, from the perspective of the Pyrrhonian, the dialectician is taking on unnecessary 
tasks – common sense is really not tottering. It would also explain why Sextus 
explicitly says that the dialectical resolution of sophisms is useless.52 After all, the 
dialectician for all his effort has not told us anything that we did not already know, or at 
least so Sextus would have us believe. Of course what Sextus has missed is that the 
dialectician could reveal not just that the conclusion is false (which we already knew) 
but also why the arguments leading to the false conclusion is a genuine sophism (which 
we did not know). 
 
We can cast the disagreement between the dialectician and the Pyrrhonian’s 
commonsensical person as a debate over the necessity of knowing that you know for 
knowing at all. The following argument seems to lay behind the thought process of the 
dialectician as presented by Sextus. 
 
1) S knows that the proposition p ‘that some objects move’ is true (by hypothesis) 
2) If S knows that p then S knows that not-p is false 
3) But S does not know that not-p is false 
4) So, contrary to the original hypothesis, S does not know that some objects move 
 
Obviously this argument turns on premise 3, so we must ask what reason the 
dialectician would have to accept this premise. Given the dialectician’s interest in 
arguments with conclusions that are commonsensically taken to be false we need not 
                                                 
52 PH II. 236 
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look too far for an answer. It makes sense to suppose that the dialectician implicitly 
assumes that knowledge is incompatible with being presented with apparently sound 
argument that one is unable to defeat.53 That is, the dialectician takes it that claiming 
knowledge requires being able to provide an account of how that knowledge was 
obtained.54 Put another way, knowledge requires entitlement, and in this respect it is 
not enough to appeal to the apparently obvious truth of the conclusion under 
consideration. To do so is mere question-begging dogmatism as it is precisely the truth 
of this conclusion that is under consideration. Given such background commitments 
dialectic becomes important because it can be taken to provide the foundation for the 
kind of account that would confer warrant. 
                                                
 
The real debate between Sextus and the dialectician might then be over the requirement 
that one know that one knows in order to know, although this would be an 
overstatement. More exactly, the debate is over whether or not we need to know that we 
know when we are concerned with knowledge of common sense. Sextus could take it 
that the dialectician is wrong to suppose that we are under any such requirement 
regarding common sense. This would at least explain some of the oddness of ridiculing 
one’s opponents when they present arguments to the effect that one lacks knowledge.55 
 
 
53 Granting for the purpose of the argument that the dialectician grants that this particular version of 
Zeno’s paradox appears to be sound. Of course it is not sound, but that is another matter which is not 
immediately relevant here. 
54 Such a requirement was hardly anything new in the Hellenistic period, as this very requirement had 
been the focus of Plato’s Theaetetus. 
55 It is interesting that one finds this same response of ridicule in both Reid and Wittgenstein, and perhaps 
for the same basic reason in each case. Reid at least seems to think we have an entitlement to common 
sense that trumps any arguments to the contrary and does not require any arguments in its support. So for 
instance we find Reid saying 
 
‘Secondly, we may observe that opinions which contradict first principles, are distinguished, 
from other errors, by this:- that they are not only false but absurd; and, to discountenance 
absurdity, Nature hath given us a particular emotion – to wit – that of ridicule, – which seems 
intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or 
practice. This weapon, when properly applied, cuts with as keen an edge as argument.’ EIP VI. 
iv. p. 438b. 
Wittgenstein makes a similar looking statement, although his conception of the relationship between 
common sense and reasons is somewhat more subtle than that we often find in Reid. So for instance we 
find Wittgenstein saying 
‘One might simply say “O, rubbish!” to someone who wanted to make objections to the 
propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not to reply to him but to admonish him. [OC 495] 
‘The queer thing is that even though I find it quite correct for someone to say “Rubbish!” and so 
brush aside an attempt to confuse him with doubts at bedrock, - nevertheless, I hold it to be 
incorrect if he seeks to defend himself (using, for e.g. the words “I know”).’ [OC 498] 
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Regardless of the coherence of Sextus conception of the relationship between logic and 
truth and what that reveals about the requirements under which we place ourselves 
when we lay claim to common sense it is clear that Sextus is here coming down on the 
side of common sense against philosophy. The reason for this is as yet unclear, and has 
something to do with an apparently unusual relationship that holds between common 
sense and reasons. In chapter 3 I shall return explicitly to what Sextus might have had 
in mind here and argue that Sextus supposes that common sense is constituted by 
practices to which we have no real entitlement beyond a pragmatic one. It is ultimately 
this idea that we have no entitlement to common sense and yet cannot provide 
ourselves with an entitlement through the provision of reasons that presents Sextus 
position from changing from a genuine scepticism to a form of dogmatism. 
 
 The Pyrrhonian project 
 
What then does this have to do with common sense and Broughton’s reading of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism? Broughton takes the Pyrrhonians, represented in the writings of 
Sextus Empiricus, to be largely unconcerned with common sense and hence certainly 
not be concerned to attribute to common sense any prima facie authority. Such a 
reading must be wrong, for we have seen in Sextus’ perception of his own project that 
he casts himself as a defender and advocate of common sense.56 The point of arguing 
that the Pyrrhonian is a defender of common sense is that it takes one directly to the 
claim that common sense is inherently sceptical. I take it that the essence of the 
Pyrrhonian project is to make good this very claim; that common sense is inherently 
sceptical. This is to be done by focusing on our everyday practices and explaining that 
following these practices leads us into scepticism. Of course, carrying this project 
through requires that at least some effort is made towards clarifying exactly what 
common sense is. 
 
                                                 
56 Of course Sextus does not always defend the views of ordinary people on all topics for in distinctly 
religious and ethical settings Sextus quite clearly does not do this. See for instance PH 1.145-163 and PH 
3.200-237. However what Sextus does do is defend common sense in those instances where a clear 
distinction is to be drawn between common sense and philosophy (where philosophy is broadly 
conceived of to include religion). In those cases where no distinction can be maintained then common 
sense comes in for the same criticism as does philosophy. What Sextus is really defending then is not the 
views of the masses as they actually exist but those views as they would exist if the influence of 
philosophy (broadly construed to include religion) could be removed. 
 Page 47  
What makes the Pyrrhonian project a distinctly sceptical one as opposed to a 
conventional non-sceptical project in analytic epistemology is twofold. First, whenever 
serious investigations into the structure of common sense are carried out common sense 
turns out to be inherently sceptical. Second, that when this conclusion is reached no 
revision of our every practices or our conception of common sense is called for. 
Pyrrhonism does not take the emergence of scepticism from within a commonsense 
perspective to be a negative or unwanted conclusion. Hence this conclusion does not 
warrant either a wide-ranging revision of our everyday practices or an ongoing 
investigation to show why the emergence of scepticism from within a commonsensical 
perspective must represent some misunderstanding of the real character of common 
sense. 
 
Nonetheless, there is indeed something ‘fishy’ about Pyrrhonian scepticism conceived 
of as common sense scepticism in that by-and-large someone guided by a 
commonsensical perspective is not sceptical about anything much. Such a one certainly 
doesn’t display anything like the character of Descartes’ meditator at the introduction 
of the Second Meditation. It seems that if we accept the legitimacy of the investigative 
process that leads to the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism then we would be unable 
to really understand common sense at all. Common sense is supposed to provide us 
with some grasp of the character of the world, developed through collaborative effort 
and honed over centuries. How can it turn out that following common sense could lead 
us to feel that we have lost our grasp on the world? That is, if the Pyrrhonian program 
can be carried through to completion then it creates problems not just for our supposed 
knowledge of the world; it also poses insuperable difficulties for our understanding of 
ourselves. 
 
In summary then, what does the Pyrrhonian program aim to establish and what is 
required to carry it through? The Pyrrhonian program aims to establish that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is commonsensical and that common sense is inherently sceptical. 
Pyrrhonism is commonsensical in that entirely commonsensical ways of conducting our 
enquiries can lead us, in certain unusual but not fanciful situations, to withdraw any 
claim to be entitled to what we in other circumstances would claim to 
commonsensically know. That is, if we operate from within a commonsensical 
perspective then no unambiguous affirmative answer can be given to the question ‘Are 
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we entitled to our common sense commitments?’ For if we are entitled to those articles 
of knowledge to which we commonsensically take ourselves to have an entitlement 
then we are also entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism, which includes scepticism directed 
towards what we commonsensically take ourselves to know. If we deny our entitlement 
to Pyrrhonian scepticism then we must also deny our entitlement to common sense. The 
Pyrrhonian program is thus to present a dilemma for anyone who would claim 
entitlement commonsensically to know anything. 
 
What is required to carry this program through? First, an account of how Pyrrhonian 
scepticism develops from inquiries carried out commonsensically into topics that we 
commonsensically recognise as being important. This account must be sufficiently 
detailed that a plausible defence can be made for the contention that it does indeed 
accurately capture our commonsensical ways of conducting our inquiries. Sextus is of 
little help in developing such an account, as we have seen above (chapter 2). Second, 
this account must lead to the conclusion that if we are entitled to common sense then 
we are also entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism (chapter 2). Third, this account of the 
development of common sense scepticism must explain not just for our entitlement to 
common sense and scepticism, it must also explain our sense of entitlement to common 
sense and scepticism. We need to account for both the epistemological and 
psychological aspects of the relationship between common sense and scepticism. Here 
it must be recognised that we largely do feel that we are entitled to common sense 
which I take it is why the whole idea of common sense scepticism seems ‘fishy’, 
without warrant I might hasten to add. Fourth and finally, we must provide a fairly 
detailed account of those aspects of common sense that are responsible for the 
emergence of scepticism which explains why it is that the possibility of common sense 
scepticism often goes ignored (chapter 3). 
 
Why is CSN given such a prominent position in carrying this program through? There 
are in fact several reasons for this. First, CSN implicitly challenges the contention that 
if we are entitled to common sense then we are also entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism. It 
does this by appealing to our entitlement as part of a broader anti-sceptical strategy that 
takes us to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, Pyrrhonian scepticism is 
concerned with claims to entitlement, not rational justification as such. As such, 
Pyrrhonian scepticism allows that there may be a means of guaranteeing our 
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entitlement to a given commitment other than by providing rational justification for that 
commitment. CSN claims that indeed there are such means to provide entitlement, and 
as Pyrrhonism is sensitive to this claim it is a claim that must be addressed. Addressing 
this claim requires more than just showing that CSN doesn’t guarantee that our 
entitlement to common sense is rationally justified. Third, in addition to the 
epistemological point that we have an entitlement to common sense, CSN also takes it 
that we are psychologically compelled to take ourselves to have such an entitlement. 
Further, lacking or being immune to this psychological compulsion is taken to be a sign 
of the breakdown of rationality, which means that according to CSN, Pyrrhonian 
scepticism can never be rational. For these three reasons CSN presents a challenge to 
both the epistemological and psychological prongs of the Pyrrhonian program in such a 
way that the Pyrrhonian is forced to respond and thus CSN needs to addressed. 
Interestingly, it will be shown that when the character of common sense has been 
established then the supporter of CSN ought also to support Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
That is, Pyrrhonian scepticism can be generated while appealing only to principles that 
a defender of CSN would accept. 
 
 Outline of the chapters 
 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is devoted to developing a fairly clear understanding of 
the central claims of Common Sense Naturalism, and also the problems that face it in 
terms of tensions within its own theory. The focus of the exegesis of Common Sense 
Naturalism will be on explaining why it is that it is anti-sceptical, why it gives priority 
to common sense and what arguments are used to support it. In the course of this 
exegesis it will be shown that there have historically been two separate arguments 
brought forward in support the claim that we are entitled to common sense, neither of 
which can simply be reduced to the claim that this entitlement is rationally justified. 
According to one argument our acceptance of some beliefs is natural, having what is 
essentially a psychological ground. According to the other argument our acceptance of 
some beliefs is required if reason is to find the proper context for its application, which 
essentially presents us with a transcendental justification for these beliefs. The main 
figures from whom inspiration is taken when developing this account of Common 
Sense Naturalism are Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, Thomas Reid, the later Ludwig 
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Wittgenstein and P.F.Strawson. In each of these thinkers engages with Common Sense 
Naturalism, some in support, some in opposition. 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation addressed the claim that common sense inquiry can in 
certain circumstances lead us to Pyrrhonian scepticism. Hence, if we are entitled to 
common sense, including common sense ways of conducting our inquiries, then we are 
also entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In carrying through this part of the Pyrrhonian 
program we need to move considerably beyond the account of inquiry provided by 
Sextus Empiricus. As we have pointed out above this account faces significant 
difficulties over the place of the pursuit of truth in guiding inquiry. However inspiration 
can be drawn from Robert Fogelin’s Neo-Pyrrhonian scepticism in developing this 
account, although chapter 2 extends his comments on this topic. Crucial to the 
argument of chapter 2 is the idea that respecting common sense must include respecting 
certain norms of inquiry. The argument of chapter 2 shows that once we clarify these 
norms it is quite easy to see how radical Pyrrhonian scepticism could develop. If 
chapter 2 is successful then it shows a clear need to reconsider how we understand 
common sense, in that the claim of Common Sense Naturalism that common sense is 
hostile to radical scepticism does not appear to be sustainable. In particular, the analysis 
of chapter 2 introduces the notion that whether common sense leads us to scepticism 
depends on the context in which we apply common sense. However the best way of 
understanding the resulting perspectivism remains unclear. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses why, if we are entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism as chapter 2 
suggests, we often (but importantly not always) feel ourselves to have an entitlement to 
common sense that excludes Pyrrhonian scepticism. The resolution of this puzzle lies in 
the fact that what we take to be commonsensical varies over time. So at some times we 
take it to be just commonsensical that we have no entitlement to scepticism. At other 
times we can be brought to find it commonsensical that we obviously do have an 
entitlement to scepticism. Some people are more inclined to scepticism than are others, 
where Hume is one of those rare individuals who was unusually sensitive to scepticism, 
although even for Hume scepticism is not a permanent psychological state. For this 
reason Hume is a valuable source of inspiration when attempting to determine why we 
sometimes take ourselves to be entitled to common sense and sometimes do not do so. 
An important claim to emerge in this chapter is that the content of common sense is 
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partially constituted by norms, and that respecting these norms is in turn constitutive of 
the proper context in which reason can be applied. A further important claim to emerge 
from a consideration of Hume’s encounter with scepticism is that what counts as being 
commonsensical at any given point in time is in fact sensitive to what mood one 
happens to be in at that time. One consequence of accepting this mood-sensitivity in 
common sense is that the scepticism that can be derived from respecting common sense 
becomes substantially more problematic than might otherwise be thought. In fact when 
some moods are present Pyrrhonian scepticism can become so radical and so highly 
generalised that it quite simply cannot be integrated into a rational perspective that 
contains everyday anti-sceptical views. Taking our cue from Carol Rovane we see that 
this in turn challenges our rational integrity and so our sense of personhood in that our 
sceptical selves have trouble understanding our non-sceptical selves and vice versa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Common Sense Naturalism 
 
 Outline 
 
This chapter attempts to clarify the central claims and associated difficulties in a 
position that is here being termed Common Sense Naturalism (CSN), in the process 
drawing inspiration from some important historical and contemporary figures. These 
figures include Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, Thomas Reid and P.F. Strawson.57 
These figures have been made the focus of such attention because each comments, 
either in support or otherwise, on the central concerns of CSN. While this chapter does 
engage with the positions of thinkers in the history of philosophy no attempt is made to 
either argue that there is a coherent tradition to be found running through each of these 
philosophers and nor is an attempt made to argue that adherence to any such tradition 
(even if one could be identified) represents these philosophers’ considered view. 
Presenting such arguments would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. However it 
will be insisted that considering the response of each of these thinkers together is a 
convenient means of identifying a position which, as has been indicated, is being 
termed Common Sense Naturalism. Hence this chapter is not a project in the history of 
philosophy. Rather it attempts to draw inspiration from some of the insights of various 
philosophers, both historical and contemporary, and especially those insights that are 
often overlooked in contemporary debates concerning the relationships between 
naturalism, common sense and scepticism.58 
 
In broad outline, considering various ideas drawn from the above thinkers will reveal 
that scepticism can, at times, be a commonsensical view to take. Further, it is not just 
everyday sorts of scepticism that can be commonsensical, for fairly radical scepticism 
can also become commonsensical. For example, it could become commonsensical to 
someone to suspect that they do not know their own name, and even not to believe that 
                                                 
57 Clear Wittgensteinian influences are also evident in the readings presented of Reid and Strawson. 
58 This is not to say however that no tradition could be identified by considering these thinkers as a 
group, and recent work on Thomas Reid is moving in this direction by considering Reid together with 
Moore and Wittgenstein. I am confident that this work could be expanded by including Hume and Sextus 
also. However whether or not this is the case is not immediately relevant to this dissertation as all that is 
currently required is that we can in fact draw inspiration from the philosophers listed above, and this does 
not require that we identify a coherent tradition to which they each belong. 
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they know their own name.59 However, radical scepticism of this sort is not constant, in 
that we do not always suspect that we lack knowledge of our name but sometimes even 
claim that this is certain knowledge. Thus it must be the case that what strikes us as 
commonsensical varies over time. Naturalism enters into this relationship via the 
assertion that the content of common sense is provided for us by the content of those 
commitments it is natural for us to adopt.60 Interestingly, the natural beliefs held by one 
person at one time will not necessarily be the same natural beliefs as those held by 
someone else at that time or themselves at a later time. This partially accounts for the 
possibility that scepticism is not a persistent problem, instead being an intermittent one. 
However, because the source of radical scepticism is internal to our natural constitution 
it is also the case that radical scepticism can never be permanently defeated, avoided, 
answered or refuted. As such, the relationship between naturalism, common sense and 
scepticism is such that we are always at the risk of becoming radical sceptics. 
 
An observation and a distinction 
 
The important relations between naturalism, common sense and scepticism mentioned 
above all come to the surface through an analysis of CSN, although CSN itself is 
usually understood as being an anti-sceptical position rather than a sceptical one.61 
Hence the immediate task is to clarify in what CSN consists, in the process of which 
inspiration will be drawn from the philosophers mentioned above. Answering two 
questions can provide this clarification. First, what makes CSN a version of naturalism? 
Second, what places CSN in the tradition of common sense philosophy? Taking the 
question of naturalism in CSN first we find this question addressed most cogently by 
P.F.Strawson in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. The first point to be made 
here is that CSN relies fundamentally on a distinction between two kinds of 
                                                 
59 This example is taken from Fogelin’s fine analysis of Pyrrhonian scepticism. See Robert J. Fogelin, 
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (New York: Oxford Univ Pr, 1994) pp. 93-94. 
60 The details of what it is for a commitment to be natural will be provided as the thesis progresses. 
61 That designation derives most directly from a paper presented by Daniel Kaufman titled “Hume, Reid, 
and the Epistemology of Modesty,” delivered at the annual meeting of the Center for the Study of 
Scottish Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, NJ, September 9, 2007. Similar ideas 
are also to be found in Daniel A. Kaufman, “Between Reason and Common Sense: On the Very Idea of 
Necessary (Though Unwarranted) Belief,” Philosophical Investigations 28, no. 2 (2005), Daniel A. 
Kaufman, “Reality in Common Sense: Reflections on Realism and Anti-Realism from a 'Common Sense 
Naturalist' Perspective,” Philosophical Investigations 25, no. 4 (2002). 
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proposition. Comparing Hume and Wittgenstein, Strawson puts the point in the 
following way. 
 
‘Above all, there is, in Wittgenstein’s work, as in Hume’s, the distinction between “what it is vain” to 
make a matter of inquiry, what “we must take for granted in all our reasonings”, as Hume puts it, on the 
one hand, and what is genuinely matter for inquiry on the other.’62 
 
However the essential idea here is more subtle than it appears and hence the foundation 
of this distinction needs to be carefully understood. The central point is captured by 
appeal to the concept of vanity, which in its old-fashioned use caries the sense of 
futility or unproductiveness. Witness for instance the intensely frustrated opening 
passages Ecclesiastes, taken here from the King James Version (1622) and with which 
Hume (along with every other 18th century man of letters) would have undoubtedly 
been familiar. 
 
‘Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. What profit hath a man of all his 
labour which he taketh under the sun?…There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there be 
any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after…The wise man’s eyes are in 
his head; but the fool walketh in darkness; and I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them 
all. Then I said in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then 
more wise? Then I said in my heart that this also is vanity.’ (Ecclesiastes 1:2-3, 11, 2:14-15.) 
 
While we may dispute the extremely long view of things the Preacher is taking here we 
can at least understand his point. The result of labour is here implicitly anticipated to be 
remembrance, but all labour will be forgotten in the future. The goal of wisdom is to 
have a better overall life that the fool, although in the end both the fool and the sage 
will be taken by the grave. The point is that everything is vain because nothing makes a 
lasting difference. Hence no activity is attributed value as no activity achieves its 
anticipated goal. When applied to the activity of attempting to provide justifying 
reasons for some propositions the concept of vanity must then imply that such activity 
fails to achieve its anticipated result. But what result would Hume have here had in 
mind? In the normal course of events the result we would expect from inquiry in this 
                                                 
62 P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Woodbridge Lectures; No. 12. (London: 
Methuen, 1985) 14-15. The quotes taken from Hume are to be found in their original context at David 
Hume, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1978) p.187. 
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justificatory mode is that we would only hold those beliefs which came out as justified 
through this process of inquiry. 
  
Put another way, we would expect that the propositional attitude we take towards the 
propositions into which we had inquired would be sensitive to the result of that inquiry 
and hence vary according to those results. Indeed the very reason why we value 
justificatory inquiry, why justificatory inquiry is not considered to be vain, is that it 
allows us to align our beliefs to the available evidence. Against this background the 
idea of vanity as applied to justificatory inquiry must be interpreted as meaning that the 
propositional attitude we take towards at least some propositions is not sensitive to the 
outcome of justificatory inquiry. Justificatory inquiry then, when directed towards some 
propositions, really does turn out to be unproductive, to be vain, in that the beliefs we 
hold after the inquiry is finished are the same beliefs we held before the inquiry began 
regardless of the outcome of this inquiry. 
 
However, it should be noted for future reference that the unproductiveness of 
justificatory inquiry into some beliefs should only be understood with reference to the 
anticipated goal of this inquiry, which in this case is the presentation of reasons which 
in some way ground the propositions in question. As we shall see, the fact that 
justificatory inquiry is futile is in fact productive in the sense that this futility provides 
the basis for the development of a transcendental argument supporting these 
propositions. While this is not the anticipated result of justificatory inquiry, in that 
transcendental arguments do not as such provide a ground for the propositions for 
which they argue, it is still an interesting and useful result. 
 
The distinction upon which CSN relies can now be stated more clearly, by appeal to 
both propositions and propositional attitudes. The relevant distinction is that the 
propositional attitude we take towards some propositions is not sensitive to the outcome 
of the attempt to provide justifying reasons for those propositions. As a result 
justificatory inquiry when directed towards these propositions is considered to be vain, 
in the sense of being futile or unproductive.63 
                                                 
63 Of course, our propositional attitude towards these beliefs could vary for reasons other than the 
outcome of justificatory inquiry. In fact that such variation is possible is an important claim of the 
argument that will ultimately be developed. 
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 Until such a time as they are inquired into such propositional attitudes manifest 
themselves as run-of-the-mill beliefs. However this manifestation may be deceptive, 
and although I shall defer for a later stage any discussion of what the propositional 
attitude we take towards these special propositions amounts to, it should not be 
assumed that it is not simply the attitude of belief. Indeed there are good reasons to 
think that this attitude cannot be that of belief, as Sextus and Wittgenstein seem to 
recognise although without extending this insight as far as they might have. These 
reasons shall be addressed in detail in chapter 3. As we shall see in that chapter, one 
important reason to think that the commitments in question are not beliefs is that they 
are not reason-sensitive in the way that beliefs ought to be. Another reason is that these 
commitments are neither true nor false, although they can be assessed on non-alethic 
criteria. Finally, these commitments actually turn out to be commitments to respect 
various norms of behaviour. As has been said, these claims will be discussed in chapter 
3 and it is largely to maintain consistency with that chapter that the term ‘commitment’ 
ought to be used instead of ‘belief’. However as employed here the term commitment is 
quite broad, so as to include beliefs if that reflects the propositional attitude involved.64 
 
                                                 
64 As we shall see shortly, some commitments are accorded a special place in our cognitive economy. It 
also deserves emphasis that the reasons for justificatory inquiry is judged in this negative manner are 
pragmatic and descriptive. This distinction, appealing as it does on what is fundamentally a pragmatic 
notion of futility or unproductiveness, is quite different from a seemingly similar distinction drawn along 
semantic or rhetorical lines. It has been argued that attempting to offer justifying reasons for some 
propositions results only in meaninglessness, where such a conclusion is standardly reached on the 
grounds that the question, which one attempts to answer by offering this justification, is itself 
meaningless. Such arguments were famously advanced by Wittgenstein is the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. So for instance we have the following sequence from that work. 
6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. 
  The riddle does not exist 
  If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it. 
6.5.1 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where 
no questions can be asked. 
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer 
exists, and an answer only where something can be said.64 
Thinking along these lines, questions such as ‘Is there an external world?’ or ‘Are there other beings in 
the universe with minds like mine?’ would be judged to be meaningless, because it is not possible to 
appeal to any evidence to decide the question one way or the other. Of course it has been widely 
acknowledged that such arguments (and there have been many over the years) face a significant problem, 
to wit, that they just sound implausible. After all, it does seem on the surface of it that a question like ‘Is 
there an external world?’ does make sense. While it might be the case that at some deep level such a 
question really is meaningless, given the surface appearance of meaningfulness convincing us of 
meaninglessness is going to be very difficult indeed. It is fortunate then that such semantic/rhetorical 
arguments are not part of CSN as understood here and that the relevant distinction is pragmatic rather 
than semantic/rhetorical. 
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When speaking of those commitments to which our propositional attitude is insensitive 
to the outcome of justificatory inquiry I shall for the moment at least leave 
undetermined who the we and our mentioned above expands to include, although again 
pre-empting subsequent discussion I can state that it includes most people all the time, a 
small minority (i.e., philosophical sceptics) most of the time (but importantly not 
always) and never includes an even smaller group (i.e., the insane). Reid and Hume 
both have useful insights on this, although neither captures the entire story when 
considered in isolation. 
 
A distinction between those propositions to which our propositional attitude is sensitive 
to the outcome of justificatory inquiry and those propositions towards which our 
propositional attitude is insensitive to the outcome of justificatory inquiry can be found 
in all the thinkers mentioned above, albeit in different ways and with different 
emphasis. As a consequence each of the thinkers identified here also treats justificatory 
inquiry into some propositions as vain, and it is this which in part justifies considering 
these thinkers together. Starting with Sextus we find the following passage in which a 
distinction is drawn between those commitments he finds are forced on him and those 
which are in some way a matter of judgement and choice. 
 
‘When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense in which some say, 
quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon 
them by appearances – for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I am not heated 
(or: chilled)’. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is 
assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences, for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything 
unclear.’65 
 
Later Sextus extends these ideas to comment explicitly on why some forms of inquiry 
are vain, with the reason being that the results of such inquiries consistently lead to 
absurd conclusions. For Sextus, the reason why the outcome of some inquiries is absurd 
                                                 
65 Sextus, Annas, and Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism. Unless otherwise stated translations are taken from 
this source. Hereafter I shall use the abbreviation PH for the Outlines and include references to Book and 
paragraph numbers, placing the reference in the main body of the text. Hence this reference would appear 
as [PH 1.19-20]. The reader should be aware however that the above quote in probably the single most 
commented upon passage in Sextus’ oeuvre, and that the translation of this passage is complex and 
debated. In these debates I stand with the Fredean line of interpretation, and especially with the position 
argued for in Frede, “The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of 
Knowledge.” At a later stage in this dissertation there will be opportunity for some justifying remarks to 
be made in favour of such an interpretation. 
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is that they lead to conclusions that we cannot possibly accept. Yet exactly what Sextus 
intends by this impossibility remains unclear. Sextus could mean either that it is 
psychologically or logically impossible to accept that we have no entitlement to some 
commitments, or indeed he could mean both. The following passage contains both. 
 
‘The argument propounded leads us either to something unacceptable or to something which we must 
accept. If the second, we shall assent to it without absurdity. If to something unacceptable, we need not 
rashly assent to the absurdity because of its plausibility: rather, they must relinquish an argument which 
compels assent to absurdities – if at any rate, they have chosen, as they profess, not to babble like 
children but to seek what is true. If a road is leading us to a precipice, we do not drive ourselves over the 
precipice because there is a road leading to it; rather, we leave the road because of the precipice: 
similarly if there is an argument leading us to something agreed to be absurd, we do not assent to the 
absurdity because of the argument – rather, we abandon the argument because of the absurdity.’          
(PH 2.251-252, translation altered)66 
 
The first point to note is that Sextus’ comments are entered in the context of those 
commitments that Sextus will find ‘forced’ upon him, those commitments towards 
which he must take himself to have an entitlement. However this need not be taken to 
be merely psychological in its thrust, for that Sextus is forced to take himself to have an 
entitlement to certain commitments is also entered in the context of recognising the 
logical implications of certain arguments and commitments. Further light might perhaps 
be shed on this issue by noting that the term Sextus uses for the absurdity of the 
relevant conclusions is the same term – atopia (and related terms such as atopos and 
atopatos) – that appears in the Platonic corpus as an adjective for describing the 
character of Socrates. Pierre Hadot makes much of the point that the character of 
Socrates is atpoos, atopia or atopatos and in the process enters the useful suggestion 
that the more appropriate translation of this term would be ‘unclassifiable’ rather than 
‘absurd’.67 
 
                                                 
66 The translation of the Greek chrēnai has been altered here from ‘ought’ to ‘must’. In this I agree with 
Bury’s older translation against both the modern translations of Annas the Barnes and also the translation 
found in Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translating chrēnai as 
‘ought’ has little lexical support as the core sense of chrē (of which chrēnai is simply the infinitive form) 
conveys the sense of necessity, not that of normativity. Further, translating this term as ‘ought’ makes 
Sextus’ argument sound a great deal more dogmatic than his overall position would justify. For the older 
translation see Sextus and Bury, Sextus Empiricus. 
67 See Pierre Hadot and Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1995) pp.158-165. 
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We ought to recall at this point that something, or especially someone, being atopia is 
related in a Greek mind with the concept of aporia – roughly translated as 
puzzlement.68 Socrates was atopos in the Platonic literature because rather than leaving 
someone with clarity over some concept at the end of one of the dialogues he usually 
left them with a profound sense of aporia. That is to say that at the end of a Platonic 
dialogue Socrates’ interlocutor has the sense that they have somehow lost their grip on 
the relevant concept, be that piety, knowledge, love or whatever. I take it that Stanley 
Cavell is appealing to a sense of aporia when he describes the outcome of being led to 
ponder the sense of a term with which we are already quite familiar. 
 
It sometimes happens that we know everything there is to know about a situation – what all of the words 
in question mean, what all of the relevant facts are; and everything is in front of our eyes. And yet we 
feel we don’t know something, don’t understand something. In this situation, the question “What is X?” 
is very puzzling, in exactly the way that philosophy is very puzzling. We feel we want to ask the 
question, and yet we feel we already have the answer.69 
 
This suggests that the sense in which the arguments rejected by Sextus are absurd is not 
entirely straightforward. In fact taking atopia to perhaps mean ‘unclassifiable’ suggests 
that there is perhaps an important semantic notion in Sextus’ thought. That is, Sextus 
could well intend to draw our attention to an important way in which we just do not 
understand what the philosopher who presents the offending arguments is saying when 
he says, for instance, that movement is impossible upon expounding Zeno’s Paradox. 
This thought suggests that what Sextus intends is that it is not possible to understand 
what the claims with which he is here concerned mean. This is not to say that Sextus 
does not understand what the original words mean, or that there is a grammatical error 
of some kind involved. It is to say that the philosophers (Sextus calls them sophists) 
                                                 
68 For an excellent exposition of this term as it appears in the early Platonic corpus see Vasilis Politis, 
“Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato,” in Remembering Socrates, ed. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis 
Karasmanis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). For an exposition of this same term in 
Aristotle’s thought see Vasilis Politis, “Aristotle on Aporia and Searching in Metaphysics,” Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 22 (2006). While the Platonic background is more in focus here this is 
not to say that Aristotelian influences are irrelevant. There is evidence to suggest that Sextus was familiar 
with the thought of both. 
69 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976) p.20. In 
fact Cavell explicitly connects this statement to a brief exposition of Socratic method. See also Stanley 
Cavell, The Claims of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.193. Note especially in that 
in this latter passage Cavell speaks of the traditional epistemologist’s words ‘not being entirely under his 
control’. 
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who put forward these arguments do not themselves know what they had meant when 
they propounded such arguments, or do not know what they had really meant.70 
 
So rather than Sextus making a psychological point when he says that we are forced to 
take ourselves to have an entitlement to certain commitments because we are 
(psychologically) forced to take things this way, he could here be making a logical 
point. Sextus could be saying that we reject certain arguments not because (or not just 
because) we are psychologically compelled to accept their opposite but because we do 
not actually understand what these arguments would mean if they meant what the 
propounders of these argument are trying to say. 
 
The moral we can draw from this Cavell-inspired reading of Sextus is that Sextus could 
well intend both the psychological and the logical points without himself introducing 
any absurdity. In that case the psychological point is that even if we could understand 
what the sophists mean when they present arguments that appear to lead to absurd 
conclusions, such arguments can never, in actual fact, make a difference for us. The 
logical point would be that we just do not understand what the sophist really means and 
so cannot even begin to take his argument seriously. Note however that the 
psychological point is consistent with us not actually having any entitlement to the 
commitments in question, unless it can somehow be shown that psychological 
compulsion is entitlement conferring. By contrast, Sextus’ logical point would seem not 
to provide us any reason to suppose that any purported entitlement we have to the 
relevant commitment is not a genuine entitlement. After all, if we cannot understand 
what an argument means then it cannot provide us grounds for thinking that any 
entitlement to any commitment has been undermined. 
 
So then, does Sextus’ point about the absurdity/unclassifiability of certain arguments or 
conclusions leave everything as it was before regarding entitlement? At first glance it 
would seem so, as Sextus’ psychological and logical points neither undermine any 
entitlement we might already have nor provide us with any further entitlement. Yet this 
is exactly the point that a defender of CSN would make, in that we have certain 
entitlements that are simply not touched by arguments attempting to either confirm or 
                                                 
70 To speak this way is to obviously follow some of Cavell’s other insights. See Cavell, Must We Mean 
What We Say? pp.39-40. 
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disconfirm this entitlement. The arguments drawn from Sextus above shows us that 
when we try to present such arguments we are met with either absurdity (and 
psychological compulsions drawing away from absurdity) or a loss of the sense that we 
know what the disconfirming arguments mean. That it, Sextus brings us face to face 
with the vanity of justificatory inquiry when directed towards certain commitments 
 
We again see the vanity of justificatory inquiry when directed towards certain 
commitments in both Hume and Reid, where in this case the idea is that the 
commitments which justificatory inquiry cannot call into question are, in some sense, 
natural commitments. 
 
‘Thus tho’ we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in our 
career, and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continu’d existence. That 
opinion has taken such deep root in the imagination, that ‘tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will any 
strain’d metaphysical conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose.’71 
 
‘My belief is carried along by perception, as irresistibly as my body by the earth. And the greatest sceptic 
will find himself to be in the same condition. He may struggle hard to disbelieve the information of his 
senses, as a man does to swim against a torrent; but, ah! it is in vain. It is in vain that he strains every 
nerve, and wrestles with nature, and with every object that strikes on his senses. For after all, when his 
strength is spent in the fruitless attempt, he will be carried down the torrent with the common herd of 
believers.’72 
 
Again, we see the same themes emerging in Wittgenstein and Strawson. 
 
‘That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.’ [OC 341] 
 
‘That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not 
doubted.’ [OC 342] 
                                                 
71 Hume, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, A Treatise of Human Nature 214. Hereafter I shall use the 
abbreviation T for the Treatise, and refer to Book, part and section numbers in addition to page numbers, 
placing this reference in the body of the text. Hence this reference would as [T I.IV.2, p. 214] 
72 Thomas Reid, Works Now Fully Collected: With Selections from His Unpublished Letters, Papers, 
Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan Stewart and Co, 1849) EIP 
VI.iv p. 434a. Hereafter references to An Inquiry into the Human Mind shall be abbreviated to IHM, and 
those to Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man shall be abbreviated to EIP. Reference to chapter and 
section number and page number in the standard edition, with the reference being incorporated into the 
body of the text. So the current reference would appear as [IHM VI.xx p.184a] 
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‘But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are 
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.’ [OC 343] 
 
‘My life consists in my being content to accept many things.’73 [OC 344] 
 
‘The correct way with the professional sceptic doubt is not to attempt to rebut it with argument, but to 
point out that it is idle, unreal, a pretense; and then the rebutting arguments will appear as equally idle; 
the reasons produced in those arguments to justify induction or belief in the existence of body are not, 
and do not become, our reasons for these beliefs; there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold 
these beliefs. We simply cannot help accepting them as defining the areas within which the questions 
come up of what beliefs we should hold on such-and-such a matter.’74 
 
With this basic observation of natural propositional attitudes established and the 
conclusion that justificatory inquiry directed towards these propositions is vain clarified 
it is now appropriate to establish in what sense CSN is naturalistic. 
 
Naturalism in CSN 
 
 i) The nature of naturalism 
 
Having established the distinction between two different types of propositions and the 
consequent vanity of justificatory inquiry when directed towards an instance of one of 
these types of propositions we are almost in a position to ask what makes this 
distinction relevant to classifying CSN as a version of naturalism. However before this 
can be accomplished some clarification must be offered as to what kind of naturalism is 
involved here, as the term naturalism is highly multivalent. One idea I might easily be 
taken to intend, given its continuing popularity, is scientific naturalism, in either its 
methodological or ontological guises.75 In its methodological guise scientific 
naturalism holds that the method of inquiry employed by the hard sciences (particularly 
the mathematical expressions of physics) to be paradigmatic of all proper inquiry.76 As 
                                                 
73 Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright, On Certainty, trans. Denis. Paul and 
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). As references to Wittgenstein are frequent the standard 
abbreviation [OC xxx] will be used for this work. 
74 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties pp.19-20. 
75 I am here following the schema laid out in Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, “Introduction: The 
Nature of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
76 Thus we could understand why Spinoza’s Ethics might be taken to be naturalistic in that it attempts to 
apply the method of the best science of its day to metaphysics. 
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a result philosophy is viewed as being continuous with science. In its ontological guise 
scientific naturalism is associated with the position that natural science provides us with 
the only true picture of nature.77 Unsurprisingly, scientific naturalism of this sort is 
often called “scientism” and is often allied to a strong version of physicalism.78 While 
naturalism of this scientific sort will be introduced shortly in connection with the views 
of Sextus and Hume there is nothing in CSN itself which would mandate such an 
approach to naturalism. 
 
Another more productive way of defining naturalism is to contrast it with that position 
which holds that if some commitment lacks rational justification then it is unjustified 
simpliciter. As intended here, naturalism does not hold that the lack of rational 
justification for a commitment implies that the commitment is unjustified simpliciter as 
naturalism countenances forms of justification other than rational justification. Granted, 
it might be thought at this juncture that the naturalist could actually concede that 
rational justification is the only legitimate form of justification but then naturalise 
reason to avoid any appearance of rationalism. However, such an approach to 
justification must strike the rationalist as unwarrantedly changing the meaning of terms 
in he middle of a debate, for what the rationalist has in mind when he speaks of rational 
justification is something that just cannot be naturalised. For a rationalist, naturalised 
reason is not reason as they understand it and CSN exists in a framework in which this 
point is conceded to the rationalist as part of a broader strategy of convincing a 
rationalist that they ought to accept that rational justification does not exhaust the 
means by which we can come to be entitled to some commitment. We must keep this in 
mind throughout the remainder of this dissertation. Describing the naturalism involved 
in CSN Daniel Kaufman in the passage below objects to this sort of rationalism, in this 
case via an appeal to the principle that we ought only to be held responsible for that 
which it is possible to do, and it is not possible according to Kaufman that we give up 
our belief in the existence of the external world. 
 
‘Small ‘r’ rationalism tells us that we ought only to believe those things for which we have warrant. The 
complimentary suggestion, of course, is that we ought not believe those things for which there is no 
                                                 
77 A position such as eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind would thus be a prime example 
of scientific naturalism in its doctrinal guise. 
78 See De Caro and Macarthur, “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism.” for a discussion of the various 
ways of understanding physicalism and the difficulties associated with it. 
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justification, and this is where the skeptic purports to catch us in epistemic infidelity. But if the common 
sense naturalist is correct, these epistemological obligations must strike us as unreasonable. For if it is 
true that we cannot help but believe in the existence of the external world, the general reliability of our 
senses, etc., is it then reasonable to say that we ought not believe in them?’79  
 
However, while naturalism will essentially mean what Kaufman means in the above 
quote a divergence from Kaufman must also be noted. Kaufman implies that everyday 
folk have a belief in the existence of the external, the general reliability of the senses, 
etc. That is, Kaufman implies that everyday folk have as beliefs the standard targets of 
Cartesian scepticism, and at this point Kaufman is mistaken. In fact everyday folk have 
no such beliefs with this content, as shall emerge as a consequence of the analysis 
presented in chapter 3. However the complete details of this argument will have to wait 
until a later stage in the dissertation. There is also the matter of whether the 
impossibility Kaufman mentions is logical or psychological, for this is not specified and 
either or both could be intended. In fact we see this tension emerging repeatedly in 
CSN, as some of the important thinkers favour appeals to psychology (as part of a form 
of scientific naturalism) whereas others favour appeals to logic (as part of a more 
liberal form of naturalism). This tension will be particularly evident later in this chapter 
when two quite different arguments in favour of CSN are introduced, one essentially 
psychological and the other logical. One of the goals of the present dissertation is to 
resolve this tension, although for the moment at least it must remain as a tension until 
such a time that sufficient philosophical resources are available to deal with it. 
 
The naturalism involved in CSN consists in the rejection of the rationalistic idea that 
the lack of rational justification for a commitment implies that the commitment is 
unjustified simpliciter.80 As we have already seen CSN also holds that justificatory 
inquiry, when directed towards some propositions, is vain. On this point Strawson says 
that 
 
                                                 
79 Kaufman, “Between Reason and Common Sense: On the Very Idea of Necessary (Though 
Unwarranted) Belief,” p.140. I of course object to the implicit idea here that we have a belief in the 
external world, as the propositional attitude here is not that of belief. 
80 CSN thus countenances the possibility that there could be other forms of justification beyond rational 
justification, and typically introduces varieties of justification such as perceptual justification. However 
this does not mean that beliefs that cannot be rationally justified can always be justified in some other 
way. A belief can fail to meet any plausible standard of justification. 
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‘the reasons produced in those arguments to justify induction or belief in the existence of body are not, 
and do not become, our reasons for these beliefs; there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold 
these beliefs.’81 
 
That is, we do not actually have, have never had, and never shall have, rational 
justifications for some propositions. Rational justification just does not connect up in 
the right way with some propositions. Recognising this, we are now in a position to 
explain the source of the distinction, drawn in CSN, between two kinds of propositions; 
those towards which our propositional attitude is insensitive to the outcome of 
justificatory inquiry and those commitments towards which our propositional attitude is 
sensitive in this way. The reason why some commitments display this type of 
insensitivity is that if such commitments can be said to have justification at all it is not 
of the type sought in justificatory inquiry. Thus while recognising the distinction drawn 
by CSN between two types of commitments is an important first step towards 
developing the theory, it is actually the idea that the kind of justification sought in 
justificatory inquiry does not connect up with some propositions in the right way that 
does the philosophical work. Without this idea the distinction drawn above is a mere 
observation. The idea that not all propositions have justification of the type sought in 
justificatory inquiry tells us why we observe this in the first place. However, if this is 
correct then it immediately raises the question of entitlement. If rational justification 
just doesn’t connect up in the right way with some commitments then what reason do 
we have to suppose that we have any entitlement to these commitments? This is the 
most important question facing the defender of CSN, and is a question to which we 
shall be returning after a addressing an important objection. 
 
ii) Interlude: An objection concerning reflection 
 
It will no doubt be thought that something must be amiss with the characterisation 
offered by CSN in that while we may not have justifications for our pre-reflective 
commitments the process of reflection can provide this justification and thereby bring 
about a change in the manner in which these commitments are held. Thus when 
Strawson makes the following claim he will be taken to have missed an important 
                                                 
81 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties pp. 19-20. The reader should keep in mind here 
that Strawson is incorrect to suppose that everyday folk have a belief in the existence of body. 
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feature of the way in which our propositional attitudes can develop in response to 
reflection. 
 
‘We accept or believe the scientific theories (when we do) just because we believe they supply the best 
available explanations of the phenomena they deal with. That is our reason for accepting them. But no 
one accepts the existence of the physical world because it supplies the best available explanation etc. 
Anyone who claimed it was his reason would be pretending.’82 
 
Granted, pre-reflectively it may be that there is no such thing as the reasons for which I 
hold commitments such as ‘that the senses and memory are reliable’ or ‘that the other 
objects in the world that behave as I do have minds’. But why is it not possible that I 
could come to hold commitments for reasons as a consequence of reflecting on them 
and deciding that they are well justified? In part the answer to this question must wait 
until Argument 2 for the naturalism of CSN is examined. At that point it will be argued 
that the commitments considered here constitute the context in which, and only within 
which, concepts like justification and reason can find their proper application. That is, 
Argument 2 for CSN is a transcendental argument. If this argument goes through then 
no reasons could ever be provided for those commitments that play this transcendental 
role. 
  
However this can only be a partial answer, as it is open to the obvious objection that it 
is actually quite easy to provide reasons for these commitments, with numerous 
philosophers throughout the ages claiming to have found reasons of just this sort. In 
fact the possibility of providing reasons for precisely these beliefs has always been the 
key recommendation for undertaking philosophical reflection in the first place. This 
also reveals an important weakness of transcendental arguments, in that it is also 
possible to confuse reaching the conditions for the possibility of applying some concept 
with a lack of imagination on the part of the person generating the transcendental 
argument. Perhaps there really are perfectly good justifying reasons for the propositions 
with which Strawson is concerned but Strawson just can’t think of them. Alternately, 
the reason why post-hoc justification appears to be futile is that we are less certain of 
the reasons than we are of the conclusion. However to conclude from this that the 
supporting argument is insufficient is to confuse the logical properties of arguments 
                                                 
82 Ibid. p.20. 
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with the psychological state of the agent assessing the argument, for certainty is a 
psychological state not a logical property.83 
 
The complete answer to this objection concerns the properties of those commitments 
that are insensitive to the outcome of justificatory inquiry, although the full details of 
this response will have to wait until chapter 4. As we shall see in that chapter, these 
commitments are commitments to respect certain norms, including norms of inquiry. 
The reason why post-hoc justification of commitments to these norms always fails is 
that we must already have a commitment to these norms in order to generate 
justifications for them and hence any justifications for these norms must be question-
begging. The argument presented in chapter 4 shall also explain just why transcendental 
arguments in support of those commitments which are insensitive to the outcome of 
justificatory inquiry have consistently failed to satisfy the philosopher who is sceptical 
of our entitlement to these commitments. Such a sceptic can grant that we cannot give 
up these commitments (for psychological reasons) and also grant that we must rely on 
them to generate any further justifications (for logical reasons). However to conclude 
from the fact that such commitments are necessarily held in order for justification to be 
possible at all begs the sceptics question, for why should it be possible to present 
justification at all? In fact it will be shown through chapters 2 and 3 that relying on 
these commitments can in some circumstances lead directly to scepticism. Hence even 
if we are entitled to these commitments we are also thereby entitled, paradoxically, to 
scepticism. Hence if CSN is to insist that we are entitled to hold those commitments 
towards which our propositional attitude is insensitive to the outcome of justificatory 
inquiry, which it must, then CSN must also be an inherently sceptical position. 
 
Arguments for the naturalism of CSN 
 
Returning then to the outline of CSN, it emerges from what has been said above that 
CSN sees us as holding commitments which are insensitive to the outcome of 
justificatory inquiries but are not thereby unjustified. One way of capturing this is by 
saying that CSN sees us as having a range of default entitlements, and hence default 
                                                 
83 The distinction between subjective certainty and its relationship to scepticism derives in this instance 
from David Macarthur, “The Seriousness of Doubt and Our Natural Trust in the Senses in the First 
Meditation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2003). 
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commitments, for which we are not required to present rational justification. The 
question remains however as to what kind of entitlement is involved when we bring 
these default commitments into view. Why should we have any entitlement to these 
commitments whatsoever if we cannot present rational justifications for them? From 
within the perspective of CSN two answers to this question are possible. 
 
First, it may be argued, in transcendental fashion, that an entitlement to some 
commitments must be granted if we are to have an entitlement to any further 
commitments, in that there are some commitments that function to at least partially 
constitute the proper context for the application of reason itself.84 Second, it could be 
argued that we have an entitlement to those commitments that come upon us 
‘naturally’, that is, as a consequence of our physical constitution. In this case our 
default entitlement attaches to our natural commitments. This might suggest that there 
is such a thing as a ‘natural justification’, although as we shall see eventually this idea 
does not provide an adequate response to someone who is sceptical about our default 
entitlements. While nature can explain why we hold some commitment, and even 
explain why this commitment is insensitive to the outcome of justificatory inquiry, it 
cannot provide us with the kind of justification that would provide an entitlement to this 
commitment. In Strawson (and in a certain reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty) we 
can find the view that there are some commitments which constitute the proper context 
for the application of reason. In Reid we can find arguments to the effect that we are 
entitled to our natural commitments, and hence that holding these commitments is 
justified because they are natural – although we should note that Reid has two different 
views on this matter, and that his alternate view is very much like that of Strawson. An 
exploration of Reid’s views shall be undertaken later in this chapter. Hume and Sextus 
also explore this idea of entitlement to natural commitment, although they both 
ultimately diverge from Reid’s conclusion. While both Sextus and Hume identify some 
natural commitments that it is not within our power to do without, they do not conclude 
that we have any entitlement to these natural commitments. I would argue that while 
both may have been happy with talk of our default entitlements, the sense of entitlement 
they would be happy to go along with could not have been construed as being in any 
way the basis of an answer or refutation of scepticism. In this sense both Sextus and 
                                                 
84 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. This work is based on the presentation and 
exploration of such arguments. 
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Hume are better guides than is Reid in that they both have a keener sense of the 
limitations of appealing to the natural as a source for justification.85 
 
The task that now presents itself is to explain why, from the perspective of CSN, we are 
entitled to those commitments that are insensitive to the outcome of justificatory 
inquiry. This requires that we examine the two arguments for this entitlement, as 
identified above, in turn. 
 
i) Argument 1. Hume and Reid (and Sextus) on natural justification and default 
entitlement 
 
Hume and Reid refer to our natural, shared, human constitution as a means of 
explaining how we come to hold, and commonsensically take ourselves to be entitled to 
hold, some commitments. This appeal to the natural is supposed to function as the basis 
for an argument to the effect that a commitment can lack rational justification without 
lacking justification simpliciter. Hume has been read as supporting such a move 
(although I argue that the reading is erroneous in chapter 3, which should come as no 
shock given the claims that were made in the previous section). Reid can also be read as 
supporting such a move, with significantly more justification than we find in Hume. 
According to this reading we have an entitlement to our natural commitments (or at 
least some of them, and the details vary) where this entitlement can be used to refute or 
answer the sceptic. So when the sceptic asks Reid to justify the claim that he is entitled 
to some commitment he can respond by saying that the commitment in question is 
justified because it is natural, where being natural means that a commitment is held as a 
direct consequence of our shared human constitution. 
 
Here an appeal to nature is providing the justification for a claim to entitlement, and so 
we can call the justification to which Reid and Hume (on this ultimately erroneous 
reading) appeal a natural justification. If natural justification is a legitimate form of 
justification then it does not follow from the fact that some commitment lacks rational 
justification that the commitment in question lacks justification simpliciter, just in case 
                                                 
85 That Hume had such a keen sense for this explains why he generally limits himself to explaining the 
genesis of our beliefs instead of attempting to justify our beliefs. Given this keen sense it should also 
come as no surprise that the fact/value distinction should play such a prominent role in Hume philosophy. 
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this commitment is a natural commitment and so has natural justification. That is, if we 
can show that some commitment is a natural commitment in that we hold it as a direct 
consequence of our shared human constitution, then we can rightfully claim to be 
entitled to this commitment regardless of whether we can present a rational justification 
for this commitment. Argument 1 attempts to establish precisely this claim. However 
two variants of Argument 1 can be discerned here. The first, Argument 1a, could be 
attributed to Hume, and has been done so by Don Garrett. The second, Argument 1b, 
derives from Reid although in presenting it here reference will also be made to both 
Sextus and Hume. 
  
Argument 1a can be stated very simply, and in fact Hume manages to reduce this 
argument to a single sentence, found in the conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise. 
 
‘Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does 
not, it can never have any title to operate upon us.’ [T I.iv.vii. p.270] 
 
Don Garrett has called the idea to which Hume refers the Title Principle, and I shall 
follow Garrett’s terminology.86 The basic idea is simple enough. Since belief for Hume 
just is a vivacious idea, and is given that vivacity through some natural propensity to so 
believe, this amounts to saying that we ought to believe what the natural operation of 
our minds leads us to believe. So where a belief is found to be natural, where it ‘is 
satisfactory to the human mind’ as he says a little later, then it ought to be believed. 
Otherwise it should not be believed. Unfortunately, if this really is Hume’s argument 
then it leaves several questions unanswered.87 What, for instance, are to be the criteria 
by which we judge whether any given belief is natural? More pressing is the question of 
normativity. The Title Principle seems to rely on pointing out a natural fact about 
vivacious ideas being beliefs, but it is unclear why this natural fact would warrant the 
normative claim. However as Argument 1b also faces a problem over normativity 
                                                 
86 Don Garrett, “'a Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of 
Man,” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Sinnott Armstrong, Walter (Ed) (Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2004), p.8-
89. 
87 I shall argue at length in chapter 3 that this cannot possibly be Hume’s argument, in that Hume shows 
no interest in defeating or refuting scepticism, on the grounds that such a refutation is impossible. Hume 
is himself a sceptic. Nonetheless, examining Garrett’s interpretation of Hume is a useful way of 
developing the two main arguments for the central thesis of CSN. 
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further discussion of this issue will be deferred until both arguments have been 
addressed. 
 
Like Argument 1a, Argument 1b attempts to support the conclusion that (some) natural 
beliefs are justified on the grounds that they are natural, although it does so less 
directly. We might call this argument the ‘Mint of Nature’ argument in deference to 
Reid’s important exposition.88 Understanding how Argument 1b manages this 
indirectness requires a brief word on its rhetorical structure. Rather than arguing in 
favour of natural justification Argument 1b is purely defensive in character. Note 
however that a purely defensive strategy can only be convincing of a positive thesis if 
set against the background of some independent reasons in favour of the positive thesis 
of which we wish an interlocutor to become convinced. In the case of Argument 1b the 
interlocutor would need independent reasons to think that non-rational forms of 
justification actually exist, and that these non-rational forms of justification provide us 
with an entitlement to some of our commitments. Without this, refuting the claim that 
justification must always be rational justification tells us nothing about the actual 
entitlement we have to our actual commitments. In fact the most coherent way of 
reading Argument 1b is as it being based on an appeal to the idea that we in fact have a 
default entitlement to our natural commitments and that we have this entitlement 
regardless of being able to present rational justification for these commitments. From 
here Argument 1b attempts to shift to burden of proof to the sceptic to show that we 
really do need to provide rational justification for our default entitlements, which is to 
say that the sceptic needs to show that we need to provide rational justification for our 
natural commitments. 
 
The sceptic is pictured as accepting this burden and suggesting that our supposed 
default entitlement just doesn’t stack up well when compared with that entitlement of 
ours that is ground in rational justification. Argument 1b goes about refuting this claim 
by picking out the feature of reliability and suggesting that there are legitimate forms of 
justification that no more reliably lead us to truth than does a reliance on our natural 
commitments, for instance those provided by perception. However we should not lose 
sight of the fact that the appeal to reliability is not supposed itself to do the justificatory 
                                                 
88 See footnote 90. 
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work. Remember that we are assumed to have a default entitlement to our natural 
commitments precisely because they are natural. The appeal to reliability is a means of 
showing that the sceptical claim is in fact unmotivated. In essence Argument 1b 
assumes a (default) entitlement to our natural commitments and goes about showing 
that there is no reason to question this assumption. Argument 1b derives from Reid and 
can be stated fairly simply. 
 
1) If and only if a faculty is sufficiently reliable can that faculty be a source of 
justification89 
2) The faculty of Reason is a source of justification 
3) Therefore, the faculty of Reason is sufficiently reliable (from 1 and 2) 
4) The faculty of Perception is as reliable as the faculty of Reason 
5) Therefore, the faculty of Perception is sufficiently reliable (from 3 and 4) 
6) Therefore, the faculty of Perception can be a source of justification (from 1 and 
5) 
7) The faculty of Perception is a natural faculty 
8) Therefore, natural justification exists (from 6 and 7) 
9) A commitment is justified if it carries natural justification 
10) Therefore, lack of rational justification does not imply lack of justification 
simpliciter (from 8 and 9) 90 
                                                 
89 This argument is overtly externalist in flavour, as is any argument that makes reliability central to an 
explanation of how justification is produced. For those who agree with Stroud in thinking that 
externalism cannot provide a refutation of scepticism, as do I, then Argument 1b will be unsatisfying as 
an explanation of how we can have entitlement to our natural commitments. See Barry Stroud, 
“Scepticism, 'Externalism', and the Goal of Epistemology,” in Understanding Human Knowledge: 
Philosophical Essays (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Barry Stroud, 
“Understanding Human Knowledge in General,” in Understanding Human Knowledge: Philosophical 
Essays (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
90 I take it that it is the ‘Mint of Nature’ argument Reid intends to put forward in the following passage. 
 
‘I am aware, that this belief that I have in perception, stands exposed to the strongest batteries of 
skepticism. But they make no great impression on it. The skeptic asks me, Why do you believe 
the existence of the external object you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it 
came from the mint of nature; it bears her image and superscription, and, if it is not right, the 
fault if not mine: I even took it upon trust, and without suspicion. Reason, says the skeptic, is 
the only judge of truth, and you ought to throw of every opinion and every belief that is not 
grounded on reason. Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of 
perception; they both came from the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he 
puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder from putting another?’ [IHM 
VI.xx p.183b] 
 
Recognising that this argument relies on the idea that reason can provide justification motivates Reid to 
spend several paragraphs immediately following this argument defending the idea of rational 
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 Granting a plausible explanation of what it is to be sufficiently reliable can be provided 
this argument will turn on premise (4).91 However the strategy of attempting to draw an 
analogy between reason and perception considered as a natural faculty faces some 
difficulties, the most obvious of which is that the beliefs based in perception can be 
falsified by further perceptions, where the analogue of this in the case of deductive 
reasoning is not the case. That is, conclusions arrived at through valid deductions from 
true premises are guaranteed to be true, it being impossible that they could be made 
false by any further true premises being added to the argument. This feature of 
deductive arguments has been called its monotonicity.92 Perception is nonmonotonic, 
and we always allow that it is possible that we could receive falsifying information for 
any of our perceptual judgements. Inductive reasoning is more like perception than it is 
like deductive reasoning in this regard, as it is also nonmonotonic. With this difference 
in mind arguing that perception, or any other faculty also lacking the monotonicity of 
deduction such as induction, is as reliable as deductive reasoning will seem highly 
implausible. 
 
To deal with this very problem arguments that can be shown to be typical of Sextus, 
Hume and Reid attempt to reinforce the plausibility of premise (4) not by attempting to 
elevate the status of perception but by decreasing the status of reason, and particularly 
deductive reasoning.93 Arguing that some commitments simply have no rational 
justification is only one part of this overall strategy. More broadly attempts are either 
                                                                                                                                              
justification. His fear is of course that the sceptic will want to throw out both natural and rational 
justification, which is indeed what Sextus does when presented with a similar argument. 
More recently modern versions of this argument have been propounded, often with a direct 
appeal being made to Reid as the inspiration of this idea. A good example of such an argument, and its 
resources for dealing with scepticism is found in Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place : The Nature of 
Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, John Greco, “"Reid's Reply to the Skeptic" 
in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2004). See also Greco comments on the relationship between reliability and evidence in John 
Greco, “How to Reid Moore,” Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 209 (2002): p.19. I take it that Greco’s 
arguments fail for they unwarrantedly take it that sceptical doubts can be dismissed. In this they share a 
flaw common to CSN, as we shall see when we examine Argument 2 for the naturalism of CSN. 
91 We should note here that the senses and reason are reliable in different ways. Reason is reliable in the 
sense that the beliefs with which it provides us are (mostly) true. The senses are reliable in the sense that 
the beliefs for which they provide the basis are (mostly) true. That is, there is an extra step involved in 
deriving a belief from the senses than there is with reason, in that when the senses are in view we must 
move from the basis (provided by the senses) to the belief itself. However this makes no difference when 
we wish to compare the reliability of the senses and reason. Casting the argument in terms of 
trustworthiness would make a difference however. 
92 See Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification p.22. 
93 Sextus has a rather different purpose in presenting such an argument that does Reid. 
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made to bypass the operation of deductive reasoning or to explain this operation in 
naturalistic terms. So on the one hand we encounter arguments the purpose of which is 
to explain as much of the functioning of our mental faculties as possible without 
reference to what we usually think of as reasoning, On the other hand, where the first 
strategy is not possible the functioning of our reasoning faculties is explained in 
thoroughly naturalistic terms and hence even deductive reasoning is said to be subject 
to the same natural limitations as perception. 
 
The strategy of bypassing reasoning as much as possible is particularly evident in 
Hume. For instance we see Hume defining belief as a ‘vivacious impression’94, and 
saying that ‘belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than the cogitative part of 
our natures.’95 We also see Hume explaining the formation of a belief in terms that 
make no significant reference to the role played by reason. Take for instance Hume’s 
description of the genesis of the belief in the ‘external world’ (for Hume, the problem 
of ‘continu’d and distinct existence’). While reason is active here it is clearly the 
imagination and not reasoning which has primacy. Hume summarises the crucial role 
played by the imagination in these cases in the following way. 
 
‘Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some idea beyond others (which is seemingly so 
trivial, and founded so little on reason) we cou’d never assent to any argument, nor carry our view 
beyond those few objects , which are present to our senses…The memory, senses, and understanding are, 
therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas.’ [T I.iv.viii p.265] 
 
The important point here for our purposes is not that the imagination plays such an 
important role in belief formation, but that reason does not. In fact Hume points out that 
reason could not play such a role without disastrous consequences, for if it did we 
would be left with no beliefs whatsoever. Taking aim specifically at deductive 
reasoning Hume argues that such reasoning should only be taken to be reliable if those 
faculties productive of it are themselves reliable. This requires that we make an 
estimation of the reliability of these faculties, however he points out that we must do so 
using these faculties. Hence we must make an estimation of the reliability of our 
                                                 
94 [T I.iii.v p.86] 
95 [T I.iv.i p.183] 
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original estimation of that reliability, and so on and so forth. Such a process, Hume 
argues, takes us inevitably to the complete undermining of deductive reasoning. 
 
‘When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions, then 
when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still farther, to turn the 
scrutiny against evert successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a 
continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.’ [T I.iv.i p.183] 
 
Hume’s argument here is ingenious because rather than attempting the very difficult 
task of undermining the reliability of deduction itself, Hume turns his attention to our 
ability to correctly carry out deductive processes of reasoning.96 However, Hume 
would want us to keep in mind that we continually take to be reliable not just deduction 
as an idea (if we do this at all), we take actual deductions to be reliable. Establishing the 
possibility of error here is far more plausible, and makes establishing a plausible 
analogy between the trustworthiness of the beliefs formed via deductive reasoning and 
through perception far easier. 
 
However, Hume’s argument does require that we think of our ability to perform 
deductions in much the same way that we think of our ability to correctly perceive 
objects through our senses, and this requires some support. Hence we come to the 
second strategy involved in Argument 1b; the naturalising of those faculties we employ 
when we actually engage in reasoning. Hume produces several analogies to support this 
idea. For instance he speaks of our passions and sentiments as ‘flowing’,97 as if our 
minds were composed of tiny channels that thoughts move through in some fashion. He 
also speaks of our shifting our attention from one idea to another as being ‘smooth’, 
‘uninterrupted’, ‘easy’ and of ‘sliding’ from one idea to another.98 Along the same lines 
he also likens to operations of the mind (in this case the imagination but given the 
                                                 
96 Undermining deductive reasoning itself, rather than our ability to carry out deductions, is difficult 
precisely because it is monotonic. However whether a premise is true and logically implies another is not 
so clear, which is what Hume wants to point out. 
97 Quotes such as ‘the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern’d in their 
movements by the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they flow in their usual channel [T 
I.iv.i p.185]’ and ‘The straining of the imagination always hinders the regular flowing of the passions and 
sentiments’ are typical here. 
98 So for instance we have statements such as ‘The passage between related ideas is, therefore, so smooth 
and easy, that it produces little alteration on the mind, and seems like the continuation of the same 
action.’ [T I.iv.ii p. 204] 
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priority of the imagination the point is of general application) to the movements of a 
great ship that 
 
‘when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue even when its object fails it, and, like a galley put 
in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse.’ [T I.iv.ii p.198] 
 
However beyond analogies of this sort, frequent and important as they are, Hume offers 
us little in the way of argumentation. Fortunately however Sextus has already provided 
precisely this kind of argument, and in the most well known section of his work no less, 
that being the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.99 Of particular interest is the idea that the 
faculties we employ when we reason are conditioned in their operation by the physical 
properties of the organ (and there is some ambiguity in the ancient world over whether 
this is the heart or the brain) through which they operate. This is because the activities 
of whatever organ is relevant to reasoning are interfered with by what Sextus calls 
‘admixtures’. These admixtures are the result of the mixing of the matter making up the 
perceptive organs with other matter that moves around the body in seemingly 
unpredictable ways (the four humours for instance, but also other material influences). 
This is not to say that Sextus relies on some sort of reduction of the mind to the brain 
(or heart). All he requires is that our physical circumstances have some influence on the 
way we reason, and this is not nearly as contentious. In support of the idea of the 
physical influence on the mental of this sort Sextus has the following to say. 
 
‘Depending on the different dominance of our humours, the appearances too become different, as we 
established in our first argument. Further, in virtue of these humours, there are many differences in our 
choice and avoidance of external things…’[PH 1.80] 
 
‘For anyone who decides them is either in some of these conditions or in absolutely no condition at all. 
But to say that he is in no condition whatsoever (i.e. neither healthy no sick, neither moving nor at rest, 
of no particular age, and free from the other conditions) is perfectly incongruous. But if he is in some 
condition as he judges the appearances, he will be part of the dispute. And again, he will not be an 
unbiased judge of external existing objects because he will have been contaminated by the condition he is 
in.’ [PH 1.112-113] 
                                                 
99 It must be clearly be kept in mind through the rest of this section that while Sextus does deploy this 
argument he is not himself committed to its conclusion as he does not share the premises from which it 
derives. Sextus’ interlocutors do however accept these premises and so are committed to the arguments’ 
conclusion. 
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 With these observations in play Sextus can then introduce his more complete argument, 
found below, based on what his opponents would recognise as their own medical 
theories. 
 
‘So because of the admixtures our senses do not grasp what external existing objects are accurately like. 
But our intellect does not do so especially since its guides, the senses, fail it. And no doubt it too 
produces some admixture of its own to add to what is announced by the senses; for we observe the 
existence of certain humours round each of the organs in which the Dogmatists think that the ‘ruling part’ 
is located – in the brain or the heart or in whatever part of the animal they want to locate it.’                
[PH 1.127-128] 
 
So we see that according to the arguments Sextus produces there are good reasons for 
anyone accepting the best medical theories of their day to conclude that the operation of 
those faculties we use in reasoning really is no more reliable than that of perception or 
induction. However Sextus’ point here can be easily modernised by an appeal to the 
findings of cognitive science that also indicate that the physical construction of our 
brains does have some influence on the way we reason. Following a more 
contemporary version of Sextus’ argument we would have to conclude that deductive 
reasoning, as it is actually employed by physically-conditioned humans, cannot 
necessarily claim greater reliability than does perception or induction. 
 
To this point however Sextus’ argument, even in a modernised form, equivocates 
between supporting two theses. First is the uncontroversial thesis that our faculties are 
influenced in their operation by our physical constitution, in that the proper functioning 
of this physical constitution is a condition on perceiving and thinking correctly. Second 
is the controversial thesis that any complete explanation of what these faculties, 
including our rational faculties, provide us must in the final analysis refer to these same 
conditions and hence must refer to the properties that appear in a completed natural 
science. I believe that it is this more rigorously naturalistic thesis that Sextus must 
intend for his argument to go through. If reason is autonomous of our purely natural 
properties then it remains possible to describe its operation, and hence its reliability, 
without having to refer to the features to which Sextus wishes to draw our attention. 
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If this is correct then McDowell would accuse Sextus of engaging in bad metaphysics, 
and he would be right to do so.100 The Sextan argument at this point is flawed in that it 
does unwarrantedly assume that we may only refer to those properties that would 
appear in a completed natural science if we are to enter any properly objective claims. 
McDowell’s response to Sextus (which is much the same response that he would make 
to Hume, and unsurprisingly so in that we find Hume presenting a version of the Sextan 
argument in the Treatise) is that the onset of reason allows us to step back from nature 
and consider whether natural facts can be for an individual reasoner actual reasons to 
justify a belief or an act. As McDowell says that the 
 
‘ability to conceptualize the world must include the ability to conceptualize the thinkers own place in the 
word; and to find the latter ability intelligible, we need to make room for not only conceptual states that 
aim to represent how the world anyway is, but also for conceptual states that issue in interventions 
directed towards making the world conform to their content.’101 
 
Sextus however seems to have completely missed the point that if we are to reason at 
all then we must also be able to distance ourselves from and critique the features of our 
natural constitution that influence our reason, which in turn implies that our reason 
must be autonomous of these features.  
 
What then does this mean for the plausibility of Argument 1b for CSN? The point of 
Sextus’ original argument was to defend premise 4 by reducing the authority of 
reasoning such that it is essentially on a par with perception as a means of providing 
justification for our beliefs. If McDowell is right, as I think he is, then it seems that 
such a reduction on purely naturalistic grounds is not possible. Reason allows us to take 
a critical stance towards our ‘brute’ nature that perception does not allow and hence 
reason has an autonomy towards this brute nature that perception does not. 
 
This means that we need to appeal to a modified version of Sextus’ argument according 
to which we ask whether reason is any more reliable than perception as a means of 
justification for our beliefs without simultaneously appealing to what McDowell calls 
‘bad metaphysics’. However, even if reason is autonomous in the way that McDowell 
                                                 
100 See John McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universiy Press, 1998) 
pp.177-182. 
101 Ibid. p.170. 
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supposes this need not mean that reasoning must in general be more reliable than 
perception. While reason may always be autonomous of brute nature as McDowell 
explains this autonomy cannot of itself reassure us that our reasoning leads us to truth. 
At best this can assure us that reason aims at truth. Yes, we may be able to provide 
reasons that are acceptable to reason by its own light, but what confidence can we have 
that reason places things in the proper light? 
 
Asking this question does not all by itself require that it be answered by appealing to 
what McDowell calls ‘first natural’ facts – facts of the sort that appear in the natural 
sciences.102 Granted, we may ask this question by asking something like ‘how do I 
know that I am not right now brain-damaged in such a way that I consistently derive 
incorrect conclusions from arguments’ (which does appeal to the facts of natural 
science) but we need not ask a question such as this. We might also ask whether we 
attach proper importance to the requirements of consistency vs. explanatory power due 
to the way we have been trained to employ our rational capacities, and that question 
does not require appealing to such facts.103 
 
One might still wonder whether this modified version of Sextus argument, a version 
devoid of an appeal to bad metaphysics, is really sufficient to warrant premise (4) of 
Argument 1b for CSN. For while we might be able to ask the right sort of questions 
about either inductive or even abductive reasoning it still does not seem plausible to ask 
such questions of deductive reasoning at least when this is considered as a purely 
formal matter. The canons of deductive reasoning are imposed by reason itself and if 
we correctly adhere to standards demanded by reason itself it does not seem to be 
possible that we could go wrong in our deductions. While the premises we use in our 
deductive reasoning might fail to be true Sextus’ corrected argument provides us with 
no conclusive reason to suppose that the deductive process itself will be unreliable so 
long as it is carried out with due care and respect for the demands of reason. 
 
However, while Sextus’ modified argument may not provide us with everything we 
want it does provide us with enough to be going on with, in that it suggests that 
                                                 
102 Ibid. p.190. 
103 I intend here to draw an implicit parallel between the ethical case McDowell considers and a more 
obviously epistemological case. See Ibid. pp.193-194. 
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perception is at least as reliable as inductive and abductive forms of reasoning, and we 
do recognise these forms to be justification conferring. It is by appeal to these forms of 
reasoning that premise (4) can be made more plausible. With premise (4) defended in 
this way a supporter of CSN is in a position to claim that the absence of rational 
justification for a commitment does not lead to the conclusion that this commitment is 
unjustified simpliciter, as there exists a perfectly respectable kind of justification 
independent of rational justification.104 
 
This is not to suggest that Argument 1, in either version, is unproblematic. Indeed, 
several problems are noticeable. First, by undermining the claims of deductive 
reasoning to the high place it normally occupies Argument 1b invites the sceptic to 
deny premise (2) and so derive a conclusion sceptical of the idea that anything can be a 
source of justification.105 Such a move would be devastating for the argument as it 
requires that we accept that reason is a source of justification and attempts to 
“piggyback” natural justification on rational justification. Further, there is also a 
conceptual problem to deal with, in that Argument 1 raises questions of normativity. It 
is commonplace to suggest that I ought to take as true any proposition which emerges 
as ‘best’ as judged through a process of reasoning. That is, reason is connected with 
normativity. However, it is not so obvious that I ought to believe that at which I arrive 
as a consequence of my nature. As Hume would no doubt be quick to point out, what I 
am by nature is an is statement, a statement of fact, and one cannot derive an ought 
from an is. However, Argument 1 concludes that nature is normative by arguing that it 
is a source of justification, and justification is an inherently normative conception.106 
How is such a conclusion sustainable? 
 
                                                 
104 However, Sextus is correct about other things. First, he is right to think that the distanced attitude to 
our natural constitution made possible by the onset of reason cannot be, for us, a permanent attitude, and 
this for thoroughly natural reasons. Second, Sextus (or if not Sextus then at least Hume, for the evidence 
regarding Sextus is less than clear) is right to think that it is this distanced attitude itself which creates 
space for scepticism to develop. 
105 In fact Sextus deploys this very argument against his opponents. Of course Sextus is not committed to 
this conclusion himself as he does not accept the truth of his own premises. Reid anticipates this very 
argument, making three separate responses. First, that it is not within his power to avoid beliefs given to 
him by reasoning, as we have already seen. Second, that such a denial would make life untenable. Third, 
that God has guaranteed the reliability of reason, as experience teaches us. However such responses make 
no ground against the purely epistemic motivation to deny premise (2). 
106 This provides us with another reason this think that Argument 1 cannot in fact represent Hume’s 
actual position, as it leads to a conclusion that we could not accept. Argument 1 then must contain as 
much of Hume’s interpreters as it does of Hume himself. 
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In fact, that Argument 1 leads to the conclusion that appeals to nature could provide 
warrant for normative claims could just as easily be taken as a reductio ad absurdum of 
its premises rather than as a confirmation its conclusion, so entrenched is the fact/value 
distinction. This is not to say that Argument should be taken in this way, for while the 
fact/value distinction remains the orthodox position it has also come under sustained 
critique in recent times.107 However, because supporting the fact/value distinction is the 
orthodox position a defender of Argument 1 would be obliged to explain why they 
rejected this distinction. To be sure, it may not be an impossible task. For instance it 
may be possible to defend Argument 1 on this point by arguing that a complete 
description of a subject’s nature cannot be reduced to natural facts about that subject 
but must include irreducibly normative claims.108 That is, a defender of Argument 1 
may argue for what Putnam calls the entanglement of facts and values.109 However, as 
such arguments are complex and controversial we can conclude that Argument 1 for 
CSN does face some significant problems, both in its naturalising of reason and its 
treatment of normativity. Now is not the place to address these problems, although that 
time will come soon. For the moment it is enough to provide an outline of CSN and the 
arguments for it, as well as to introduce some of the problems CSN faces. The 
remainder of the dissertation will indeed be an exercise in attempting to address these 
and other difficulties and so now we turn to Argument 2 for CSN. 
 
ii) Argument 2. Wittgenstein and Strawson on transcendental arguments. 
 
The argument drawn from Wittgenstein and Strawson is somewhat more complex than 
those drawn from Sextus, Hume and Reid although it does still attempt to support the 
same conclusion as does Argument 1, namely, that the absence of rational justification 
for a commitment does not imply that this commitment lacks justification simpliciter. 
Where Argument 1 attempts to show that non-rational forms of justification are 
                                                 
107 See Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge: Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002) esp. ch. 1-2. This work contains both excellent arguments against the 
fact/value distinction and also a helpful survey of much of the literature on the topic. One should also 
note that the understanding of ‘nature’ for which McDowell and to which reference was made above 
would also imply that normative considerations could be read off natural facts and this also undermines a 
strict is/ought distinction. 
108 Something akin to Aristotle’s teleology might be able to carry this sort of philosophical burden, 
invoking a principle such as ‘you ought to act and believe so as to realise your (naturally-defined) telos’. 
However even if it can one wonders whether an appeal to such a teleology, metaphysically loaded as it is, 
is truly conformable to the spirit of CSN. 
109 Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays pp. 28ff. 
 Page 82  
available, Argument 2 recognises only one form of justification, that being rational 
justification.110 Instead Argument 2 attempts to show that the concept of rational 
justification only finds its proper application in a specific context, and that this context 
is partly constituted by those same commitments towards which our propositional 
attitude has been observed to be insensitive to the outcome of justificatory inquiry. 
Strawson summarises this idea the following way. 
 
‘The point was that our commitment on these points is pre-rational, natural, and quite inescapable, and 
sets, as it were, the natural limits within which, and only within which, the serious operations of reason, 
whether by way of questioning of justifying beliefs, can take place. (“Serious” = “actually making a 
difference.”)’ 111 
 
One result of adopting such a view is that some commitments are seen to stand outside 
the context in which justification finds its application, as they define that context rather 
than being part of it, and so some commitments must always remain unjustified. 
However precisely because these commitments stand outside the context for the proper 
application of the concept of justification they cannot be judged to be unjustified any 
more than they can be judged to be justified. Hence it follows that the absence of 
rational justification for a commitment does not imply that the commitment is 
unjustified simpliciter, just in case the commitment in question is one of those 
constituting the proper context of justification. We can see now that this argument has a 
transcendental structure, although without any appeal to metaphysics. Argument 2 
attempts to show that it is a condition for the application of the concept of justification 
that there be present a commitment to a certain range of (as yet unspecified) 
commitments.  
 
However we need to ask whether the context in which these observations are made 
biases the results. For instance, while it may strike us as odd to begin to ask questions 
about the past existence of the physical world or the uniformity of nature when in a 
history class it has generally struck philosophers as quite appropriate to ask these same 
questions in the context of philosophical, especially epistemological, inquiry. While our 
commitment to, say, take other human-like objects in the world to have minds may be 
                                                 
110 Hence in this section all talk of justification is to be taken to be talk of rational justification. 
111 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties p.39. We shall have reason to return to the 
notion of seriousness shortly. 
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pre-rational and natural as Strawson suggests it does not seem to be entirely 
inescapable. However if asking the questions Strawson thinks we may not ask is 
unexceptional in the context of philosophical inquiry then this raises a troubling 
possibility for a defender of CSN. For it may be the case that there is more than one 
rational context, and that each such context is structured by different pre-rational, 
natural and ‘inescapable’ commitments.112 
 
For the moment it has not been established that the possibility of there being more than 
one rational context can in fact be realised. However, a significant portion of chapter 3 
shall be devoted to establishing that this possibility can be realised via specifying how 
our commitments could shift and so create several different rational contexts or 
perspectives. Further, chapter 3 shall establish that some of these contexts or 
perspectives are thoroughly sceptical. Even so, just the possibility of our commitments 
being able to constitute more than one rational context poses significant problems for 
CSN, the most pressing of which concerns the way CSN handles scepticism. 
 
Recall that CSN does not attempt to refute scepticism, but instead attempts to dismiss it 
as vain because it does not make a difference to the structure of our commitments and 
so is not worthy of our serious attention. It also should be kept in mind that Strawson 
defines “serious” as meaning “actually making a difference.” Yet even taking 
seriousness thus defined as an appropriate criterion poses a problem. As defined here 
seriousness is a psychological criterion, concerning whether anyone feels the 
psychological force of sceptical arguments. However, it is not the psychological force 
of scepticism that must be the sceptics primary concern. As we have said, the sceptic is 
concerned with our entitlement to our commitments. The fact that our psychology is 
such that we feel entitled to commitments to which we in fact have no entitlement 
reveals an interesting, even disturbing, fact about our psychology but is not inconsistent 
with scepticism. That is, a sceptic may well reply to Strawson’s appeal to seriousness 
with the rejoinder that what he says is true but irrelevant. 
 
                                                 
112 I place ‘inescapable’ in scare-quotes because of course such commitments will only be inescapable in 
a given context because they are constitutive of that context. These ‘inescapable’ commitments could in 
fact be escaped if we were to shift to a different context not constituted by these commitments. 
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Even if we grant that an appeal to the notion of seriousness is an appropriate criterion 
against which to judge scepticism such an appeal does still not seem to help the 
defender of CSN. While an appeal to the apparent unseriousness of scepticism might go 
uncontested in a history class, or even in many other contexts, it may not go 
uncontested in an epistemology class. Indeed, when in such a class it is possible to 
begin to doubt that one knows all sorts of things, and to contemplate a radical revision 
of our commitments. But if sceptical doubts naturally emerge when undertaking 
distinctly epistemological inquiry, and history itself teaches us that several philosophers 
have claimed that this is indeed the case, then sceptical doubts cannot simply be 
dismissed in the blanket fashion required by CSN. Suddenly sceptical doubts and 
sceptical questions must be moved into the category of the “serious”. 
 
In the face of such a challenge several moves could be made in defence of CSN. First, it 
could be argued that even in the context of epistemology, or philosophy more generally, 
sceptical doubts are vain, having no real impact on our commitments. I take this to be 
an empirical question, best answered by considering those philosophers who have 
claimed to genuinely feel the force of sceptical doubts when undertaking philosophical 
reflection. Admittedly, this approach seems unlikely to succeed given the frequency 
with which philosophers have claimed to have fallen into sceptical doubts. Second, 
failing being able to show that sceptical doubts are always vain, a defender of CSN 
could argue that even though such doubts do emerge in some philosophical contexts 
there is nevertheless something ‘wrong’ with these contexts. For the moment I leave 
undetermined what exactly ‘wrong’ is understood to mean, as there are many different 
possibilities. One could for instance argue that the philosophical context suffers from 
some internal contradiction, adherence to an undefended but contentious theory or 
some other logical error.113 One could also argue that the philosophical context is not a 
rational context and further classify the emergence of sceptical doubts as the 
                                                 
113 An excellent example of this kind of approach to scepticism, particularly Cartesian scepticism, is 
found in Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Here 
Williams argues that the normal epistemic context in which sceptical arguments are pursued is 
committed to a doctrine he calls the epistemic realism. More recently he has pointed to the generality, or 
hyper-generality, of the sceptic’s questions in Michael Williams, “Scepticism and the Context of 
Philosophy,” Nous Supplement 14 (2004). 
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breakdown of rationality and hence a species of madness.114 That is, one could attempt 
a diagnosis of scepticism rather than a refutation of it. 
 
Interestingly, if it is conceded that sceptical doubts are serious and a diagnosis is 
attempted CSN will find itself committed to a distinction between distinctly 
philosophical contexts and other contexts, where the criterion for drawing this 
distinction will be whether a context allows for the legitimate development of sceptical 
doubts. However if such a distinction were introduced and it was still insisted that 
scepticism could be dismissed then CSN would be committed to privileging contexts 
not permissive of sceptical doubts (non-sceptical contexts) over contexts that are 
permissive in this way (sceptical contexts). Otherwise it would be just as valid, so far as 
the argument goes, to dismiss non-sceptical contexts. Yet privileging any one context 
over others runs contrary to the central thrust of CSN, at least as it emerges in 
Strawson’s work. Strawson is committed to a ‘relativising move’ that explicitly denies 
any one perspective, that of science for instance, has a privileged status. We thus see 
another tension within CSN to add to problems we saw earlier in connection with the 
idea of normativity. Here the tension is not caused by naturalising reason or the direct 
appeal to nature as normative but instead by the possibility that sceptical doubts cannot 
be dismissed as vain in the blanket sense needed by CSN, and the resulting possibility 
that a privileged distinction between different kinds of contexts would have to be 
introduced to account for the reality of sceptical doubt. Note however that this tension 
could be removed if it were simply conceded that sceptical doubts are not vain and 
emerge naturally in a specifiable context but without granting that this context is in any 
way privileged. That is, to remove this tension CSN could be adapted such that it is 
compatible with scepticism. There would still be a distinction between sceptical 
contexts and non-sceptical contexts but without the need to privilege the one over the 
other. As we shall see, distinguishing between sceptical and non-sceptical contexts 
without privileging either is a key feature of Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
 
Naturalism and commonsensical commitment in CSN: two views 
 
                                                 
114 Reid presents this idea in his Inquiry, where he calls scepticism “metaphysical lunacy”. See [IHM VI. 
p.209b] 
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Having now provided an outline of the two main arguments for the kind of naturalism 
involved in CSN it would now be wise to look more closely at the different kinds of 
naturalism that could be encompassed by CSN, and the relationship between these 
naturalisms and the notion of common sense. Examining these issues will also allow us 
to gain a clearer grasp on how the positions of Sextus, Hume, Reid and Strawson 
interrelate. As we shall see in this section, what binds these four philosophers together 
is that they all agree that there is such a thing as a natural commitment, and that it is our 
natural commitments that constitute (at least an important part of) common sense. 
Where differences emerge is over the question of our entitlement to these natural 
commitments, although even here the various responses to this question are 
recognisably similar in their conceptual structure. 
 
 i) Hume and Sextus: Common sense as scientific nature 
 
We find in Hume a connection between natural commitments and those that we rely on 
in everyday life. Moreover, we also find the idea that these natural commitments are 
held in common by all humans. Of particular interest is the belief in the uniformity of 
nature, which is held not just by all humans but by many animals also (if I may be here 
permitted to momentarily follow Hume and call such a ‘belief’ even though I shall 
ultimately argue that it is really no such thing). To confirm his own conclusions Hume 
draws a parallel between human cognition and animal cognition, arguing that they share 
an identical source and so one that must be attributed to a shared animal nature. 
 
‘Here we must make a distinction betwixt those actions of animals, which are of a vulgar nature, and 
seem to be on a level with their common capacities, and those more extraordinary instances of sagacity, 
which they sometimes discover for their own preservation, and the propagation of their species. A dog 
that avoids fire and precipices, that shuns strangers, and caresses his master, affords us an instance of the 
first kind. A bird, that chooses with such care and nicety the place and materials of her nest, and sits upon 
her eggs for a due time, and in a suitable season, with all the precaution that a chemist is capable of in the 
most delicate projection, furnishes us with a lively instance of the second. As to the former actions, I 
assert they proceed from a reasoning, that is not in itself different, nor founded on different principles, 
from that which appears in human nature.’ [T.I.iii.xvi. p.177] 
 
Hume here attributes to animals of a vulgar nature not just a generic ability to reason 
but an ability to engage in higher-order reasoning. Note that even this higher order 
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reasoning is described as an expression of an instinct of our nature arising from habits 
that are themselves based on lower-order instincts like natural induction. Hume says 
this quite clearly when he continues the above quote. 
 
‘To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, 
which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to 
their particular situations and relations. This instinct, it is true, arises from past observation and 
experience; but can any one give the ultimate reason why past experience and observation produces such 
an effect, any more than why nature alone should produce it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can 
arise from habit: nay, habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from 
that origin.’ [T.I.iii.xvi. p.179] 
 
Indeed, part iv of Book 1 of the Treatise is in many ways an extended defence of the 
idea that the beliefs which shape our common sense responses to the world are all held 
as a consequence of our nature, given that these commitments are founded in the 
operation of the imagination and that operation is explained in naturalistic terms. In 
Hume’s case then we could gloss ‘natural’ with ‘the kind of thing that could be 
discovered through scientific investigation’ and ‘nature’ with ‘the world as described 
by science’ and capture his basic meaning. That Hume takes such a scientific view of 
nature is the only reason why the appeal to animals could feature so prominently in his 
work. 
 
However of itself the appeal to science to account for nature is not exceptional. The 
truly interesting feature of Hume’s position is that it leaves no place for an appeal to 
anything other than what can be explained by science in that scientific explanations are 
complete. Note that all reasoning can be explained naturalistically in the above 
quotes.115 When McDowell refers to, and vehemently disagrees with, Neo-Humean 
empiricism it is this view that empirical scientific investigation tells us everything there 
is to which he is objecting. 
 
Hume thus offers us a straightforward reading of what it is for a commitment to be 
natural. A commitment is natural if it can be accounted for purely in terms of empirical 
                                                 
115 Note also that in the closing passages of the introduction to the Treatise Hume seems to explicitly 
state that the limits of (empirical) science are the limits of knowledge, and hence that we cannot go 
beyond what science can reach. For Hume it also turns out that science doesn’t tell us all that much. 
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science. Of course this doesn’t tell us much, since by Hume’s standards all 
commitments can be accounted for by empirical science if they can be accounted for at 
all. Rather than asking what beliefs are natural in this sense we ought to ask which 
beliefs are naturally common. To answer this question all we need do is disregard any 
commitments that are held due to individual idiosyncrasies, and the remainder will be 
held by any and all humans. While this remainder may be quite restricted it will also be 
very important, containing principles such as that the objects of perception are 
‘continu’d and distinct’, that objects retain an identity even through great physical 
change, that all events have a cause, that nature is uniform etc. 
 
I suggest that this remainder will form an important part of the content of common 
sense, and that Hume would have recognised it as such.116 Hume’s repeated appeal to 
the views of the ‘vulgar’, those who unwarrantedly but pre-philosophically accept all 
the above principles, would itself suggest that these principles are indeed 
commonsensical.117 This impression is reinforced by Hume’s claim that when not 
actually engaged in philosophical reflection even philosophers accept the above 
principles.118 If this is correct then because common sense is natural in this strict 
scientific sense it is also unavoidable. While we have already noted that this does not of 
itself show that common sense is normative it does explain why it is consistently 
observed to hold; why it is common sense and not good sense. 
 
We find a very similar view on the relationship between natural belief and common 
sense in Sextus. The Sextan position is similar to that we find in Hume in that both 
appeal to the same empirical scientific approach. We have already seen the Sextan 
version of this in connection with the defence of premise (4) of Argument 1a for CSN. 
Keeping this earlier analysis in mind, we now find Sextus making the point that the 
commitments which both structure our everyday lives and which we hold in common 
(as opposed to culturally determined or idiosyncratic commitments) are attributable to 
our natural constitution, what he here calls the “necessitation by feelings”. 
 
                                                 
116 A further socio-cultural but changeable element will usually in practice be added to this, for every 
culture has taken its own parochial views to be commonsensical. However this need not invalidate the 
general method. 
117 For some relevant appeals to the views of the vulgar see T.I.iii.xii, p.132, T.I.iv.ii, p.192-194, 209, 
213, 216. 
118 See T.I.iv.ii, p.217. 
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We said above that ordinary life, which the Sceptics too participate in, is fourfold, consisting in the 
guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds 
of expertise. By the necessitation of feelings the Sceptics are conducted by thirst to drink, by hunger to 
food, and so on. In the same way Methodic doctors are conducted by feelings to what corresponds to 
them: by contradiction to dilation as when someone seeks refuge in heat from the compression due to 
intense cold) and by flux to checking (as when those in baths who are dripping with sweat and relaxed 
come to check it and seek refuge in the cold air.)…I think that everything which the Methodics say in 
this vein can be brought under the necessitation of feelings, either natural or unnatural. (PH 1.238-239) 
 
In Sextus and Hume then we have a distinctly scientific view of the origin of common 
sense, although as McDowell has pointed out it is not without its deficiencies. 
However, even so the Humean-Sextan view is not totally without plausibility either. It 
does after all account for why common sense is common. Further, given the strict 
scientific criterion that it establishes it also allows us a method to separate what is 
generally part of common sense from what is merely a cultural artefact. The implied 
parsimony regarding what we are to take as being genuinely commonsensical is one of 
the chief advantages of this view. The question though is whether the Humean-Sextan 
view is too parsimonious for its own good. 
 
 ii) Strawson: Nature as the presupposition of reason 
 
In contrast to the strictly scientific approach to natural commitment and common sense 
we have Strawson’s view. Reflecting on Hume, Strawson finds himself in broad 
agreement with the general thrust of Hume’s conclusions. However, Strawson is able to 
accommodate many of the main points of the Humean-Sextan view without reducing 
natural commitment and common sense to a strictly scientific basis. 
 
Of course, we can be convinced that a particular reaction of ours on a particular occasion was unjustified, 
just as we can be convinced in particular cases that what we took for a physical object, or a physical 
object of a certain kind, was no such thing. But our general proneness to these attitudes and reactions is 
inextricably bound up with that involvement in personal and social interrelationships which begins our 
lives, which develops and complicates itself in a great variety of ways throughout our lives and which is, 
one might say, a condition of our humanity. What we have, in our inescapable commitment to these 
attitudes and feelings, is a natural fact, something as deeply rooted in our nature as our existence as 
natural beings.119 
                                                 
119 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties p.33. 
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 In Strawson we see ideas connected with sociality and rationality emerging alongside 
talk of ourselves as natural beings. Of particular importance is the idea that our natural 
commitments provide the ‘condition for our humanity’. Such a notion as a condition of 
our humanity could not feature in the Humean-Sextan view as our natural commitments 
having such-and-such a structure is a consequence of us having a physically human 
constitution, and not a condition of that constitution. I suggest that Strawson is 
introducing at least two new elements into what we understand to be natural. 
 
First, Strawson introduces the question of what it is that makes us truly human, refusing 
to understand that in the strictly biological way implicit in the Humean-Sextan view. 
Strawson’s answer to this question is that we must include our uniquely human social 
interactions in any answer to this question, in addition to our ability to reflect on our 
strictly natural constitution. Strawson’s view includes the social and rational realms in 
the scope of the natural. This social element is not something that can be explained in 
the way that we explain the interaction of other animals because other animals do not 
enter into the process of demanding reasons for their commitments as humans do. That 
is, the social element is essentially a rational element. What makes us truly human is 
not that we are rational animals, it is that we are rational animals. The Humean-Sextan 
position places insufficient emphasis here. Granted, rationality is still something which 
is to be accounted for naturalistically in that it is ‘as deeply rooted in our nature as our 
existence as natural beings’ and so is not something imposed on an otherwise natural 
creature from the outside. However, in Strawson’s account the necessary space is made 
for the kind of distancing of ourselves from what McDowell calls our first nature that is 
a requirement for any rationality worth the name. 
 
This brings us to the second new feature in Strawson’s account of what it is for a 
commitment to be natural which, as has been alluded to, is that Strawson introduces the 
idea of a condition. If we keep in view the idea that our uniquely human social 
interactions are rational interactions then the conditions that make social interactions 
possible must be the conditions for the application of reason when applied to the social 
sphere. What conditions might these be? One prime candidate would be the supposition 
that other human-looking objects we encounter have minds. Another would be that 
these minded objects must be treated as both moral objects and moral agents. On this 
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reading some commitments are natural not because they are provided by our 
scientifically-defined nature, but because we only achieve our truly human nature by 
presupposing these commitments. Fundamentally, what separates the Humean-Sextan 
view from Strawson’s view is a debate about what criteria we are to impose on 
judgement of what it is to be genuinely human. 
 
Like the Humean-Sextan view, Strawson’s view is also capable of explaining why there 
is such a thing as genuinely common sense. By associating natural commitments with 
the content of common sense, and then arguing that natural commitments are necessary 
if humans are to be human in the fullest sense of humanity, it follows that these natural 
commitments will indeed be common.  
 
 iii) Reid: Tensions over nature and common sense 
 
Having now explained the divergent views of Sextus, Hume and Strawson we are now 
in a position to mention the position of Reid. Reid has been left to last because he 
equivocates between a position that looks more that the Humean-Sextan position and 
one which seems to anticipate that of Strawson. Hence it is easier to understand Reid 
when one already understands these other philosophers. 
 
 a) Outline of the basic points to Reid’s view 
 
Regarding the immunity of common-sense to philosophical arguments Reid would have 
it that the defenders of philosophy have erred in that 
 
‘the votaries of this philosophy, from a natural prejudice in her favour, have endeavoured to extend her 
jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call to her bar the dictates of common sense. But these decline 
this jurisdiction; they disdain the trial of reasoning, and disown its authority; they neither claim its aid not 
dread its attacks.’120 
 
Note that common sense here does not emerge as being justified after being submitted 
for philosophical examination, but is not as a consequence judged to be unwarranted. 
                                                 
120 Reid, Works Now Fully Collected: With Selections from His Unpublished Letters, Papers, Notes, and 
Supplementary Dissertations IHM I.iv. p.101b. 
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Instead common sense beliefs ‘disdain the trial of reasoning’ and do not ‘dread its 
attacks’. That is, common sense is immune to any challenges which philosophy might 
present. Reid pushes the point even further than this by arguing that it is both 
theoretically and practically impossible that common sense could be called to the bar of 
philosophy. 
 
Practically, any resultant examination would surely end in unmitigated disaster.121 
Theoretically, for philosophy to call common sense into question is for philosophy to 
engage in a self-undermining activity. Take for instance the following passage. 
 
‘Such principles [i.e. principles of common sense] are older, and of more authority, than philosophy: she 
rests upon them as her basis and not they upon her. If she could overturn them, she must be buried in 
their ruins; but all the engines of philosophical subtlety are too weak for this purpose; and the attempt is 
no less ridiculous than if a mechanic should contrive an axis in peritrochio to remove the earth out of its 
place.’122 
 
Reid also notes that in some cases common-sense beliefs also have the property of 
being arrived at independently of any process of reasoning, inferential or otherwise. 
Taking into consideration the belief that the testimony of consciousness can be trusted 
Reid makes the following remarks. 
 
‘But why did he [i.e., Descartes] not prove the existence of his thought? Consciousness, it may be said, 
vouches that. But who is voucher for consciousness? can any man prove that his consciousness may not 
deceive him? No man can: nor can we give a better reason for trusting to it, than that every man, while 
his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it, and to 
laugh at, or pity, the man who doubts its testimony. And is not every man, in his wits, as much 
determined to take his existence on trust as his consciousness.’123 
 
This last quote also makes it clear that Reid takes common-sense to be genuinely 
common. Observe that the only people who are said to be lacking these common-sense 
beliefs are those suffering from some kind of mental disturbance. We see here the close 
connection in Reid’s thought between accepting our natural commitments and having a 
normally functioning psychology. We also see the close connection between having 
                                                 
121 Ibid. IHM VI.xx p.183b. 
122 Ibid. IHM I.v. p.102b. 
123 Ibid. IHM I.iii. p.100a. 
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these commitments and being rational. Indeed Reid takes the acceptance of common-
sense beliefs to be the criterion according to which the limits of rationality can be 
assessed.124 From this we must concede that Reid’s understanding of common sense 
revolves around the idea that the beliefs constitutive of common sense are both forced 
upon us and are immune to being overturned as a consequence of countervailing 
philosophical considerations.125 They are also common among all sane individuals. As 
we have indicated, these are precisely the characteristics typical of natural 
commitments. 
 
 b) Reid’s primary ‘foundationalist’ view 
 
Moving then to Reid’s two view’s on the nature of common-sense, or natural 
commitment, we can already see above indications of the view which ultimately comes 
to dominate Reid’s thinking in its clearly foundationalist overtones. On this view 
common sense provides us with what are genuine first principles, able to play a 
foundational role for the construction of philosophical systems. In fact according to this 
view without such a foundation in common sense philosophy would be impossible. 
Granted, Reid does not think that these foundations are anything like those sought in 
the Cartesian project, but they play a similar functional role nonetheless. That Reid 
thinks about common sense in these foundational terms becomes more obvious when 
we survey his later works, especially the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 
(hereafter EIP). While introducing the idea of a common sense Reid has this to say. 
 
‘But there are other propositions which are no sooner understood than they are believed. The judgement 
follows the apprehension of them necessarily, and both are equally the work of nature, and the result of 
our original powers. There is no searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not 
deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself and has no occasion to borrow it from 
another. 
                                                 
124 As later chapters will show this association between accepting common-sense and assessments of 
sanity has far-reaching consequences for the normativity of natural commitments. 
125 While there are no doubt some differences between the perspectives of Reid and Hume on this subject 
it is important not to overlook the similarities. This observation is by no means original or modern, being 
noted from contemporaries of Hume and Reid. 
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Propositions of this last kind, when they are used in matters of science, have commonly been called 
axioms; and on whatever occasion they are used, are called first principles, principles of common sense, 
common notions, self-evident truths.’126  
 
A number of points stand out in this statement. First, we see again that natural 
commitments are forced upon us and are natural in this sense. This appears to be a 
psychological point, not an epistemic one. Second, and not surprisingly given the 
preceding observation, natural commitments are not inferred from any other beliefs. 
Third, and to reemphasise an important point, in virtue of their not being inferred from 
other beliefs, natural commitments can function as foundational premises for the 
construction of further arguments. Note for instance that the axioms of mathematics and 
natural science are these natural commitments under another name, and Reid makes it 
quite clear that the reason why mathematics and natural science had made such 
stunning progress by the late 18th century is that these branches of inquiry had been able 
to make explicit the natural commitments relevant to these fields of inquiry. Making 
explicit the natural commitments operative in other fields of inquiry was hence seen as 
a prerequisite for the same kind of rapid advancement that had recently been seen in the 
sciences; so much so that Reid claims such an achievement would 
 
‘contribute greatly to the stability of human knowledge, and consequently to the improvement of it, if the 
first principles upon which the various parts of it are grounded were pointed out and ascertained…There 
are two branches of human knowledge in which this method has been followed – to wit, mathematics and 
natural philosophy; in mathematics, as far back as we have books…The science, once firmly established 
upon the basis of a few axioms and definitions, as upon a rock, has grown from age to age, so as to 
become the loftiest and the most solid fabric that human reason can boast.’127 
 
Further, while these natural commitments may be implicit for many people, having 
been forced upon them in the absence of any process of reasoning, Reid thinks that we 
should not thereby be led to conclude that these beliefs can only ever be implicit. When 
functioning as premises in arguments they must in fact be made explicit, and Reid is 
quite comfortable with the process of making these beliefs explicit. The most famous 
example of Reid’s engagement in this task occurs in the chapter titled ‘First Principles 
of Contingent Truths’. Here is a sampling of the principles he lists. 
                                                 
126 Reid, Works Now Fully Collected: With Selections from His Unpublished Letters, Papers, Notes, and 
Supplementary Dissertations EIP VI.iv. p. 434. 
127 Ibid. EIP VI.iv. p. 436. 
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 • That the thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I 
call MYSELF, my MIND, my PERSON. 
• That those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and 
are as we perceive them to be. 
• That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not 
fallacious. 
• That, in the phænomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like what has 
been in similar circumstances. 
 
Reid makes it quite clear that the attitude we take towards these principles (whatever 
that may be) cannot in practice be influenced by reasons, as these principles are not 
adopted for reasons. The reason-insensitivity of common sense is implicit in the earlier 
quotes, and the following passage is also indicative of this general view. 
 
‘In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both 
with dishonour and loss; nor can she ever thrive till this rivalship is dropt, these encroachments given up, 
and a cordial friendship restored….’128 
 
Thus perhaps we ought to conclude that natural commitments are not actually beliefs, 
and introduce some new designation instead. Belief, after all, is a reason-sensitive 
propositional attitude. Such a move would be premature at this stage for to conclude 
that we do not actually believe these natural commitments would commit us to the odd 
consequence that we do not believe any axiom or self-evident proposition, as these are 
also reason-insensitive in the same sense that Reid’s common-sense beliefs are. Yet 
surely we cannot say that we do not believe the axioms of mathematics. As a result of 
such considerations we ought perhaps to conclude that according to this conception 
natural commitments are reason sensitive. At the very least we ought to recognise that 
if these natural commitments do amount to beliefs then there is something queer about 
them. They seem to form a class of their own, and to function quite differently to 
normal beliefs.129  
 
                                                 
128 Ibid. IHM I.v. p.100b. 
129 Assigning beliefs ‘at the foundation’ special properties is of course a feature common to many, if not 
all, foundationalist epistemologies. 
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 c) Reid’s secondary ‘proto-transcendental’ view 
 
Even granting that distinguishing a special class of commitments that play this 
foundational role has been a recurrent theme among epistemologists for some time, 
Reid’s foundationalist framework does raise some difficult questions. In particular we 
might wonder whether natural commitments really can or do function as premises in 
philosophical arguments. We can appeal to Wittgenstein for assistance on this question, 
much as Wolterstorff has done recently. In On Certainty Wittgenstein undertakes 
numerous investigations, not all of which can be easily brought together to form one 
coherent view. One of these investigations concerns the foundation for our inquiries, 
and especially our philosophical inquiries. This investigation was prompted by Moore 
who, following Reid’s view as explained above, had taken various principles of 
common sense as premises in philosophical arguments. Moore’s warrant for taking 
such a position was that he was more certain of the beliefs he took to be premises than 
he was of anything else. Keep in mind that it is only because these commitments are 
genuine beliefs that they could be made explicit in the way Moore required. This had 
led Moore to make some rather unusual statements, for instance that he knew an 
external world existed because he knew he had two hands. Quite rightly, Wittgenstein 
was prompted to wonder whether we really do ‘know’ that we have two hands in the 
sense in which Moore intended, or whether Moore had somehow misrepresented our 
epistemic state in speaking thus. Hence some of Wittgenstein’s observations are useful 
when we ask whether the principles Reid identifies can really function as premises for 
arguments. So it is to these observations that we now turn. 130 
 
Of particular importance at this juncture is Wittgenstein’s idea that our inquiries find 
their terminus in our practice rather than in any foundational premises of the sort Reid 
identifies. For instance Wittgenstein makes the following points. 
 
                                                 
130 There is however a proviso in what follows, in that the conclusions I draw from Wittgenstein’s may 
not have been Wittgenstein’s conclusions. In fact I am not convinced that Wittgenstein drew any one 
conclusion from his inquiries, or even that the term ‘conclusion’ is the appropriate terms with which to 
describe the terminus of his thought. Rather than attempting to follow Wittgenstein’s thought I shall 
instead draw inspiration from a few of the observations he made. Note that Wolterstorff also makes 
extensive use of Wittgenstein’s insights, although he comes to different conclusions to those I draw here. 
See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Reid on Common Sense, with Wittgenstein's Assistance,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74, no. 3 (2000). 
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‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;- but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ [OC 204] 
 
‘If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a calculation of his teacher’s? But 
these explanations must after all sometime come to an end. Will he also be taught that he can trust his 
senses – since he is indeed told in many cases that in such and such a special case you cannot trust them? 
– 
Rule and exception.’ [OC 34] 
 
‘In certain circumstances, for example, we regard a calculation as sufficiently checked.  What gives us a 
right to do so? Experience? May not that have deceived us? Somewhere we must be finished with 
justification, and then there remains the proposition that this is how we calculate.’ [OC 212] 
 
‘Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceeding.’ [OC 229] 
 
Wittgenstein’s point in speaking in this manner is perhaps that it is our practice that 
ultimately provides the ground for our justificatory activity. That is, our justifications 
come to an end when we act on our beliefs, and not when we find a solid foundation for 
those beliefs in terms of a deduction from first principles. This would explain why 
Wittgenstein says that our talk (including, I believe, our justificatory procedures) gets 
its meaning from the rest of our proceeding, that is, it gets its meaning from our 
practice. I take it that Wittgenstein’s intent would then be to change the direction of 
analysis by giving priority to appeals to practice over appeals to theories of 
justification. While I will argue in chapter 3 that this basic intuition about the proper 
direction of analysis is quite correct I think that if the above comments capture 
Wittgenstein’s view then Wittgenstein must have been wrong. It is not the practices but 
the norms that those practices respect that gives meaning to the rest of our proceeding. 
 
We see this attempt to change the perspective from which the debates over justification 
are normally carried out in the following statement. 
 
‘We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know…” For it is not a question of mental 
processes or mental states. 
 And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not.’ [OC 230] 
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Our focus here needs to fall on the phrase ‘what do we do’, in that this phrase brings to 
our attention the claim that it is our practices which form the foundation for our 
justifications, and not the other way around. Once we grasp this point it becomes 
perfectly obvious what Wittgenstein intends when he makes the following claim.  
 
‘If the true if what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.’ [OC 205] 
 
For practices are not true or false, propositions are. But the ground is the practices, or 
‘the rest of our proceeding’, not the propositions. Casting this in terms more directly 
relevant to the current discussion of the character of our natural commitments, we can 
point out that beliefs, in virtue of having propositional content, can be said to be true or 
false (in a derivative sense). But then if we take it that our natural commitments are 
beliefs then, if Wittgenstein is correct, these natural commitments cannot be the 
foundation for our philosophical justifications that both Reid and Moore require. 
 
This immediately suggests that if Wittgenstein is right then Reid’s view that our natural 
commitments are beliefs (even if of a special sort) must be mistaken. By the same token 
Moore is also mistaken to appeal to his knowledge of the existence of his hands to 
ground his activity of saying that he knows there exists an external world. The mistake 
however is not that the principles Reid and Moore introduce are false, for if they are at 
the ground then they are neither true nor false. Nor is the error to be found in some 
faulty deduction from these principles. Rather the error of these two philosophers is to 
take it that the ground can play a foundational role in the construction of philosophical 
theories in the way they suggest. Moore was right to appeal to the practice of using his 
hands, but wrong to think that this could be the basis for a deductive refutation of 
scepticism. That is, Moore should have responded to the sceptical challenge just as 
Sextus and his Cynic forbears did, by practicing in normal everyday sorts of ways.131 
 
                                                 
131 Of course there is some reason to think that Moore was not offering a refutation of scepticism in a 
traditional sort of way, and he may well have been meaning to give priority to practice in holding up a 
hand and proclaiming ‘Here is a hand’. See Greco, “How to Reid Moore.” If that is right, then Moore 
may have made a crucial mistake in attempting to translate his practical refutation into a published paper, 
as this fundamentally distorts the point Moore was trying to make. 
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Ironically, Wittgenstein here accuses Reid of an error of which Reid had previously 
accused Descartes. We have seen earlier that Reid accused Descartes of attempting to 
prove his own existence in the following passage. 
 
‘But why did he [i.e., Descartes] not prove the existence of his thought? Consciousness, it may be said, 
vouches that. But who is voucher for consciousness? can any man prove that his consciousness may not 
deceive him? No man can: nor can we give a better reason for trusting to it, than that every man, while 
his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it, and to 
laugh at, or pity, the man who doubts its testimony. And is not every man, in his wits, as much 
determined to take his existence on trust as his consciousness.’132 
 
The thrust of Reid’s criticism of Descartes at this point is that Descartes is attempting to 
find a justification for something Reid takes to be a ground. The details here are worth 
dwelling upon, for the ground that Reid takes Descartes to have misidentified is not the 
kind of first principle that Wittgenstein’s argument indicates cannot be the ground. 
Rather Reid picks out here a feature of our practice as the ground. Specifically, Reid 
points to the practice of taking our existence on trust, and following Wittgenstein we 
would have to grant that Reid is quite correct to criticize Descartes in this manner. 
 
This in turn suggests that Reid must have an alternate understanding on what function 
is played by natural commitments, one in which they do not appear as first principles 
functioning as premises in arguments intended to justify our knowledge claims. 
Otherwise it would not be possible for Reid to coherently criticize Descartes on exactly 
the same point concerning which Reid was indiretly criticized by Wittgenstein. Why 
Reid has this alternate understanding of natural commitment is not of immediate 
importance. What is of immediate importance is what this understanding amounts to, 
and it is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
As Wolterstorff rightly points out, there is some good textual support for the idea that 
Reid had more than one way of understanding natural commitment.133 Take for 
instance the following statement of Reid’s. 
                                                 
132 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) I.iii. pp. 
10-11.  
133 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Reid on Common Sense,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, ed. 
Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.84ff, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas 
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‘If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to 
believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without 
being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is 
manifestly contrary to them is what we call absurd.’134 
 
To further clarify the character of a natural commitment according to this new 
conception requires some examples. Looking at some other of Reid’s statements can 
help us to determine what our answer ought to be. For instance consider the following, 
drawn from An Inquiry into the Human Mind. 
 
‘The skeptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object you perceive? This belief, 
sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of nature; it bears her image and superscription; 
and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I even took it on trust, and without suspicion…I think it would 
not be prudent to throw off this belief, if it were in my power…But what is the consequence? I resolve 
not to believe my senses. I break my nose upon a post that comes my way; I step into a kennel; and, after 
twenty such wise and rational actions, I am taken up and clapped into a mad-house.’135 
 
This example invites a distinction between a belief and a natural commitment, in that 
there are some commitments that are reason-insensitive because they provide the 
context in which reasons finds its proper application. Reid brings out the constructive 
feature of these commitments by imagining what would happen were it in our power to 
abandon them (which of course it is not). The conclusion he reaches is that we would 
be ‘taken up and clapped in a mad-house’. That is, abandoning these commitments is 
tantamount to abandoning rationality.136 If we are to reason at all, Reid wants to say, 
then we must accept some commitments. In Reid’s case these commitments are 
provided for us by the ‘mint of nature’, which is to say that the commitments that we 
must accept to be rational at all are the same commitments that we find it natural to 
adopt. Clearly, such commitments cannot be reason-sensitive because they stand 
outside the context in which reason finds its proper application. However, beliefs are 
reason-sensitive, and so these constitutive commitments cannot be beliefs. 
                                                                                                                                              
Reid and the Story of Epistemology, ed. Robert B. Pippin, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.223ff. 
134 Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind II.vi. p. 32. 
135 Ibid. VI.xx. pp. 207-208. 
136 Reid appears here to be attempting to collapse Arguments 1 and 2 for CSN. While his attempt is not 
entirely successful because it unhelpfully blurs the distinctions between epistemology and psychology, it 
is indicative of the direction in which these arguments would need to be developed. 
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 Supposing that a natural commitment is not a belief coheres well with some of 
Wittgenstein’s intuitions about the structure of the grounds for our beliefs. Take for 
instance the following sequence. 
 
‘I have a telephone conversation with New York. My friend tells me that his young trees have buds of 
such and such a kind. I am now convinced that his tree is…Am I also convinced that the earth exists?’ 
[OC 205] 
 
‘The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting point of belief for 
me.’ [OC 209] 
 
‘Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists? Much seems to be 
fixed and is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted into an unused siding.’ [OC 210] 
 
‘Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. 
But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being 
has parents.)’ [OC 211] 
 
Using the distinction drawn from Reid, we would say that Wittgenstein here has a 
belief that certain young trees in New York are of such and such a variety which is 
grounded in some non-belief which is also a natural commitment. This seems to be the 
thrust of Wittgenstein’s questions in the above quotations and Reid can on these 
grounds be accused of carelessness in designating natural commitments as beliefs.137 
This is not to say that Reid has simply anticipated Wittgenstein’s insights in a less 
rigorous form, as there is a genuine divergence between these two thinkers over the 
content of these natural commitments. As OC 210-211 indicates (see above) 
Wittgenstein allows for the possibility that the character of our natural commitments 
can and do shift over time. At another point in On Certainty he goes further and states 
unequivocally that this character does indeed change over time. 
 
‘It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and 
functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this 
relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.’ [OC 96] 
 
                                                 
137 Note also that at times Wittgenstein seems to make the same mistake, designating what are really 
grounds for belief as belief. See for instance On Certainty 240-242. 
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‘The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the riverbed of thoughts may shift. But I 
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though 
there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.’ [OC 97] 
 
On this Reid and Wittgenstein diverge, as Reid takes it that the principles he identifies 
are timeless, even if they also happen to be contingent. I believe, pace Wolterstorff, that 
Wittgenstein has the better of the argument at this point and preference shall be given to 
this view in chapter 3. 
 
Nature and common sense: convergence, divergence and debate 
 
Having now provided an outline of the two views of nature in the authors taken to be of 
central importance for an analysis of CSN we can now ask what brings these authors 
together and what keeps them apart. First we can note what keeps them apart, and here 
we can appeal to the obvious distinction between Hume and Sextus (nature as that 
described by science) on the one hand and Strawson (nature as the condition for reason 
and fully realised humanity) on the other, with Reid falling to both camps depending on 
which passage we choose to highlight. As has been noted, this distinction is based on a 
more fundamental distinction over what the best way of understanding the human 
person. Are we rational animals or are we rational animals? It is divergence on this 
point that creates a further divergence in the view taken of common sense. Hume and 
Sextus take the content of common sense to be common on account of a shared 
physical constitution. Strawson takes (or would have to take were he to comment 
directly on the matter) common sense to be common on account of all humans entering 
into distinct social interactions that require certain forms of rational activity that in turn 
are only made possible by the prior acceptance of the principles of common sense. 
Again, Reid confusingly says both.138 
 
                                                 
138 While it is true that these views are not actually inconsistent, they are not actually consistent either. 
Consistency requires conceptual overlap, and no such overlap exists here as Arguments 1 and 2 appeal to 
quite different factors in explaining why the lack of rational justification does not imply the lack of 
justification simpliciter. It would seem that Arguments 1 and 2 are actually incommensurable. Hence if 
we are to make these arguments consistent then one or both would need to be substantially modified. It 
will be a secondary desiderata of this dissertation to show exactly what modification would be required 
to render Arguments 1 and 2 into a consistent set. 
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However observing the divergences can blind us to the genuine convergences. Of these 
convergences two are of great importance. First, all four philosophers take it that there 
is such a thing as natural commitment, and also take it that these natural commitments, 
even if contingent, are also common to all humans. These common natural 
commitments is what each identifies as common sense, Reid more explicitly than the 
others. Second, all four also take it that appealing to the naturalness  – in the sense in 
which each understands nature – of common sense explains why justificatory inquiry 
directed towards common sense is vain. Each philosopher agrees that try as we might 
nature will not be denied. 
 
Hence according to CSN it is accurate to say that it is commonsensical to take such-
and-such an attitude to specifiable content. In this way CSN sidesteps debates over 
whether common sense is to be defined in terms of content or in terms of attitude. In 
fact both attitudinal and content-based appeals are required to do justice to common 
sense. Appealing exclusively to attitude is inadequate as the natural attitudes important 
for common sense cannot be maintained when directed towards just any proposition. 
Some propositions really do have a special place in our cognitive economy. However 
simply listing these propositions is also inadequate as it leaves unexplained why these 
propositions are special. To account for that we need to appeal to the natural fixity of 
our propositional attitudes when directed towards these propositions. 
 
It is only by grasping these convergences that we are also able to grasp what these 
thinkers are really disagreeing about, for to disagree with anyone about anything we 
must first agree with them about something. As it turns out the real disagreement 
between these philosophers turns on whether the naturalness of common sense provides 
us with any entitlement to common sense. This question is highly motivated because of 
the vanity of inquiry into common sense, for if we always find ourselves unable to do 
without commitments to which we have no entitlement then this carries clear sceptical 
implications. Thus the disagreement between these philosophers is predicated on both 
the reality of common sense as natural and the fact that our taking common sense as 
commonsensical is insensitive to outcome of justificatory inquiry into common sense. 
As it turns out each of Sextus, Hume, Reid and Strawson is in disagreement with each 
of the others in one way or another. We can see this by looking at the answer of each to 
the question ‘Are we entitled to common sense’? 
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 To this question Sextus and Strawson give categorical answers, Sextus in the negative 
and Strawson in the affirmative. To avoid any form of dogmatism Sextus adds to this 
negative claim the further claim that we are also unentitled to both the contrary of 
common sense and, interestingly, the non-entitlement claims just mentioned. Sextus 
and Strawson thus represent the extreme wings of the debate over our entitlement to 
common sense. On the reading I will defend both as Hume’s position and the correct 
position in its own right, Hume’s answer is cast hypothetically rather than categorically. 
It follows from his position that if we have an entitlement to common sense then we 
also have an entitlement to (Pyrrhonian) scepticism. This is not to say that we do have 
such an entitlement to common sense, but does imply that the anti-sceptical use of 
appeals to common sense is misguided. Reid supports Strawson’s conclusion, but 
perhaps provides a different reason for thinking that we have an entitlement to common 
sense when we engages with the scientific view we see in Hume and Sextus.139 Hence 
Strawson and Reid defend CSN, Hume is a revolutionary or insurgent operating from 
inside a framework accepted by the defenders of CSN and Sextus attacks CSN from the 
outside. Thus Hume represents the most dangerous response to a defender of CSN and 
the remainder of this thesis is in fact an extended defence of the Humean response to 
the question of whether we are entitled to common sense. However the remainder of the 
present chapter is devoted to drawing some conclusions regarding CSN. 
 
Summary of CSN and its problems 
 
This chapter began with the contention that CSN boils down to an observation and two 
assertions. The observation is that there are propositions towards which our 
propositional attitude is insensitive to the outcome of justificatory inquiry, and 
importantly so when we consider the usual outcome of justificatory inquiry is to lead to 
our propositional attitudes varying. Given this insensitivity in the context of 
justificatory inquiry, commitments with this propositional content are seen not to 
connect up with rational justification in the right way. Attempting to find rational 
justifications for these commitments is thus judged to be vain, as is attempting to show 
that no rational justification exists for these commitments. As scepticism invokes 
                                                 
139 Given the variation that Reid introduces in particular it is clear that which side of the question of 
entitlement on which one comes down is not determined by the view one takes of nature. 
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precisely these justificatory considerations it too is considered to be vain on this view. 
Thus this observation apparently (but incorrectly) leads to the conclusion that 
scepticism, as vain, can be safely dismissed. 
 
The first assertion, constituting the naturalism of CSN, is that the absence of rational 
justification for some commitments does not imply that the commitment is unjustified 
simpliciter. Either there are forms of justification apart from rational justification or 
some commitments are required if rational justification is to find a proper context for its 
application. In either case we are in a position to say that such commitments ought to be 
held, as either they are justified independently of rationality or they are required in 
order for rational justification to be possible. The second assertion, concerning common 
sense, is that these propositions constitute the content of common sense. We should 
now have a tolerably clear idea about what this means when the details are spelled out. 
 
There are several problems facing CSN at this juncture, quite apart from the tensions 
over which arguments we are to use to support it that were mentioned earlier. The first 
concerns normativity. CSN argues, as we have seen, that we have an entitlement to 
common sense. If this is argued on the ground that common sense is justified because 
our commitment to common sense is a natural fact (as in Argument 1a) then CSN will 
face problems. Natural facts are not normally thought to warrant normative claims. 
CSN also faces the same problems with normativity if it is argued that natural 
justification is equally as respectable as rational justification, in addition to inviting a 
sceptical attack on rational justification itself. This leaves open the second argument for 
naturalism in CSN, that common sense is constitutive of the context in which rational 
justification is possible. However this approach will only be plausible if scepticism 
really is vain, and hence only if it can be shown that sceptical doubts do not in fact lead 
to any revision of the propositional attitude taken towards our commitments. However 
there are strong arguments both for the conclusion that scepticism is not vain in this 
way and further that scepticism sometimes emerges naturally and inevitably from 
within our common sense perspective. If these arguments are sound then scepticism 
cannot be dismissed. But if scepticism cannot be dismissed so easily then the 
‘transcendental’ argument of CSN must strike us as question begging by assuming that 
sceptical doubts are not both real and rational. 
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Thus we see that CSN faces problems over both naturalism and scepticism. Further, 
these problems interact in such a way as to bring CSN face-to-face with the possibility 
of legitimate scepticism. Either CSN must show that scepticism is not both real and 
rational or it must concede scepticism a legitimate place in our cognitive lives. I suggest 
that CSN would do best to adopt the second approach, given the strength of arguments 
developed in favour of Pyrrhonian scepticism in recent years. These arguments, taken 
mostly from the work of Robert Fogelin, will be examined in chapter 2. If these 
arguments succeed, as I think they do, then in order to claim that common sense is 
normative CSN must concede that scepticism is equally normative. 
 
However a further perspectivism must be developed here both to deal with the 
contradiction implied in granting scepticism normativity and also to account for a sense 
in which CSN is right to insist that scepticism is vain. The sense in which CSN seems 
to get things right is that scepticism usually does not influence the commitments we 
actually hold. According to this perspectivism there is a perfectly legitimate sense in 
which scepticism is normative, but only emerges when we occupy the philosophical 
perspective, or perhaps a better way of saying this is that scepticism only emerges when 
we are in the philosophical mood. However while this mood is perfectly legitimate it is 
only one of many moods in which we can find ourselves and has no greater claim to 
privilege than any other. Perhaps Cavell, himself inspired here by Emerson, has 
captured the idea best. 
 
‘Emerson may be said to be a philosopher of moods and it is one wise with moods who observes that 
“Our moods do not believe in each other” (“Circles”). Neither do our philosophies, or visions, which is 
why the idea of pluralism in philosophy, however well meant, is so often an empty hope; and neither do 
our non-philosophical and our philosophical moods believe in each other.’140 
 
The undoubted insight of Emerson notwithstanding, it is Hume who provides the best 
analysis of the sceptical mood, perhaps because he is one of the few philosophers who 
recognised that scepticism is both real and rational, but limited to a specific and quite 
unusual context.141 Re-examining what Hume can tell us here will provide the material 
                                                 
140 Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden, An Expanded ed. (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981) 
p.151. 
141 This is not just a restatement of the central thesis of Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological 
Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. While that work did argue that scepticism only emerged in a special 
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for chapter 3. The immediate task however is to defend the idea that someone can in 
fact find themselves immersed in radical scepticism even while respecting common 
sense, for it is at this point that CSN appears to be at its weakest. If this idea can be 
defended then CSN, by its own standards, must take scepticism seriously. This will 
entail a reconsideration of what is actually included in the special class of our natural 
commitments, and what these natural commitments actually are. 
                                                                                                                                              
context, the special context was not defined with reference to the inquirer. Instead the special context was 
defined in terms of its unique content, specifically in terms of the uniquely general or global questions 
that it addressed. No such content-based account is envisaged here. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Common sense and radical Pyrrhonian scepticism 
 
Outline 
 
Chapter 1 has already provided us with an outline of Common Sense Naturalism (CSN) 
and explained the view that would be adopted towards scepticism by a defender of 
CSN. To repeat some points that were made in the Preface; unless otherwise specified 
scepticism here means Pyrrhonian scepticism, where among other things Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is conceived of as challenging our entitlement to knowledge. The present 
chapter shall focus on two important components of the view taken towards this sort of 
scepticism. First, CSN claims that scepticism is not serious in the sense that it does not 
actually lead anyone to revise any of their actual commitments. Second, CSN claims 
that indeed we are entitled to those commitments questioned by the sceptic, for one of 
two possible reasons as explained in chapter 1. First, we could have an entitlement to 
these commitments because they are forced upon us by our natural psychological 
constitution, where we have an entitlement to any commitment that is natural in this 
sense. Second, we could have an entitlement to these commitments because they 
partially constitute the proper context for the application of reason. If this latter 
possibility obtains then without an entitlement to these reason-constituting 
commitments we would never even be able to conceive of having an entitlement to a 
commitment. Further, it emerged in the course of developing our understanding of CSN 
in chapter 1 that the commitments to which we have an entitlement according to either 
of these two methods provide the content of common sense. Hence it follows 
straightforwardly that if either of the two methods introduced in chapter 1 really does 
provide us with an entitlement to these commitments then we thereby have an 
entitlement to the content of common sense. 
 
It is at this point that the Pyrrhonian enters with a dilemma for a defender of CSN, for 
the Pyrrhonian will attempt to show, quite paradoxically, that even if we grant that we 
have an entitlement to common sense then it can also be shown that we have an 
entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism. That is, the Pyrrhonian shows that common sense 
is inherently sceptical because Pyrrhonian scepticism is inherently commonsensical. 
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Now it may also be the case that common sense really isn’t a respectable authority, 
being in fact nothing more than a reification of ignorance or apathy. If so this can only 
make the situation worse for the defender of CSN and easier for the Pyrrhonian. The 
strength and danger of Pyrrhonian scepticism when deployed against CSN is that 
Pyrrhonism grants to the defender of CSN every premise they need regarding our 
entitlement to common sense and from there still manages to derive a sceptical 
conclusion. The purpose of the present chapter is to attempt to show exactly how this 
sceptical conclusion can be reached. This requires showing in some detail how it is that 
Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from common sense. 
 
The method employed to carry this project through to its completion is to show that 
radical (but non-general) scepticism can be derived from an adherence to norms of 
inquiry that are themselves commonsensical. It is the goal of this chapter to make clear 
that if we adhere to these norms then on some occasions scepticism of a fairly radical 
kind does (or at least could, where which it is depends in interesting ways on the 
inquirer) completely undermine any entitlement we might have had to commonsensical 
commitments. The main source of inspiration for this preparatory work is Robert 
Fogelin’s Pyrrhonism, and especially the argument that radical scepticism emerges 
quite naturally when we inquire into the structure of our everyday epistemic practices, 
taking these practices to be paradigmatically commonsensical. However specifying 
with some precision what the relevant norms are goes beyond what Fogelin has done 
and makes use of some important observations made by David Lewis. The main 
objections to the argument of this chapter are; first, that the kind of reflection involved 
in carrying out these inquiries is not actually what it presents itself to be and hence 
inquiries of this sort are not internal to our everyday practices; second, that if 
Pyrrhonism does manage to be commonsensical it can only do so at the expense of 
being radical. Both these objections are found in the work of Michael Williams. 
According to Williams any radical scepticism can only manage to undermine our 
entitlement to our commitment as the result of a prior commitment to questionable 
philosophical theory at odds with our everyday epistemic practices.142 
                                                 
142 That is, according to this argument Fogelin’s Pyrrhonism is in fact a disguised form of Cartesian 
scepticism, as that distinction is drawn in the introduction. In fact this argument goes further and suggests 
that Fogelin is faced with the dilemma of conceding that his scepticism is actually Cartesian or conceding 
that it is not really scepticism at all, in fact being a manifestation of fallibilism. See Michael Williams, 
“Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7, no. 2 (1999). 
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 Where then does this leave the claim that scepticism is not serious in the sense that it 
does not actually lead anyone to revise any of their actual commitments? To this one of 
two answers is possible. Either we could insist that scepticism is not serious in the 
defined sense or we could concede that at least sometimes scepticism can become a 
serious problem. It is in fact the second of these options which must appear the most 
palatable even to the defender of CSN, for adhering to the first option only creates more 
problems for the commonsensical perspective that CSN wishes to preserve from 
sceptical attack. This becomes apparent when we consider the implications of the 
dilemma with which the Pyrrhonian presents the defender of CSN. For if it can be 
shown that our entitlement to common sense can be undermined in straightforwardly 
commonsensical ways, and yet our actual commitment to common sense does not 
actually vary then so much the worse for common sense. In this case our commitment 
to common sense is in violation of that principle of reason according to which the 
strength of our commitments should be shaped according to our best available 
evidence. Further, one need not reach too far back into the history of philosophy to find 
examples of thinkers for whom scepticism has seemed serious in this sense. Thus our 
first option is both conceptually and historically unappealing. Given that the strongest 
defence of CSN could be mounted on the concession that scepticism is at least 
sometimes serious, much of this chapter is devoted to exploring how this seriousness 
comes about. The goal of this activity is to explain that a proper understanding of this 
mechanism that can avoid the two main objections deployed by Michael Williams. 
 
Given all this, the present chapter begins with a brief outline of Fogelin’s Pyrrhonism, 
providing in the process some further clarifications on the distinction between Fogelin’s 
Pyrrhonism and Cartesian scepticism. After this will come an extended treatment of the 
argument for taking Pyrrhonian scepticism to be internal to these practices and an 
assessment of the counter-arguments that Pyrrhonian scepticism is either an imposition 
on these practices or is not radically sceptical. It will be shown how these 
counterarguments fail, leaving us facing the conclusion that scepticism is internal to our 
everyday epistemic practices and counts as common sense scepticism. This presents 
CSN with the dilemma of either conceding that scepticism is commonsensical or 
abandoning common sense. As we shall see, it also brings us face to face with the 
problem of the rationality of scepticism, and the associated problem of explaining how 
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we can be entitled to both sceptical perspectives and anti-sceptical perspectives. 
Chapter 3 addresses this theme of the rationality of scepticism and especially our 
entitlement to scepticism, and thus taken together chapters 2 and 3 show not just that 
we are entitled to scepticism from within a common sense perspective but that at times 
this common sense perspective is prone to morph into a radically sceptical perspective. 
 
An outline of Pyrrhonism 
 
 i) Problematic inquiry 
 
The central claim of Fogelin’s Pyrrhonism is that Pyrrhonian doubts are both natural 
and unanswerable. That is, inquiring into the structure of justification and taking 
seriously our everyday intuitions about what we are right to claim to know leads us to 
question whether we know that much at all, in that we don’t seem to be able to provide 
the kind of justification we intuitively require for our beliefs to count as knowledge. 
However all attempts to provide this justification by undertaking further inquiries into 
the nature of justification (apparently) fail. Certain kinds of inquiry lead us only into 
further inquiries, where no resolution to these inquiries in terms of a settled conclusion 
seems possible. One form of inquiry to which Fogelin pays particular attention are 
inquiries that allow us to ask any questions we like about any topics we like. I shall call 
inquiry of this sort problematic inquiry, although this term requires further 
clarification.143 Let us provide this clarification by contrasting problematic inquiry with 
non-problematic inquiry, such as that one might find in a history class for instance. 
 
In a history class one does not ask, because one is not allowed to ask, about whether the 
external world exists or whether we have knowledge of other minds or other such 
things. Were a student in a history class to suddenly begin to ask such questions their 
teacher might smile indulgently but would not likely answer them or even attempt to 
answer them, as the discipline of history simply presupposes that there is a world and 
from here supposes that we can know (or fail to know) its history.144 Historical inquiry 
                                                 
143 Such reflection is labelled as problematic precisely because it is unclear whether this reflection is 
internal to our everyday practice of conducting inquiries or is an imposition on these practices, where this 
matter is central to the current investigation. 
144 I know this because I have asked history teachers and been told that they would probably just laugh at 
such questions in a class as it would disrupt the learning process. 
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is non-problematic because it rules some questions out of court as a consequence of the 
way the inquiry is set up. Indeed to stay genuinely historical these inquiries must rule 
some questions out of court. Problematic inquiry is problematic just because it doesn’t 
make the same move of ruling out any questions. So whenever we engage in 
problematic inquiry it is always legitimate for someone to ask us (or perhaps even for 
us to ask ourselves) any question they like. 
 
Let us imagine how a problematic inquiry into, say, the chemical composition of a 
particular cup of tea might proceed. Suppose we begin this discussion by tasting the tea, 
and suppose that we know enough of tea to say that the tannin content is unusually high 
and that the tea tastes as if it has been heavily oxidised. However, because this is a 
problematic inquiry what would happen if someone were to ask ‘Are you sure the tea 
has a high tannin content, or have you just become too used to drinking weaker teas?’. 
We would have to rule out the possibility that our palette has become overly sensitive 
to tannin do to under-exposure to it. This question will cause us no particular trouble. 
What if someone were to ask ‘Was that really tea you tasted just now, or just an 
infusion from a quite different species of plant?’ What if someone were to ask ‘Does 
the tea now taste the same as it did then, or have its properties changed as it has 
cooled’. We would have to address these questions also. So far things are not so bad, 
for while answering these questions would be time-consuming and difficult it would at 
least be possible. However things becomes much worse if a question such as ‘But did 
you really taste the tea just now, or was the tea cup replaced with a technologically 
advanced copy which creates the holographic illusion of tea within the cup and feeds 
appropriate electrical signals to the nerves in your tongue and mouth?’ At least at first 
glance this looks to be a very difficult question to answer, if it can be answered at all. 
 
The important point to recognise is that it seems that not only would such questions 
make inquiries into the chemical composition of tea rather difficult, they would also 
make inquiries into any other particular empirical matter extremely difficult if not 
impossible. Engagement in problematic inquiry seems to eventually raise questions 
about the likelihood of a successful conclusion to any of our particular inquiries, in that 
the questions with which we can be faced are equally difficult regardless of the details 
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of the particular empirical matter into which we wish to inquire.145 Importantly, this 
also seems to be the case when the matter into which we are inquiring is the structure of 
our everyday epistemic practices. 
 
Traditional epistemology, accepting problematic inquiry to be a legitimate form of 
inquiry and thereby giving such inquiries an air of respectability, is tasked with 
carrying out inquiries even when faced with the possibility that such questions will be 
asked. The ultimate goal of carrying out such inquiries is finding some justificatory 
framework which can lead to the successful outcome of our inquiries even when we do 
not restrict the range of questions we are allowed to ask. Fogelin argues that while 
problematic inquiry raises doubts about our ability to provide the kind of justifications 
we seek, further problematic inquiry on these doubts cannot make them disappear. 
Hence we fall into what Fogelin calls Pyrrhonian doubt. Such was the conclusion of 
Pyrrhonian Reflections which Fogelin stated in the following way. 
 
‘These reflections, then, seem to yield a dual conclusion. First, Pyrrhonian doubts are the natural and 
intelligible result of the unrestricted examination of our epistemic practices. Second, Pyrrhonian doubts, 
once raised, seem incapable of resolution.’146 
 
However, it should be noted that Pyrrhonian doubt as described here does not of itself 
imply any wide scale revision to all of our commitments. Pyrrhonian doubts as 
understood by Fogelin directly target only knowledge claims, not beliefs as such. 
Further, Pyrrhonian doubts only target those commitments into which we have actually 
inquired. As described above they do not need to be, and nor should they be expected to 
be, completely general doubts.147 Even so, our inability to demonstrate that we do know 
what we pre-reflectively take ourselves to know does come with some implications, 
particularly as this regards the motivation we might feel to engage in inquiries aimed at 
grounding or transcending our everyday practices. The Pyrrhonian’s experience has 
taught him that such inquiries lead only to further inquiries without any real sense of 
progress being achieved, in much the same way that one may painfully learn that 
                                                 
145 Where successfulness looks something like actually finding the chemical composition of the tea in a 
particular teacup at a particular time. 
146 Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification 203. 
147 This implies that at this stage of his argument Fogelin is conceiving of Pyrrhonian scepticism as being 
knowledge scepticism rather than belief scepticism. Later in the chapter we shall make clear that 
Pyrrhonian scepticism will in fact lead to the development of belief scepticism also. 
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gambling as a means of extracting oneself from gambling debts generally leads only to 
further debts. That is, the Pyrrhonian may revise his commitment to the idea that 
problematic inquiry is a fruitful use of his time. In his more recent work there are signs 
that Fogelin has moved in this direction, as evidenced by the following statement. 
 
‘Not only is philosophy as traditionally pursued incapable of discovering or providing the foundations it 
seeks, but the philosophical enterprise may itself dislodge the contingent de facto supports that our daily 
life depends upon. If that is so, then philosophizing in a certain unrestricted way not only reveals the 
precariousness of our intellectual life, but actually makes it more precarious.’148 
 
The task of epistemology when restructured to account for Pyrrhonism, to the extent 
that it survives at all, is to prevent us from inquiring into the structure of our knowledge 
in those ways which lead to Pyrrhonian doubts, as we have learnt that such doubts 
cannot be resolved by further inquiry, as least not so far.149 Only by such means can the 
acceptability and usefulness of common sense be preserved. 
 
In the view of the Pyrrhonian sceptic, problematic inquiry is unable to validate the 
knowledge claims we feel perfectly entitled to enter when engaged in our everyday 
epistemic practices. One interesting feature of Pyrrhonian scepticism is that it does not 
conclude that we ought to withdraw the knowledge claims we make when engaging in 
our everyday epistemic practices as a result of problematic inquiry being unable to 
validate these practices. However, nor does the Pyrrhonian make any straightforward 
claim to the effect that we are entitled to these practices, and nor does the Pyrrhonian 
claim that these epistemic practices are somehow normative for philosophy. Remember 
that the claim of the Pyrrhonian is the conditional claim that if we are entitled to our 
everyday practices then we are entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism. So we can either 
claim to be entitled to our everyday practices and intermittently lose this entitlement to 
scepticism or we can deny this entitlement to everyday practices and accept an even 
greater scepticism. That the Pyrrhonian (in both his Classical and modern 
                                                 
148 Fogelin, Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal 67. 
149 This does not commit the Pyrrhonian to the conclusion that problematic inquiry is fundamentally 
flawed in some way, or that it will never lead to the resolution of Pyrrhonian doubt, and nor does Fogelin 
ever argue for such a strong conclusion. The Pyrrhonian claim is based on past experience and so does 
not warrant any certain statements regarding what might be discovered in the future. In fact Fogelin 
explicitly says that such a strong conclusion is not warranted by the arguments he presents in Pyrrhonian 
Reflections, although the Pyrrhonian may still be left with the general impression that the prospects for 
success here are extremely dim. See Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification 
p.194. 
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manifestations) chooses to cast himself as a defender of common sense suggests that he 
chooses the former option.150 This naturally raises a question as to the extent of the 
Pyrrhonian’s scepticism, and indeed whether we have any reason to take them to be 
sceptics at all.151 
 
 ii) Pyrrhonism and radical but non-general scepticism 
 
We see from the above considerations that the Pyrrhonian develops a scepticism about 
epistemology, although some features of this scepticism deserve emphasis. Here 
scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, is being taken in the same sense in which we say 
that someone is sceptical about the existence of witches. That is, they think that there is 
no good reason to think that the proposition ‘that witches exits’ is true. Other items 
about which we might be sceptical would include aliens, telepathic ability, human-
caused climate change and the ability to predict the outcome of the next general 
election. Observe however that holding scepticism about, say, witches does not in any 
way imply that one is sceptical about the existence of, for instance, human-caused 
climate change. That is, scepticism as used here is non-general in that its target is 
always a particular belief the falsity of which does not imply that all or even most of 
our other beliefs are also false. The scepticism here is thus of a prosaic and somewhat 
unexciting variety, quite some way removed from what gets called Cartesian 
scepticism, which as has been said in the Preface is here being understood as abstract, 
knowledge scepticism.152 
                                                 
150 I have already provided several reasons to think that the Classical Pyrrhonians as represented by 
Sextus Empiricus saw themselves as defenders of common sense in the Preface to this dissertation, and 
this in turn implies that they must have allowed themselves to have some beliefs, regardless of whether 
they would have recognised these as beliefs as such. As will emerge in the following discussion it is also 
the view taken by Fogelin. Anyone familiar with the literature will recognise this is to adhere essentially 
to Frede’s reading of Pyrrhonism and against Burnyeat, Barnes, Striker and most (but not all) other 
commentators.  
151 Of particular importance is the claim that Pyrrhonism is really nothing more than exaggerated 
fallibilism. See Williams, “Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism.” 
152 I am here implicitly representing Cartesian scepticism as targeting all knowledge (except knowledge 
of the cogito and other first person present sense-impressions) and this requires comment. While 
Broughton does defend a view such as this, it has also been questioned in Macarthur, “The Seriousness of 
Doubt and Our Natural Trust in the Senses in the First Meditation.”. Macarthur has argued that Descartes 
only targets certain knowledge – scientia. The main reason I reject Macarthur’s view is that it does not 
explain why Descartes would use such strong language at the close of Meditation One and the opening of 
Meditation Two. I take this language to represent a sceptical crisis, and yet undermining scientia does not 
appear to lead to any sceptical crisis. Macarthur’s reading leaves this point unexplained, and implies that 
Descartes is claiming far more than that to which he is entitled regarding the scope and importance of his 
scepticism. A further reason to reject Macarthur’s view is found in the arguments presented by Gail Fine, 
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 Because Fogelin’s Pyrrhonian scepticism is non-general we must be careful to avoid 
any implication that a very wide range of our beliefs are false when clarifying what the 
target of Pyrrhonian scepticism actually is. The actual target of Pyrrhonism must be 
‘that engaging in problematic inquiry directed at any particular knowledge claim 
entered while following our everyday epistemic practices will always lead us to be 
secure in the knowledge claims we enter when following these practices’. Fogelin’s 
Pyrrhonism partially consists in not accepting that this proposition is true.153 However 
it could well seem that taking this to be the target of Pyrrhonian scepticism does 
introduce general scepticism, as this above proposition can be easily taken to include 
any and every knowledge claim we could enter.154 Further, the above proposition can 
be thought to encompass propositions such as ‘that there are other minds’ or ‘that the 
senses are generally reliable’ or ‘that the future will in general resemble the past’. It 
seems that if we are not able to demonstrate that such propositions are true then general 
scepticism does seem to follow, in that a vast number of our everyday beliefs rely for 
their truth on propositions such as ‘that the future will in general resemble the past’ also 
being true. 
 
However, taking general scepticism to follow from the target of Pyrrhonism as clarified 
relies on several errors, which the following two observations bring to light. First, just 
because a commitment cannot be grounded by providing rational justification for it 
through some process of problematic inquiry does not imply that the commitment is 
                                                                                                                                              
who has argued that not only did Descartes’ scepticism target all of our knowledge it targets our beliefs 
also. See Fine, “Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?.” In describing Descartes’ 
scepticism as knowledge scepticism I take it that while I am saying less than I might I am not actually 
contradicting what Fine has claimed. 
153 Fogelin often mentions the idea that reflection (of a certain sort I shall further specify shortly) can 
cause us to doubt the trustworthiness of our everyday epistemic practices. See Fogelin, Pyrrhonian 
Reflections on Knowledge and Justification 94, 193, 195-196. 
154 Fogelin describes his position as a form of scepticism about philosophy, not scepticism about 
epistemology. This despite the fact that his immediate target is obviously epistemological in character. 
This leads to the conclusion that Fogelin takes it that epistemologically is prior to other fields of 
philosophical inquiry in such a away that undermining epistemology undermines all philosophical 
activity. There is some plausibility to introducing this priority, as without a clear understanding of what 
knowledge is it remains unclear how we could claim to know anything else, or at least could not claim to 
understand what we mean when we make such a claim. In any case, without the priority of epistemology 
there is no way to move from a failure of epistemology to scepticism about philosophy. However I do not 
think that Fogelin is alone is positing the priority of epistemology. This priority is evident in the structure 
of Descartes’ Meditations and also in the structure of Sextus’ works. I suspect that the priority of 
epistemology is a broadly-held thesis among many philosophers taking scepticism seriously and was a 
thesis to which I was introduced as an undergarduate. Wittgenstein is of course a notable exception. 
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unjustified, as a defender of CSN would be at pains to remind us. We could be unable 
to provide rational justification for a commitment and still hold it to be justified just in 
case the commitment was justified in some other way, by being constitutive of the 
proper context of rationality for instance. That is, the Pyrrhonian could actually appeal 
to arguments for CSN to defend himself against the claim that his scepticism is in effect 
general. This is interesting, for it raises that possibility of Pyrrhonism generating a form 
of scepticism consistent with CSN and hence as a serious challenge to the anti-sceptical 
thread of CSN. 
 
Second, the target of Pyrrhonism as clarified above explicitly mentions knowledge 
claims we make when following our everyday epistemic practices, but for what reason 
do we suppose that these practices include claiming to know the principle of induction 
to be true or claiming to know that the ‘external world’ exists? Our everyday 
knowledge claims do not in general include explicit claims to know, for instance, that 
there are other minds or that we know the principle of induction to be true, or that our 
senses are reliable. We simply respond to others as if they have minds, take it for 
granted in our actions that the future will in general resemble the past and likewise take 
it for granted that do have knowledge of the world through the senses. But in doing so 
we make no appeal to the principle of induction or any other such abstract principle, 
and indeed our ability to interact with the world as we do would be severely limited if 
we did. Hence rather than granting the right of problematic inquiry to judge all our 
commitments on the basis of its inquiries into principles like the principle of induction 
perhaps we ought to conclude that this judicial process is an artificial and unnecessary 
imposition on our everyday activity of entering knowledge claims. Wittgenstein 
perhaps says it best. 
 
‘But do we not simply follow the principle that what has always happened will happen again (or 
something like it)? What does it mean to follow this principle? Do we really introduce it into our 
reasoning? Or is it merely the natural law which our inferring naturally follows?  This latter it may be. It 
is not an item in our considerations.’ [OC 135] 
 
‘The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more 
do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our perceptions.’ [OC 287] 
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These two observations can be taken together to yield a combined argument against the 
idea that Pyrrhonian scepticism is general in scope. This argument would proceed first 
by claiming that some commitments are exempt from the range of rational justification, 
for one reason or another. Second would be the claim that the propositions typical of 
general scepticism (other minds, induction, reliability of the senses etc) form part of the 
content of the propositions that are exempt in this way. Third, even if these theoretical 
reasons to exclude such propositions fail there remains the point that questioning the 
propositions typically used to generate general scepticism is just not something that we 
actually do, regardless of whether we could do this. Hence Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
recognising all this and wishing to respect our everyday practices, implicitly removes 
such propositions from its scope.155 
 
As has been made clear in the Preface, Pyrrhonism does not need to generate sceptical 
problems by targeting highly abstract propositions the truth of which is implied by a 
wide range of other propositions. However, as we also said in the Preface, there is 
nothing to prevent Pyrrhonism from targeting such abstract propositions, provided that 
this is a coherent activity, and it has already been noted that Williams and others think 
it is not. Thus when the above argument suggests that Pyrrhonism reserves some 
propositions from its scope it may well be misrepresenting Pyrrhonism, where whether 
it does so is contingent on the conceptual coherence of general scepticism. If targeting a 
proposition such as ‘that there are other minds in the world’ turns out to be coherent 
then Pyrrhonian scepticism is free to make such a proposition its target. However one 
strength of Pyrrhonism is that it is not committed to targeting such propositions in a 
way that Cartesian scepticism is, in that it is possible that abstract scepticism is not 
conceptually coherent. Thus for the moment I take it to be undetermined what the 
actual scope of Pyrrhonism is, as the conceptual coherence of abstract scepticism has 
not been resolved, although I also believe that abstract scepticism is not coherent, 
taking my cue from Williams. In any case this thesis shall proceed on the supposition 
                                                 
155 This suggests that Pyrrhonian scepticism is not so much scepticism about epistemology as it is 
scepticism about problematic inquiry. That is, Pyrrhonian scepticism is sceptical about the ability of 
problematic inquiry to yield positive results. It is because epistemology engages in problematic inquiry 
that it is singled out for special attention. However as we shall see later in this chapter we do not require 
problematic inquiry to generate troubling forms of scepticism. Recall the overarching point of the present 
chapter is to defend the idea that quite troubling forms of scepticism can emerge when we behave 
entirely commonsensically. Thus even if problematic inquiry is an imposition on our everyday practices 
such a fact (if it is a fact) cannot provide an escape from Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
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that the coherence of abstract scepticism has not yet been established and hence will 
read Pyrrhonism, in a conservative fashion, as being non-abstract. 
 
Let us suppose for the moment that Pyrrhonism does make such exemptions as the 
above argument suggests, and consider whether this would lead to the conclusion that 
Pyrrhonism is not an interesting form of scepticism. I suggest that it would not. For 
instance, even if we grant that some commitments are not properly taken to be in need 
of rational justification and so remove some commitments from the reach of scepticism, 
some commitments still remain within easy reach of scepticism. For instance, while the 
commitment that my son (a toddler) has a mind may be beyond sceptical reach, it 
seems quite reasonable to doubt whether he really understands the content of the 
propositions with which I present him. That is, even once we exempt some of the 
commitments which seem to underpin our everyday knowledge claims from sceptical 
undermining156 we must still leave a wide range of commitments open to sceptical 
undermining. Further, the non-general scepticism generated in this way clearly has the 
potential to effect the way I interact with the world. For instance, in the above example 
I would interact with my son differently if I doubted whether he genuinely understood 
what I say to him. That is, we do not need the full generality of Cartesian scepticism (or 
nearly full generality, remembering that Cartesian scepticism exempts the cogito and a 
few other first-person present impressions) to encounter quite troubling sceptical 
problems.  
 
Hence there is still a significant scope allowed for the development of sceptical 
arguments even once general scepticism is eschewed. The crucial point is that avoiding 
general scepticism means that such sceptical arguments as can be developed must be 
iterative in nature, taking commitments on a case-by-case basis. We have already seen 
that this limitation is an important distinguishing feature of Pyrrhonian scepticism as 
against Cartesian scepticism, as Cartesian scepticism does involve arguments for 
general scepticism. We now have a clearer idea of why this must be the case. That is to 
say, Pyrrhonian scepticism considers one proposition at a time whereas Cartesian 
scepticism attempts to introduce consideration that target all the propositions we could 
believe all at once. Hence terms such as ‘our knowledge of the world’ (whatever that 
                                                 
156 Either by rejecting problematic inquiry into these commitments altogether or by arguing that these 
commitments form proper context for the exercise of rationality, or both. 
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may mean, and I admit I suspect that it has no definite meaning) will not be a feature of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism, although they are a feature of Cartesian scepticism.157 
 
This is not to say that Pyrrhonian cannot at times be radical, for we need to distinguish 
being radical from being general. A Pyrrhonian is free to argue that I am not (or do not 
appear to be at least) in a position to claim to know anything about whether matter is 
partially composed on electrons, or about the colour of the ink in my favourite pen, or 
about…and so on. While the Pyrrhonian limits himself to considering propositions in 
this iterative fashion this process can be extended to include virtually all the 
propositions we care about. As we have noted above, there is nothing to prevent the 
Pyrrhonian from asking of our entitlement to any given commitment, so long as asking 
of this entitlement is conceptually coherent. The only limitation on this inquisitive 
activity derives from the practical limitations deriving from our finite capacity for 
actually formulating propositions for judgement.158 However, we cannot conclude from 
the fact that there are practical limitations on inquiry that we are somehow entitled to 
those commitments into which we cannot practically inquire. That we cannot 
practically inquire into some commitments shows only another reason why we are 
unable to answer the Pyrrhonian’s legitimate questions. 
 
Interestingly, by limiting itself from engaging in arguments for general scepticism 
Pyrrhonism makes itself immune to an important argument against foundationalism 
which also targets the radical scepticism that foundationalism attempts to refute. This is 
the now familiar argument that for any inquiry to be possible some propositions must 
be held to stand outside the bounds of inquiry, and is of course an objection that a 
                                                 
157 Even at its most radical Classical Pyrrhonism, i.e., the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, did not go so 
far as to question the existence of the objects felt through the senses although they did go so far as to 
argue that we know nothing for certain about their properties, given what we know about how our senses 
function, or at least so I would argue. See [PH 2.72-75]. However as noted in the Preface, Gail Fine 
thinks otherwise. See footnote 4.The argument presented in this section parallels rather closely the 
sceptical arguments Hume derives from an adherence to the ‘way of ideas’, that is, the 18th century 
empiricist doctrine that we perceive ideas, not objects. 
158 It was limitations of this sort which seem to have motivated Descartes not to attempt this task, as he 
explains in the opening paragraphs of the first meditation. “So, for the purpose of rejecting all my 
opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt.  And to do this I will 
not need to run through them all individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundations of a 
building are undermined, anything built upon them collapses on its own accord; so I will go straight for 
the basic principles on which all my former beliefs rested.” Descartes et al., Descartes: Selected 
Philosophical Writings AT VII 18. 
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supporter of CSN would be comfortable entering. Wittgenstein encapsulates the anti-
sceptical, anti-foundationalist import of this argument in the following passage. 
 
‘That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.’ [OC 341] 
 
‘That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not 
doubted.’ [OC 342] 
 
‘But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are 
forced to rest content with assumption. If we want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.’ [OC 343] 
 
If Wittgenstein is correct then Descartes’ foundationalist approach is fundamentally 
flawed, as it incorrectly assumes that all our commitments (other than the cogito and 
other first-person present sense impressions) can be called into question, and justified, 
all at once. Unsurprisingly, the general scepticism this foundationalism is attempting to 
refute is also fundamentally flawed, as it leaves nothing beyond the range of doubt. 
This reveals that the practical limits with which Descartes was concerned were not the 
most important limits. The most important limits, so Wittgenstein teaches us, are 
conceptual. Note however that this objection is not necessarily devastating for the 
iterative method adopted by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Since only one proposition is called 
into question at any time, and because those propositions that are questioned are not of 
the fully general type targeted by Cartesian scepticism then some propositions will 
always be considered to be beyond inquiry. Thus there is no reason to suppose that 
Pyrrhonian scepticism would have to call into question all our beliefs (excluding the 
cogito etc), or even all our knowledge claims, all at once. 
 
However some further comments are necessary here regarding the perception that the 
preceding passage could be taken to be attributing to Wittgenstein a foundationalism at 
odds with what has been described above as his anti-foundationalism. The troublesome 
foundationalism could emerge if it were supposed that the commitments that must stand 
fast in any investigation are always the same commitments and in that way provide a 
foundation for inquiry. Yet the situation is not like this, for what stands fast in any 
given inquiry will do so relative to that inquiry, and hence what stands fast in one 
inquiry may not do so in another. This in turn means that no commitments are being 
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treated as foundational in the sense of being permanently and univocally removed from 
the range of commitments that require support. This is not foundationalism. 
 
Hence Pyrrhonian scepticism achieves highly generalised (but not fully general) 
scepticism without falling prey to the objection that it attempts to call into question too 
much. In the case of knowledge this should be fairly obvious, as for any putative item 
of knowledge Pyrrhonian scepticism can ask whether we are entitled to take this to 
really be knowledge, provided of course that such a question can be sensibly asked at 
all.159 This may mean that some items of putative knowledge are not questioned, for 
Pyrrhonism does not suppose that it does make sense to think that we can ask questions 
of entitlement about any item of knowledge. 
 
Further, it should also be clear that there is nothing to stop Pyrrhonism from expanding 
its view beyond knowledge to include belief. This is because questions of entitlement 
can be as sensibly asked of beliefs as they can be of knowledge. Granted, in each case 
different standards will be applied when answering questions of entitlement, with the 
standards of belief being far lower, and thereby easier to meet, than the standards 
applying to knowledge. However to say that standards are lower and easier to meet is 
not to say that that there are no standards. For instance, merely finding some 
commitment entertaining does not give us an entitlement to take the propositional 
content of that commitment to be true. Thus were it to turn out that we failed to have 
any entitlement to both our knowledge and our belief then Pyrrhonism would result in 
both highly generalised scepticism (by virtue of targeting a very wide range of 
propositional contents) and also quite radical scepticism (by targeting a wide range of 
propositional attitudes to these propositional contents). Thus by describing Pyrrhonian 
scepticism as radical I intend to convey the idea that Pyrrhonism is at least theoretically 
capable of targeting beliefs in addition to knowledge, although I have not yet shown 
that it does successfully undermine our entitlement to either our beliefs or our 
knowledge.  
 
Again, it should be clear that as described Pyrrhonian scepticism is capable of posing a 
significant problem for CSN if it actually does turn out that Pyrrhonism can be derived 
                                                 
159 Adding this final clause is necessary precisely because it is possible to ask questions that in fact have 
no sense but where the senselessness is not at all apparent.  
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from the same common sense basis as that to which CSN appeals. In this case we 
would either have an entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism or no entitlement to common 
sense. Either is disastrous for CSN. The question then is whether Pyrrhonism truly is 
commonsensical. Can one develop Pyrrhonism whilst only appealing to our everyday 
epistemic practices? 
 
 iii) Pyrrhonism and everyday practice 
 
For all his radical (even if not fully general) scepticism, Fogelin still pictures the 
Pyrrhonian as someone who follows our everyday epistemic practices. In fact Fogelin 
goes out of his way to make this point quite clear in the passage below. 
 
‘The Pyrrhonian freely participates in common epistemic practices, drawing on all the practical 
distinctions embodied in them. These practices are often fallible. Often this fallibility doesn’t matter, 
since the price of being wrong is not high. When the cost of error becomes excessive, the skeptic, like 
others, may seek ways to improve these practices so that the chances of error are reduced. Pictured this 
way, the skeptic is rather like Hume’s moderate skeptic (whom he improperly contrasted with the 
Pyrrhonian skeptic): cautious, agreeable, and sane. 
Historically, the Pyrrhonian skeptics have targeted the philosopher as the object of their skeptical attack. 
Here the philosopher is understood as someone who either (1) attempts to replace our common fallible 
modes of thinking about the world with new modes that transcend them, or (2) accepts these common 
modes of thinking, but attempts to ground them is modes that transcend them.’160 
 
This claim is bound to strike us as odd, for even if we grant that the Pyrrhonian is no 
general sceptic, his radical scepticism will still not seem to feature in our everyday 
epistemic practices. Hence we might well wonder how a Pyrrhonian can be both a 
radical sceptic while simultaneously claiming to be an adherent of our everyday 
epistemic practices. To dispel the sense that the Pyrrhonian is attempting to fool us at 
this point he would need to argue that radical scepticism is indeed internal to our 
everyday epistemic practices. An obvious way in which this could be accomplished 
would be to argue that the form of inquiry which leads to radical scepticism is itself just 
another form of the kind of inquiries in which we involve ourselves as we go about our 
everyday practices. However it has already been suggested that problematic inquiry is 
an imposition on these practices, in that it inevitably generates a general scepticism at 
                                                 
160 Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification 88. 
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odds with our everyday practices. Hence if the form of inquiry involved in generating 
the radical scepticism typical of Pyrrhonism is to be internal to our everyday practices 
then it must be carefully distinguished from problematic inquiry. The form of inquiry 
which leads to radical scepticism shall be termed radical inquiry. The form of inquiry 
in which we engage when following our everyday practices shall be termed everyday 
inquiry. 
  
In practice, defending Pyrrhonism against the claim that it artificially imposes a 
scepticism on our everyday practices amounts to describing the mechanism by which 
we move from those forms of inquiry that do not generate radical scepticism to those 
forms of inquiry that do in such a way that the continuity between these forms of 
inquiry is obvious. If you suspect that this will lead to the evaporation of the recently 
introduced distinction between radical and everyday inquiry, then you would be right. It 
will turn out that radical inquiry is really everyday inquiry in unusual (but not far-
fetched) situations. While those who are already inclined towards the idea of a common 
sense scepticism may have no problems with this, those with no such inclination will 
take this to be a contentious idea, which is exactly why the distinction is being 
introduced. The distinction does not exist to allow us to identify a real difference, it 
exists to allow us to examine a form of inquiry without contentiously assuming that this 
form of inquiry is everyday inquiry. 
 
As it turns out, Fogelin has shown how this is possible although arguing for this 
continuity leads to some interesting outcomes. One of these outcomes is that 
Pyrrhonism is inherently unstable, and in fact this is one of its most distinctive features. 
This instability results from the fact that while radical inquiry is continuous with 
everyday inquiry we do not always engage in radical inquiry. Yet radical scepticism 
only emerges when we do engage in radical inquiry. Hence while we are always prone 
to encounter radical scepticism, we are not always radical sceptics, or at least so the 
Pyrrhonians argue. As a result a Pyrrhonian will often appear to be a non-sceptic at all 
those times at which he is not actually engaging in radical inquiry.  
 
However this instability is itself difficult to understand, and faces the Pyrrhonian with 
some problems. If the Pyrrhonian can recall that problematic inquiry did not result in 
the resolution of the doubts that originally motivated the inquiry, and if it also turns out 
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that radical inquiry fares no better, then we should also expect him to remember this. 
However if he can recall this point, why does the Pyrrhonian also feel equally entitled 
to engage in our everyday practices? Have these practices not been undermined by the 
results of radical inquiry, at least in all those regions to which radical reflections have 
extended? Given that the one undermines the other, it is difficult to understand how a 
Pyrrhonian could adhere to both. A useful test for the successfulness of the Pyrrhonian 
argument that radical inquiry is internal to everyday practice, although problematic 
inquiry is not, will be whether it can resolve these questions. 
 
The precariousness of problematic and radical inquiries 
 
 i) Inquiry and levels of scrutiny 
 
To this point problematic inquiry has been described merely by saying that it is that 
form of inquiry that does not rule out any possibilities which would falsify our 
everyday knowledge claims. Such a definition has been adequate to this stage, as the 
argument to this point has focused on clarifying the challenges which face Pyrrhonian 
scepticism. However as the argument how turns to a sustained analysis of problematic 
inquiry significantly more detail needs to be provided, where the first and most 
important detail to be mentioned is what Fogelin calls the level of scrutiny. This is 
required if we are to draw a clearer distinction between problematic and radical inquiry. 
 
In order to understand what a level of scrutiny is we first need to grasp the idea that our 
everyday epistemic practices are carried out against the background of a wide range of 
possibilities which, if realised, would defeat at least some if not all of our knowledge 
claims. For instance the possibility that Parliament has just now mandated that all 
representation of the time of day conform to the French decimal system of 1793 but not 
informed me of this statute would, if realised, defeat the claim that I know when a 
certain TV broadcast will begin based on looking at a TV guide issued after the statute 
came into effect. That the TV guide contains a misprint would also defeat the claim that 
I know when the broadcast will begin based on looking at the defective TV guide. 
These scenarios and others like them can be arranged into a spectrum, although there is 
some ambiguity over what principle should determine where the different scenarios are 
placed in the spectrum. Some of the alternatives would be: 
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 i) The range of commitments a scenario would falsify were it to be realised. 
For instance the possibility that Parliament had changed our method of 
representing the time would, if realised, falsify all my claims to know what 
time it was based on reading this in some official publication. The 
possibility that the TV guide contains a misprint does not carry these broad 
consequences, as it only applies to the defective TV guide itself.  
ii) Whether a possibility can be eliminated and how difficult it would be to do 
so. For instance the possibility that Parliament have enacted a given statute 
without informing me is somewhat more difficult to check than whether a 
TV guide contains a misprint. In the latter case all I need do is consult a 
second TV guide and check for consistency. In the former case I would need 
to access the Hansard record of the daily proceedings of Parliament, and if 
Parliament is intentionally keeping things from me this could prove to be 
difficult, in exactly the way that conspiracy theorists would find compelling. 
iii) The probability that the scenario does obtain. For instance it is more 
probable that a TV guide contains a misprint than that Parliament, in a fit of 
revolutionary fervour, would change the way we represent time.  
 
While in this simple example the same ordering of scenarios is given this will 
obviously not result in every case. That the there is an ogre standing directly outside my 
study window at this very moment is less likely than there being a man hiding under 
my window at this very moment. However the presence of an ogre is easier to check 
than the presence of a mad hiding, as ogres would be easier to see than are hiding men 
for ogres are (reputedly) larger than are men. 
 
While Fogelin says less then he could on this matter what he does say indicates that 
what determines the place of a scenario in the spectrum is the probability that it could 
be realised.161 In our everyday epistemic practices we usually set aside all scenarios 
with probabilities of being realised that we deem to be too low. For instance it is 
possible but highly improbable that someone has disconnected my keyboard from my 
                                                 
161 At least, so it seems. Fogelin doesn’t explain this concept in terms of probabilities speaking instead of 
possibilities. However the talk of some possibilities being more distant than others does lead one to think 
in these terms. However as we shall see there are some reasons to think that Fogelin has something else 
in mind. 
 Page 127  
computer and that the letters now appearing on my screen are doing so at random. I 
have dismissed this possibility and assume that my keyboard is functioning normally, 
although I admit that I have not actually checked the connections to make sure that 
things are as I assume them to be. A higher level of scrutiny requires that we consider 
even scenarios with a low probability of being realised. A lower level of scrutiny 
requires that we only consider scenarios with a higher probability of being realised. The 
level of scrutiny thus defines how far along the spectrum we need to go before we 
arrive at scenarios which we deem to have too low a probability of being realised to be 
worthy of our consideration. 
 
No doubt many will find this concept of a level of scrutiny to be unacceptably vague, 
for several reasons. First, what would a probability of, say, 0.76293 really mean to us, 
and how fine-grained are the probability calculations of which we are capable? Second, 
if the spectrum here is a smooth spectrum then how are we able to set a limit at all 
without falling prey to slippery-slope arguments and other objections related to 
vagueness? Third, how would we determine the probability that, say, we are a brain in a 
vat? In fact scenarios such as that we are a brain in a vat, in that they are systematically 
ineliminable, either seem to apply everywhere or only as a limiting case as we have no 
means of determining the probability that they do obtain. Clearly such scenarios do not 
in practice enter into our thinking all the time, so how is it that systematically 
ineliminable possible defeators ever enter into our thinking? As the probabilities 
attached to scenarios involving these defeators are unknown it must be that these 
scenarios become relevant when the level of scrutiny rises to an unrestricted level 
where all scenarios are taken seriously regardless of their probability. Systematically 
ineliminable possible defeators thus emerge as a limiting case for the level of scrutiny, 
in that they only emerge when the level reaches it highest possible level. Finally, just 
because the probability attaching to these scenarios is unknown, wouldn’t we need to 
consider them, just in case they do obtain? 
 
The solution to some of these puzzles is that even granting that the level of scrutiny is 
defined in terms of probability it is not as if we explicitly determine the probability that 
a scenario obtains before deciding whether it is worthy of our consideration. Rather 
than making any such explicit judgment we simply find that the level of scrutiny is set 
for us when we engage in any kind of inquiry. This in turn implies that grasping where 
 Page 128  
the level of scrutiny is set is simply part of knowing how to properly engage in a 
process of inquiry. The more general point is that every practice in which we might 
engage occurs against a background of possible defeators which we could consider but 
do not, and that learning how to engage in a given practice includes learning which 
defeators are to be ignored and which are to be considered. 
 
Recognising this allows us to see that thinking of the spectrum as being organised in 
terms of explicit probabilities is a mistake. Talk of probabilities is actually a reflection 
of what we have learned to pay attention to by being immersed in a shared practice. The 
possible scenarios against which our everyday practices take place may have specific 
probabilities of being realised, but that is not what determines whether we find them to 
be salient. That we find some scenarios to be salient and not others is a fundamental 
fact of the way we live our lives, not to be explained by reference to anything else other 
than the nature of our practice. 
 
Speaking specifically of the practices involved in using language, Fogelin indicates that 
he takes this perspective when he speaks approvingly of Wittgenstein in the following 
way. 
 
‘Wittgenstein is saying that we accept things, believe them, and act on them, in the face of identifiable 
risks that we could eliminate but do not. He further claims that this is simply how we employ our 
language, and accepting this is essential for a proper understanding of how our language works.’162  
 
Take another example drawn from the functioning of my computer keyboard. When I 
sat down at my desk this morning and began typing at my keyboard I did not first check 
that the keyboard was connected to the computer. But nor did I consider the possibility 
that the keyboard was not connected too low to bother with. In fact I made no 
determination one way or the other. I simply started typing, and would suggest that 
anyone who did routinely consider all the ways in which a keyboard could fail to 
function and eliminated each of these before attempting to use the keyboard does not 
really know how to use a keyboard properly.163 I demonstrate my knowledge of how to 
                                                 
162 Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification 92. 
163 This would not be the case if computer keyboards proved to be chronically unreliable. In such a case 
one would anticipate that the level of scrutiny would in general be set somewhat higher than it is 
currently. In this case correct use would require some checking for reliability. 
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properly use a keyboard by just using it, and by not dwelling on certain possible ways 
in which it might fail. Analogously, I demonstrate that I know how to properly enter 
knowledge claims not by checking to see that every possibility which could falsify my 
knowledge claim fails to obtain but rather by just entering knowledge claims in the face 
of these possibilities. 
 
This is not to say that the level of scrutiny does not fluctuate as we engage in our 
everyday practices, for it obviously does. However when it does shift there will be a 
good reason for it shifting, and particularly for it shifting upwards. A paradigmatically 
good reason would be the observation that a possibility we had previously considered to 
be too remote had in fact been realised. In such a case the level of scrutiny will 
automatically rise such that it encompasses this suddenly relevant possibility, thereby 
making relevant certain other scenarios also.  
 
This means that explicating the level of scrutiny is something we can only do after we 
have begun to act, and in consequence of which practices have been carried out 
successfully in the past. With this description of the level of scrutiny in place we can 
now more precisely describe problematic inquiry as that form of inquiry which is 
undertaken at a maximally heightened level of scrutiny. That is, when involved in 
problematic inquiry we do not consider any scenario too improbable to be worthy of 
our consideration. That means that problematic inquiry will be distinctive from all other 
forms of inquiry by it taking seriously systematically ineliminable possible defeators, as 
these defeators are only considered at a maximally heightened level of scrutiny. 
 
However from what has been said above it should be clear that we do not necessarily 
engage in problematic inquiry on the basis of antecedent inquiries which take seriously 
any uneliminated possible defeators to our knowledge claims leading us to conclude 
that we ought to move to this heightened level of scrutiny. We should not expect that 
the level of scrutiny would shift to an unrestrictedly high level based on such an 
observation, for two reasons. First, although raising the level of scrutiny is important in 
terms of getting things right and demonstrating due caution and attention, there is also a 
real practical cost to raising the level of scrutiny. This practical cost includes the 
opportunity costs of not being able to carry out other important activities if all our time 
is dedicated to one inquiry. At some point getting things right will become less 
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important than engaging in other activities we take to be important, and at this point we 
will cease raising the level of scrutiny. I suggest that these pragmatic considerations 
lead to a default level of scrutiny at which our inquiries begin and at which they stay 
unless some further consideration becomes relevant. Second, while no observation can 
count decisively against a systematically ineliminable scenario no observation can 
count in favour of such a scenario either. By hypothesis such scenarios are always 
consistent with any observation we make, and so cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed 
by any experience. Thus merely being aware of systematically ineliminable possible 
defeators does not provide a reason all by itself to raise the level of scrutiny sufficiently 
high to consider these scenarios. 
 
 ii) Engaging in problematic inquiry 
 
If when engaged in everyday practice the level of scrutiny at which we operate is raised 
consequent to us beginning on an inquiry, and not based on antecedent reflection on the 
ways our knowledge claims can go wrong, then how is it that we do come to engage in 
problematic inquiry? That is, what observations would lead to the level of scrutiny 
reaching a level where no probability is considered to be to unworthy of our 
consideration, and hence lead us to consider systematically ineliminable possible 
defeators. As it turns out, according to Fogelin merely reflecting on the level of scrutiny 
at which we have been operating in the past tends to raise the level of scrutiny and lead 
us to engage in problematic inquiry. We have already seen that part of properly 
enacting our everyday epistemic practices entails excluding a wide range of scenarios 
that would falsify our knowledge claims were they to be realised. However mere 
exclusion does not mean that these possibilities are not realised, as the memory of our 
own errors tells us. But what happens if we start to consider all the ways in which we 
could go wrong in our knowledge claims? 
 
According to Fogelin we will, as a matter of fact, begin to doubt. Imagine that upon 
walking into my study in the morning and sitting at my desk but before I start typing at 
my keyboard I think about all the ways in which the keyboard may have stopped 
functioning properly since I last used it. Maybe the connection has come loose, maybe 
tea has been spilt on the keyboard causing a short-circuit, maybe someone has 
scrambled the relationship between the letters on the keys and the signals sent to the 
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computer. Now that I am aware of these possibilities what should I do? Should I do 
anything? I believe I should do something, and it is fairly easy to see what this 
something should be. I should test the keyboard, perhaps by typing out the alphabet on 
a blank document, and checking that the letters come out in the correct order. That I 
find this a perfectly reasonable thing to do on this particular morning indicates that the 
level of scrutiny has shifted, and hence that following everyday epistemic practice 
requires that I take seriously possibilities I had not previously considered. But what else 
could have caused this shift in the level of scrutiny but explicitly considering that I had 
not ruled out various scenarios which would falsify my claim to know that the keyboard 
would work? That is, reflecting on everyday epistemic practice, and particularly those 
aspects according to which we do not consider various scenarios which if realised 
would force us to withdraw some claims or act differently. 
 
However to this point it has been argued that the level of scrutiny does not, or at least 
does not typically, rise as a consequence of antecedent inquiry into the ways our 
knowledge claims could go wrong. Yet antecedent reflection of exactly this sort is what 
Fogelin indicates is involved in encouraging us to engage in problematic inquiry. After 
all, it is not as if I actually observed some problem with by keyboard in the above 
example and that as a result of this observation the level of scrutiny was raised to 
include probabilities that had previously been excluded. Even if this process of raising 
the level of scrutiny begins with some observation it is unclear exactly what such an 
observation might include. It would surely have to be of an extraordinary nature to 
warrant moving to an unrestrictedly high level of scrutiny, and the more extraordinary 
this observation is the more problems the necessity of it creates. 
 
If the observation that originally impelled us into problematic inquiry is extraordinary it 
is also likely to be quite rare, and this will not do. For problematic inquiry to be the 
kind of activity we can pursue in a systematic fashion we need to have some control on 
how it begins, and when it begins. Relying on rare observations to get problematic 
inquiry underway fulfils neither of these criteria, and nor does it make sense of our 
experience. Problematic inquiry is one of the most structured and systematic of 
activities, going hand-in-hand with a focused mind and freedom from distraction. That 
is why it is important, even necessary, that we remember that no observations of any 
kind are necessary for problematic inquiry to begin, and insist that reflection alone is 
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sufficient to provide this impetus, as reflection is the kind of thing that can fall under 
our own direction. However this means that the way in which problematic inquiry 
develops is markedly different from the way our more everyday inquiries develop. This 
lends support to the idea that problematic inquiry is an imposition on our everyday 
practices. Hence, even if problematic inquiry does generate scepticism this would not in 
itself indicate that scepticism could be both serious and continuous with our everyday 
practices, as it remains a possibility that problematic inquiry is an imposition on our 
everyday practices. Troublingly, it also suggests that radical inquiry may also be an 
imposition on our everyday practices, at least to the extent that it is also motivated 
independently of any actual observations.  
 
 iii) Unserious scepticism and problematic inquiry 
 
We have now arrived at an appropriate place at which to consider arguments in favour 
of the idea that problematic inquiry generates scepticism. We shall see that the 
scepticism that these arguments generate is always unserious scepticism. As our goal is 
the development of serious scepticism these arguments are not immediately useful 
except as a means of drawing attention to the correct way of arguing for serious 
scepticism. Given the way that problematic inquiry has been defined above these 
arguments can be presented in a fairly straightforward way, for all that is required for 
scepticism to be inevitable is that we be unable to secure our knowledge in the face of 
systematically ineliminable possible defeators to our knowledge claims. Possibilities 
such as these are raised for us in well-known sceptical scenarios such as those 
involving the possibility that we are dreaming or are a brain in a vat.  
 
To aid efficiency we can introduce the following schematic argument for scepticism, 
and ask whether this argument can be defeated when systematically ineliminable 
possible defeators are allowed into the argument. The basic set-up for arguments for 
scepticism is as follows. 
 
1) If p, then not-q 
2) S knows that (if p, then not-q) 
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3) If S knows that p, then S knows that not-q164 
 
This conditional allows for both a modus ponens and a modus tollens to be applied, and 
we ought to consider which on these we ought to accept 
 
Modus Ponens (the anti-sceptical case) 
 
If S knows that p, then S knows that not-q 
S knows that p 
Therefore, S knows that not-q 
 
Modus Tollens (the sceptical case) 
 
If S knows that p, then S knows that not-q 
S does not know that not-q 
Therefore, S does not know that p 
 
Let us suppose that: 
p = I am typing at my keyboard 
q = I am dreaming 
 
So then, which of the above two cases ought to be accepted, the sceptical or the anti-
sceptical case? The answer to this question can be given very easily, as it is ex 
hypothesi impossible that one could know that one is not dreaming.165 From this it is 
                                                 
164 Note that this way of setting  up the sceptical argument assumes the truth of the principle of closure 
under known entailment. While this principle has been questioned by Dretske and Nozick in my 
judgement the result of denying the principle is simply the development of another form of scepticism. 
165 Whether this ex hypothesi assertion is in fact reasonable has been challenged, notably in J. L. Austin 
and G. J. Warnock, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). In that work Austin insists 
that while we might say the same things about dreams and waking experiences we should not be led 
astray into thinking that this way of speaking reflects how things really are. There is, he asserts, a 
‘dream-like’ quality that we recognise in dreams but not generally in waking experience. Austin may 
well have been right, although his point will not convince the sceptic who will simply ask why we 
associate this ‘dream-like’ quality with cases of deception and the opposite quality with accurate 
perception. Nor does Austin limit his comments to dreams in this regard, criticising philosophers for too 
quickly assuming there is ‘no qualitative difference’ between two perceptions when there really is such a 
difference. More recently the assertion that we can never know that we are not dreaming has been 
provided with a vigorous defence, with which I am sympathetic, in Barry Stroud, The Significance of 
Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984) pp.19-
27. The crux of Stroud’s reconstruction of Descartes’ argument is that to know that we are not dreaming 
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clear that the non-sceptical case is unacceptable for it incorrectly assumes that we can 
know that we are not dreaming. With this case unavailable we are thus forced to accept 
the sceptical case. 
 
Clearly, an extremely wide range of propositions can be substituted for p whilst holding 
q fixed. In fact on a liberal interpretation of what is involved in dreaming we could let p 
= that we are dreaming and coherently substitute for q any belief about the state of 
affairs in the world around us. In fact if we understand dreaming to include the 
possibility that our beliefs are invented by us then we may even be in a question to call 
into question the belief that the world around us includes physical objects like busses, 
televisions and tea. We could well have merely imagined that such objects existed.  
 
This also suggests that basing arguments for scepticism on systematically ineliminable 
defeators invites the move to general scepticism about all knowledge claims hinging on 
references to matters of fact in the world around us. True, this does not necessarily 
warrant fully general scepticism as it may be that there is some knowledge that is 
immune to such sceptical arguments as it could perhaps be known even if we are 
dreaming. Necessary truths known a priori suggest themselves as possible objects for 
this special kind of knowledge. However even with such truths exempted from these 
arguments we are still facing a scepticism of an uncomfortably broad scope. 
 
It is also quite clear that all the work being done in this argument is being done by the 
idea that the possibility that we are dreaming is systematically ineliminable. Without 
this feature we would not so easily be able to dismiss the anti-sceptical case, as it would 
always be possible that we would be able legitimately show that we do have knowledge 
by showing that the relevant possible defeators do not obtain. This is precisely the way 
that we would attempt to secure a priori knowledge or perhaps knowledge of necessary 
truths. As indicated, that the defeator invoked in the above argument is systematically 
                                                                                                                                              
we would need to carry out some test to show that we are not dreaming. However to trust the results of 
such a test we would need to know that we had carried out the test while we were not dreaming, and this 
does not appear to be something that the test itself could tell us. So we would need a further test, and then 
yet another test for the further test. That is, once we accept that knowing that we are not dreaming is a 
condition on knowing in general then, Stroud argues, we cannot know. I take it that Stroud’s argument 
has in this case carried the day against Austin’s, given that it is commonplace in epistemology to attempt 
to refute the sceptic by other means than by appealing to the different ‘feel’ that dreams have to waking 
experience. 
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ineliminable is also what provides some encouragement for this argument to be 
generalised. Systematically ineliminable possible defeators can easily be constructed 
(and usually are constructed) such that they undermine the justification available for a 
wide range of possible knowledge claims. 
 
However, while it is relatively straightforward to generate scepticism if systematically 
ineliminable possible defeators are allowed to form the foundation of the sceptical 
argument the scepticism generated in this way cannot possibly be taken seriously (in 
the sense in which that this term is used in CSN). To see this imagine what would result 
were this highly generalised scepticism taken seriously, where to take scepticism 
seriously requires that it change the structure of our commitments to account for our 
sceptical conclusions. In this case all beliefs about any state of affairs in the world 
around us would have to be withdrawn. For instance I would have to withdrawn any 
beliefs I might have about what words are currently displayed on the screen of my 
computer, whether my hands are currently in contact with the keyboard or whether my 
wife is now standing in front of me telling me that dinner is ready. Yet withdrawing all 
such beliefs is clearly an untenable position, and CSN has a simple explanation of why 
this is so. Fully general scepticism fails to recognise that there are natural commitments 
to which we are entitled, as explained in chapter 1. Yet if we are entitled to these 
commitments, and if these commitments contradict the conclusions of any arguments 
for scepticism based on systematically ineliminable defeators, then we can safely 
disregard such sceptical arguments. If our natural commitments include such 
commitments as that the senses are generally reliable, that there are other minds etc 
then they would indeed appear to contradict the conclusion of sceptical arguments 
based on systematically inelimable defeators. 
 
What then of the fact that arguments for the above scepticism seem to many to be 
entirely watertight? This I take is one of the deeper problems facing CSN, and it is the 
problem that our natural commitments do not seem to be appropriately related to the 
demands of reason. Why for instance do we not derive an entitlement to any 
commitment we take to be rationally justified, as we might well take the conclusions of 
the above sceptical arguments to be? Surely reason demands that we have such an 
entitlement as the very notions of rationality and entitlement suggest that rationality 
grants entitlement. Why does CSN violate this? I admit that I can think of no warrant 
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for allowing this violation. Note also that while the above scepticism is the locus for the 
problems of rationality and entitlement that beset CSN, the possible rationality of this 
form of scepticism is not the real issue. The issue is that CSN allows for the possibility 
that we could take some commitment to be rationally justified and not take ourself to be 
entitled to it. It is one thing for CSN to say that rational justification is not necessary for 
entitlement, but it is quite another to say that it is not sufficient. The above scepticism 
merely happens to be the relevant example of this troubling move. 
 
 iv) Eliminable defeators and scepticism 
 
While the above version of scepticism may be common and interesting in its own right 
it is not the form of scepticism with which Pyrrhonism is concerned. As has been said, 
Pyrrhonian scepticism need not rely on systematically ineliminable defeators. While it 
is conceivable that it can generate general scepticism, were Pyrrhonism to do so it 
would have to be through the iterative analysis of all our beliefs. Hence as a first step 
towards developing a form of Pyrrhonian scepticism we must develop a scepticism that 
does not rely on systematically ineliminable possible defeators. We have already seen 
that radical inquiry has been defined as that form of inquiry which allows for all 
possible defeators except those that are systematically ineliminable, hence ruling out 
some logical possibilities in the setting up of an inquiry. Hence, we need to develop 
arguments for scepticism that only require us to engage in radical inquiry. 
 
This will have several consequences, the first of which will be that both generalisation 
and radicalisation become more difficult. Generalisation from an eliminable defeator is 
difficult because the number of possible ways available to us for eliminating a possible 
defeator is directly proportional to the scope of that defeator.166 For instance the 
possibility that all the books in my study have been replaced by holographic replicas is 
of broader scope than that one book in my study has been replaced by a holographic 
replica, but also far easier to eliminate. Eliminating the possibility that all my books 
have been tampered with in this way could be accomplished by checking any book in 
my study to see if it is a replica, as all I require to verify that this scenario does not 
obtain is only that I find one book which is not a holographic replica. There are thus as 
                                                 
166 This is clearly not the case for ineliminable possible defeators. 
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many ways of verifying that this scenarios does not obtain as there are books in my 
study. However, eliminating the possibility that one book in my study has been 
replaced with a holographic replica requires that I check each and every book until 
either the suspect hologram is found or all books have been checked. 
 
If the ease of determining whether an eliminable possible defeator obtains is linked to 
the number of ways available to us by which this can be determined, and it seems 
intuitively plausible that there is such a link, then the generality of scepticism generated 
by appeal to possible defeators will be linked to the ease with which this scepticism can 
be dismissed. Hence when one deals with eliminable possible defeators it seems that 
general scepticism will be easily dismissed. This is another reason why Pyrrhonian 
scepticism ought to avoid general scepticism. However, we must not confuse 
radicalness and generality, for at this point they have different structures. 
 
Using the same argument schema we developed for scepticism based on ineliminable 
possible defeators, we can examine how arguments for scepticism develop when only 
eliminable possible defeators are allowed into the equation. 
 
1) If p, then not-q 
2) S knows that (if p, then not-q) 
3) If S knows that p, then S knows that not-q 
 
Let us suppose that: 
p = The book-shaped objects on the bookcase are books 
q = The book-shaped objects on the bookcase are fake books167 
 
Inserting these values into the above argument we can ask ourselves what we would 
normally feel ourselves entitled to claim when we are considering the book-shaped 
objects on the book-case. Specifically, do we feel ourselves entitled to claim to know 
that these objects are indeed books? I believe that we do, and that we do so even though 
we do not normally check to see that these book-shaped objects are fake books used for 
decorative purposes. Hence, all other things being equal the anti-sceptical modus 
                                                 
167 Such as for instance one might find on a movie set, designed to provide a room with an air of 
respectability, learning and tradition. 
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ponens case will seem to be the most appealing. Indeed, someone who customarily 
examined the books-shaped objects on every bookcase they came across just to make 
sure that these objects really were books would be thought to be behaving quite 
strangely, unless they had some good reason of course. 
 
This at least describes our default behaviour as it were, all other things being equal. But 
what happens when other things are not equal? For instance, what would happen if 
specific observations come our way indicating that we have ignored a relevant 
possibility? For instance, imagine that while perusing a bookcase in an unfamiliar 
house one comes across a book-shaped object with an interesting title, Hobbes’ 
Leviathan perhaps, and takes the book-shaped object down from the shelf for a closer 
look. Knowing that a friend of yours is looking for some literary entertainment you call 
out to her and say ‘Hey, I’ve found some books to read’. Next, one attempts to open the 
book-shaped object to see if the editor has retained the original spellings, only to find 
that the object cannot be opened, and is indeed a fake book. Surprised at the quality of 
the fake, one looks at the bookcase again, and wonders whether the other book-shaped 
objects are also fake books. Taking another book-shaped object off the shelf at random, 
one finds that it too is a fake. At that moment your friend in the other room calls to 
confirm that you have indeed found some entertaining books to read. In such a 
circumstance, how would one normally respond? 
 
I believe one would not respond to the query with a strong affirmative statement. 
Instead one might respond by saying ‘Actually, I’m not sure, its all a bit weird’ or 
‘Well, maybe, but I don’t really know yet’. That is, the appropriate response would be 
to distance oneself from making any firm knowledge claim one way or the other. This 
indicates that the modus ponens form has suddenly become less appealing. After all, it 
is not as if one has verified that all the book-shaped objects are fake books and so it 
remains an open possibility that some of them might really be books. However the level 
of confidence we express will reflect our further discoveries. Taking a series of even 
three or four book-shaped objects at random and finding them all to be fake books 
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would, I believe, remove all our confidence that the bookcase had any books on it. At 
this point the modus tollens form has become appealing.168 
 
So what does this indicate? First, it indicates that radical scepticism can be generated 
about specific targets (such as whether the book-shaped objects on a given bookcase are 
actually books) by appealing solely to eliminable possible defeators. Further, such 
scepticism can be generated fairly easily, provided it is coupled with specific 
observations. However this creates an immediate problem, for it seems that it is only 
possible for such scepticism to emerge if highly specific and unusual observations are 
made first.169 However it has been consistently argued that one of the defining features 
of Pyrrhonian scepticism is that it can emerge as a result of reflection alone, and need 
not rely on any observations for its emergence to be possible. An associated concern we 
might have here is that as scepticism based on eliminable defeators requires specific 
observations be made in order to be motivated, not only will this scepticism be non-
general it will actually be severely limited in scope. The only things we could be 
sceptical about would be those things we can observe not to be the case. This leaves 
very little space for any interesting scepticism. 
 
A further concern might be that the apparent scepticism generated on the basis of 
eliminable possible defeators is merely apparent, being in fact a version of fallibilism 
masquerading as scepticism. The driver for this concern would derive in part from the 
connection between radical scepticism and observation. If this scepticism really is as 
limited in scope as it appears then the only moral we could draw from it of general 
scope would be that some of our knowledge claims might be unwarranted, and that 
close observation would confirm or disconfirm this. As a result, when we make 
knowledge claims we should do so in the full awareness that further observation might 
show them to be unwarranted.170 But as we have said, this is clearly a form of 
fallibilism, not scepticism. 
 
                                                 
168 However observe that in this circumstance we may also remain sceptical about whether we have any 
right to claim to know that the bookcase in question contains only fake books. It would after all be a 
highly unusual circumstance if this were the case, and we have no actually checked every book in the 
bookcase. Hence this sequence of events should not lead us to a form of negative dogmatism. 
169 A similar problem was observed to emerge in the case of problematic inquiry. 
170 This objection has been launched against Fogelin’s Pyrrhonian scepticism, in particular by Michael 
Williams. See for instance Williams, “Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism.” 
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The solution to both these concerns can be found by further examining the mechanism 
that is involved in the move from the observation that things are not what they seem to 
the conclusion that some of our knowledge claims are unwarranted. As will be shown, 
this mechanism allows for the possibility that just a few observations of such 
circumstances obtaining can lead to scepticism emerging which is far broader in scope 
than the observations which originally motivated in would seem to allow. Appeals to 
the level of scrutiny play a crucial role in the explaining this mechanism.  
 
 v) Interlude: An objection from Williams 
 
At this point it is necessary to address a concern regarding Pyrrhonian scepticism that 
has been raised by Michael Williams. Williams’ concern is that Pyrrhonian scepticism 
is at root nothing more than a version of fallibilism.171 Ultimately I find this objection 
ungrounded because it applies an unrealistic standard of what it is for some 
philosophical position to amount to scepticism. To see both the objection and the 
standard that any position would have to meet to qualify as scepticism that Williams 
applies we can examine the following statement. 
 
‘It is no affront to common sense to point out that there are lots of things we don’t know about and never 
will. The relevant evidence is fragmentary or nonexistent and its defects will never be repaired. Nor will 
scepticism be a serious threat if its generality consists only in claiming that any belief can be called in 
question, given suitable stage setting. This too is something we can easily live with. A serious form of 
philosophical scepticism must issue a negative verdict on all our claims to knowledge. It must judge them 
collectively, not severally.’172 
 
The concern at the heart of Williams’ objection is not difficult to discern from the 
above passage. As Williams sees it, for some philosophical position to qualify as being 
genuinely sceptical it must judge our claims to knowledge ‘collectively, not severally’. 
It is not enough, on this reading, to simply go about questioning this belief or that, this 
knowledge claim or that. As he says at another point, scepticism targets (and must 
target) the very possibility of knowledge, and not merely whether any given piece of 
                                                 
171 This is only one of the objections to Pyrrhonism that Williams has, the other important objection for 
present purposes being that raising the level of scrutiny changes the direction of analysis rather than just 
alerting us to previously disregarded possibilities of error. 
172 Williams, “Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism,” p.3. 
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putative knowledge is actually knowledge.173 It would seem to follow from this that the 
mere fact that Pyrrhonism is iterative and does not question the possibility of 
knowledge warrants the claim that it is not genuinely sceptical. 
 
Given his previous attempts at a refutation of scepticism there are reasons for Williams 
to take such a view. The argument Williams presents in Unnatural Doubts relies 
crucially on the claim that knowledge does not form one coherent subject for 
philosophical analysis. Instead, Williams favours a contextualist approach to 
understanding knowledge, arguing that it is not possible to conceive of knowledge as 
one coherent entity without first accepting some contentious theoretical commitments 
regarding knowledge itself. However, as Pyrrhonism makes no such commitments it 
cannot be accounted for by providing this sort of theoretical analysis.174 Thus another 
approach must be developed, and Williams arrogates to himself the right of not having 
to account for Pyrrhonian scepticism by arguing that it is not really scepticism after all. 
Quite cleverly, Williams argues that the downfall of scepticism is generality and then 
builds generality into the definition of scepticism. 
 
But are Williams’ standards too high? Granted, Williams is surely right that it is ‘no 
affront to common sense that there are lots of things we don’t know about and never 
will’. But why do we have to suppose that in order to generate something that is an 
affront to common sense we need to question the very possibility of knowledge. Surely 
common sense consists not just in the claim that we could know many things. Common 
sense tells us that we actually do know many things, and this is where Pyrrhonism has 
some bite provided it can call into question a sufficient number of commitments. 
Common sense can indeed tolerate ignorance attaining some scope, but there are limits 
to this toleration. 
 
Does Pyrrhonism content itself with the claim that there are some things we don’t know 
about and never will? I suggest that it does not. Instead, the claim of Pyrrhonism 
(treating Pyrrhonism, for rhetorical purposes as makings claims, which of course it does 
not actually do) is that each time our entitlement to any specific knowledge claim has 
                                                 
173 Ibid.: p.2. 
174 Williams concedes this point about the lack of theoretical commitment in Pyrrhonism. See Ibid.: 
p.146. 
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been examined the result has been that this supposed entitlement cannot be grounded. 
In fact that entitlement is always undermined. The Pyrrhonian challenges us to take any 
commitment we like, and try to show that we are entitled to either believe or know it. 
As it turns out, every time we attempt to provide some warrant for this entitlement we 
end up undermining this entitlement. 
 
The deeper challenge of the Pyrrhonian then is for us to explain how it is that we have 
the entitlements we normally take ourselves to have, if we have them. That is, 
Pyrrhonism challenges our understanding of our own entitlement claims, not the 
possibility of knowledge as such. For all we know, we may have entitlement to all our 
regular knowledge claims and there is nothing to stop the Pyrrhonian conceding that 
knowledge really is possible. The point though is that it is not enough that knowledge 
be possible, it is not enough that we might actually happen to know things, and it is not 
enough that we happen to have an entitlement to our knowledge claims. For any 
philosophically reflective rational agent, satisfying the demands of reason requires that 
we explain to ourselves how it comes about that we have the kind of everyday 
entitlements that we commonsensically think we do, and this is what the Pyrrhonian 
thinks we continually fail to do.175 Perhaps the moral of the story ought to be that we 
should avoid philosophical reflection about common sense, but that ship seems to have 
sailed and we now have no choice put to press on. 
 
In any case, the challenge over entitlement with which the Pyrrhonian presents us is no 
mere fallibilism. Further, the pressing nature of this challenge also suggests that the 
standard Williams applies to scepticism needs careful handling. Either that standard 
does not capture something essential to scepticism or a philosophical position does not 
need to be sceptical to create the kinds of consequences we normally associate with 
scepticism. I suggest that given the complications associated with the latter, we ought to 
choose the former and conclude that Williams has imposed an unfair criterion in his 
analysis of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism, when correctly understood, is no mere fallibilism. 
 
                                                 
175 Granted, this is an explicitly internalist demand and so one that will not convince the externalist. 
However given the radically different basic intuitions about what is required for entitlement that exist 
between the internalist and externalist I do not see how an internalist could ever convince the committed 
externalist or vice versa. 
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Even so, there is something right about Williams’ critique of Pyrrhonism. This is that 
even though Pyrrhonism does manage to be sceptically problematic it is only so for 
those who both attribute some prima facie authority to common sense and also engage 
in philosophical reflection on common sense. Yet this need not, and does not, include 
everyone. There are both people who never engage in philosophical reflection and there 
are also those who take a revisionary attitude towards common sense. To such as these 
Pyrrhonism need pose no problems, and will be taken as trading on unnecessary 
philosophical commitments regarding both common sense and the role of philosophical 
reflection. Hence when directed towards those not having such ideas about common 
sense and reflection Williams basic conclusion regarding Cartesian scepticism would 
also stand against Pyrrhonism. However I take it that much contemporary analytic 
philosophy does attribute some authority to common sense and takes it that the goal of 
philosophical inquiry is the refinement of common sense. To such as these Pyrrhonism 
is problematic.176 
 
Pyrrhonian scepticism and reflection 
 
 i) Reflection and levels of scrutiny 
 
It cannot be argued that Pyrrhonian scepticism can be generated on the basis of 
reflection alone. Observations of some sort are required. However because of our 
ability to remember past instances in which observation has pushed us into radical but 
tightly constrained scepticism, it makes sense to think that these observations could be 
quite general in their consequence. The mechanism by which the memory of past 
instances in which observation has pushed into radical but tightly constrained 
scepticism being reapplied to new circumstances is fairly straightforward. What seems 
to happen is that in recalling these past instances we also recall that the circumstances 
surrounding our observations did not indicate that these instances would turn out to be 
unusual in any way. In the bookcase example above, it is assumed that we have a 
general familiarity with bookcases and that the specific bookcase with which we are 
presented appears to be a normal run-of-the-mill bookcase. We only react with surprise 
and suspicion because nothing warns us that our circumstances are in any way unusual. 
                                                 
176 This also suggest that Williams criteria that scepticism be ‘natural’ must be also be applied with case 
as what is ‘natural’ is a relative matter. 
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 The circumstances that lead to radical (even if constrained) scepticism do not announce 
their presence until they are actually upon us. In this regard there is a similarity 
between the circumstances in which we find ourselves at present and those past 
circumstances that led us to radical scepticism, and this similarity applies equally to any 
circumstances in which we might find ourselves in the future.177 This raises the 
possibility that our circumstances at present are such that with a moments notice they 
could lead us down the path to radical scepticism. However if our knowledge claims 
turned out to be unwarranted in those past circumstances then it is possible that the 
knowledge claims we make at present could also turn out to be unwarranted. 
 
Granted, unless observations indicating the falsity of some specific knowledge claims 
have already been made then the emergence of radical scepticism seems to only be a 
mere possibility. Indeed, the recollection of the similarity between our present and 
future circumstances and those past instances that sparked off radical scepticism cannot 
mandate that our current knowledge claims are untenable. At most it warrants a benign 
form of fallibilism. One cannot present valid deductions from the fact of previous error 
to the certainty of present error. How then does anyone arrive at Pyrrhonian scepticism 
in a logically acceptable way? To see exactly how this radical emerges we must look to 
where our everyday practices actually lead us when we begin to reflect on our past 
errors, at which point we need to again return to the idea of levels of scrutiny. 
 
As we said earlier, our knowledge claims are entered against a background of possible 
defeators which would undermine our knowledge claims if they were realised but 
which we do not check. The level of scrutiny at which we are operating describes the 
range of possible defeators we consider relevant to our ability to coherently enter 
knowledge claims. That is, we do not feel ourselves entitled to enter knowledge claims 
unless we have checked to see whether some possible defeators obtain, where the level 
of scrutiny describes the range of these relevant defeators. It is reasonable to suppose 
that reflection on the ways in which our circumstances have in the past turned out to be 
                                                 
177 Note that this recollection does not amount to the deployment of the ‘Best Case Scenario’ argument 
made famous by Descartes and forcefully critiqued by Willliams. The conclusion of that argument is that 
because we lack knowledge in the best possible case, we lack knowledge in all other cases. The argument 
from recollection does not warrant the conclusion that we lack knowledge presently, as only an 
observation could show that.  
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different from what we have supposed could raise the level of scrutiny at which we 
operate. For instance, reflecting on the ways in which normal seeming bookshelves 
have deceived us in the past could incline us to be suspicious of previously 
unencountered normal seeming bookcases in the future. Such suspicion might perhaps 
manifest itself in us customarily picking one book shaped object at random to see 
whether it is a genuine book.178 Looking again at the process which led to radical 
scepticism first being introduced we can now see that it is actually the heightening of 
the level of scrutiny which does all the work in opening the door to radical scepticism. 
In fact if the level of scrutiny is raised sufficiently high then suspicion will always 
follow as there will be some scenario which we do feel needs to be eliminated but 
which has not been eliminated.   
 
Hence, if such suspicion did manifest itself in this way then it would be a clear 
indication the level of scrutiny had been raised to include scenarios that had previously 
been disregarded. However it must also be emphasised that the level of scrutiny does 
not rise in this instance as a result of an explicit decision to raise it, due to an antecedent 
recognition that it ought to be raised. Instead, as a result of recollecting those times at 
which our circumstances have been other than what we supposed we simply find 
ourselves considering scenarios that we previously dismissed. Rather than raising the 
level of scrutiny, we would do better to render this into the passive voice and say that 
the level of scrutiny is raised for us. Hence talk of the level of scrutiny being raised is 
actually offering a description of how we are inclined to act after reflecting on 
circumstances we have previously encountered. 
 
Importantly though, it seems that the level of scrutiny at which we are operating with 
regard to one knowledge claim has an impact on the level of scrutiny at which we 
operate with regard to other knowledge claims. The factors that seem to control how 
much impact is actually exerted are the height to which the level of scrutiny is raised 
with regard to the knowledge claim originally undermined by observations and the 
                                                 
178 I say that such previous experiences might lead to such action rather than that they would  because the 
character of the individual having these experiences seems to be an important feature when considering 
whether scepticism will emerge. Some people seem to be immune to any scepticism, and some are prone 
to scepticism. As will be argued later in the thesis, epistemology  has paid insufficient attention to this 
personal aspect to the development of scepticism. 
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perceived similarity of the original knowledge claim to other knowledge claims.179 
Having a number of beliefs undermined by observations in effect increases the scope 
for judgements of similarity to have effect. That is, having the level of scrutiny raised 
because of observations about book-shaped objects also can bring along with it a 
heightening of the level of scrutiny we apply to judgements about car-shaped objects, 
computer-shaped objects, pen-shaped objects or any other objects we deem to be 
relevantly similar to books. If a heightened level of scrutiny is extended in this way 
then finding oneself inclined to verify whether some book-shaped object really is a 
book will be associated with an inclination to check whether the pens on the desk really 
are pens. 
 
If this is correct then we have a clear mechanism whereby radical but tightly 
constrained scepticism generated on the basis of specific observations can be extended 
to target knowledge claims not originally connected with these observations, This in 
effect decouples observation from the scope of the resultant scepticism, at least to a 
significant extent. However observation still retains a pivotal role in providing the 
impetus for radical scepticism and also in shaping the range of knowledge claims to 
which this scepticism extends. For instance observations concerning perceptual errors 
about small objects may not impact our feeling warranted in claiming to know the 
shape of large objects. Similarly, observations concerning flaws in theoretical 
constructions in ethical theory need not impugn the entitlement we feel have for 
theoretical constructions in the physical sciences. However, the entitlement any one 
person will feel themselves to have will vary depending of their previous experiences 
and so may not track their actual entitlement. What we need to further clarify then is 
whether felt entitlement always track actual entitlement. Are these perhaps actually the 
same thing? 
 
What we need to know now is whether the form of reflection involved in recollecting 
those times when circumstances have deceived us is an imposition on our everyday 
practices. Specifically, what we require is some account of how the shift to a 
heightened level of scrutiny can be accounted for in terms of the norms of inquiry that 
                                                 
179 It is important to recognise that it is perceived (i.e. subjective) similarity which is relevant here. Shifts 
in the level of scrutiny are highly sensitive to individual psychologies and past experiences. Hence the 
way the level of scrutiny shifts for one person will not allow us to predict in precise terms what will 
happen when another person encounters the same observations. 
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govern our everyday inquisitive practices. But first it is necessary to deal with an 
objection to this sort of analysis that has again be raises by Michael Williams. 
 
  ii) Another objection from Williams, and a partial response 
 
The second major objection Williams raises against Pyrrhonian scepticism, as 
represented above, is that raising the level of scrutiny does more than just increase the 
range of scenarios that we find to be salient. According to Williams, raising the level of 
scrutiny changes the direction of analysis and generates new forms of inquiry. This is 
indeed a serious objection for if true it would seem to suggest that the radical inquiry 
that Pyrrhonism requires to generate radical scepticism is after all an imposition on our 
everyday epistemic practices. Hence if Williams is right then Pyrrhonism is not 
common sense scepticism, in fact raising no particular problems for common sense at 
all. In generating radical scepticism, all the sceptic has shown is that certain sorts of 
philosophical reflection, including radical inquiry, are problematic and not that 
reflection as such in problematic. Williams claims that 
 
‘[t]he sceptic’s fallacy is that he takes the discovery that, in the study, knowledge of the world is 
impossible for the discovery, in the study, that knowledge is impossible generally. He infers the 
impossibility of knowledge from what is, at best, its instability.’180 
 
Williams point is that reflection carried out ‘in the study’ is by no means the same thing 
as reflection carried out ‘in the street’, and conclusions gained in one context cannot 
always be applied to another context. Hence even if knowledge turns out to be 
impossible in one context this cannot be used to ground the more general claim that 
knowledge is impossible in another context, where this is precisely what the sceptic 
does. I shall call contexts in which one cannot draw such conclusions as the sceptic 
needs epistemically independent. Note that Williams’ point here cannot be avoided by 
the Pyrrhonian merely on the grounds that Pyrrhonism does not question the possibility 
of knowledge in general, as has been explained. Williams’ statements imply that even if 
our entitlement to some specific piece of knowledge in one context cannot be accounted 
                                                 
180 Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism p.359. Williams 
makes a great many interesting comments on this matter in the first chapter of that same work. 
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for this does not mean that we are unentitled to that specific piece of knowledge in 
another context. 
 
That in some contexts our entitlement to our commitments cannot be accounted for has 
already been suggested, with the context of radical inquiry providing one such context. 
For Williams’ argument to be made good against the Pyrrhonian then it would have to 
be the case that everyday inquiry and radical inquiry can be sharply distinguished as 
different contexts. Without these contextual differences the distinction between the 
instability of knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge will collapse. So then, can 
the argument that everyday inquiry and radical inquiry are different contexts be 
sustained? 
 
In one sense these are clearly different contexts as each considers a different range of 
questions to be legitimate as each operates at a different level of scrutiny, and this is all 
that Williams needs for contexts to be epistemically independent. Yet even if the 
context of everyday inquiry is epistemically independent of the context of radical 
inquiry (and to reiterate, I think it is not) we do still not get the conclusion that 
Williams requires. This is because the shift from the context of everyday inquiry to that 
of radical inquiry is a shift that is mandated by the character of everyday inquiry itself. 
That is, inquiring commonsensically can in some circumstances lead us into radical 
inquiry. 
 
Let us suppose that Williams is correct and that radical inquiry does not represent our 
‘actual’ epistemic state in which we are bound by the host of practical concerns that we 
normally have to consider. Let us also suppose that everyday inquiries can leave us 
knowing and reasonably believing all sorts of things. From this does it follow that the 
perspective of radical inquiry represents our ‘actual’ epistemic state? Indeed it does not. 
Does it also follow that the perspective of everyday inquiry does represent our actual 
epistemic state? No it does not. No one perspective represents our ‘actual’ epistemic 
state, if by that we mean that that our ‘actual’ epistemic state is the one that is 
abstracted from any practical or discipline-specific considerations.181 One of Williams’ 
                                                 
181 By discipline-specific considerations I have in mind the considerations that discourage the historian to 
consider the possibility that the world popped into existence 30 minutes ago, complete with historical 
textbooks. 
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central points is that such considerations are always an inherent part of our epistemic 
state, which is exactly why in his view appeals to raising the level of scrutiny cannot do 
all the work in generating Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
 
And yet that we can in fact move easily from everyday to radical inquiry is easily 
shown, and has been shown in the preceding passages. Further, that it is so easy seems 
to be important. In fact one of the lessons of the preceding account is that radical 
inquiry appears to be nothing other than everyday inquiry carried out in unusual 
circumstances. This is not a deceptive impression, although this appearance need not 
trouble Williams. This is because Williams is still free to reply with the claim that all 
the ease of this shift shows is that radical inquiry has an almost hypnotic appeal and is 
deceptively commonsensical but not actually so. Thus an adequate response to 
Williams’ objection can only be given by showing that radical inquiry and everyday 
inquiry present two aspects of what is actually the same form of inquiry. If this can be 
shown then either we should rename radical inquiry as everyday or everyday as radical, 
and it doesn’t really matter which we choose. The overarching point is that what are 
apparently two forms of inquiry is actually two aspects of one form of inquiry. 
 
For this to be shown a criterion for distinguishing between forms of inquiry other than 
by appealing to the level of scrutiny characteristic of that form of inquiry needs to be 
established. After all, radical and everyday inquiries really do operate at different levels 
of scrutiny. More precisely, what we need is an account describing how it is that we 
come to move to higher levels of scrutiny such as has already been provided, for that is 
only one half of the story. What we also need is an account of how it comes about that 
we move back down through levels of scrutiny after they have been raised, and of why 
we are sometimes reasonably resistant to the level of scrutiny being raised at all. What 
we need is a common feature of both everyday and radical inquiry which accounts for 
why levels of scrutiny differ in each case without leading to the conclusion that these 
are quite separate forms of inquiry. 
 
Of course none of this addresses Williams’ concern, although it does at least establish 
what would be required, and these requirements are indeed demanding. Nonetheless 
they can be addressed, and the following section is dedicated to meeting these 
requirements by providing a more complete account of inquiry. It will emerge in the 
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course of this analysis that everyday inquiry and radical inquiry are unified by being 
responsive to the same norms. In fact each simply gives expression to these norms in 
different circumstances. This explains why shifting to problematic inquiry is so easy 
and in part also explains why Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a constant threat without 
being our constant state. 
 
 iii) Levels of scrutiny and norms of inquiry 
 
Reflecting on the fact that some investigations strike us as forced and unserious 
suggests that our inquiries may be governed by norms that direct us not to engage in 
some inquiries in some circumstances, even if it is possible for us to begin such 
inquiries. More precisely, there seem to be norms that control where the level of 
scrutiny is set and hence tell us which scenarios we are to take into consideration. I 
believe these should be constructed in something like the following way. 
 
• The level of scrutiny should be set to include all those scenarios that seem 
salient, but no higher than this. 
• Inquiries should be made into any scenarios that do seem salient to ascertain 
whether or not they actually obtain 
• Inquiries should not be made into any scenarios that do not seem salient if such 
inquiry interferes with inquiries into scenarios that are taken seriously, taking 
opportunity cost associated with inquiry into account. 
 
The first and second norms carry the same force as Lewis’ Rule of Attention, rewritten 
into the terminology of levels of scrutiny and salience.182 Lewis’ deploys this rule as 
part of a broader strategy of determining what scenarios we are properly allowed to 
ignore, where part of his answer to this is that we are not allowed to ignore any 
scenarios to which we are actually paying attention. In my terminology we are not 
allowed to ignore any scenarios that we actually find salient, where the scenarios that 
we find salient are just those that capture our attention. However I also want to expand 
Lewis’s comments on this rule such that it explicitly tells us not just what we may not 
ignore but also what we may ignore. Hence the third norm above states that we may 
                                                 
182 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4 (1996): pp.559-
560. 
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ignore any scenario that we do not find salient, or in Lewis’ terminology, we may 
ignore any scenario to which we are not currently paying any attention. 
 
Does this not mean that we can disarm scepticism by simply paying it no mind, thus 
ensuring that the scenarios used by the sceptic never actually become salient to us? If 
so, is this not too easy a victory against the sceptic? In one sense, scepticism can be 
disarmed just this easily, although this is not ultimately anti-Pyrrhonian point, for the 
Pyrrhonian will be quick to point out that we can only defeat Pyrrhonism so long as we 
can continue to pay no mind to those scenarios to which the Pyrrhonian appeals. But 
this, so claims the Pyrrhonian, is not something that we can actually do and here again 
we can appeal to another of Lewis’ rules, the Rule of Resemblance. 
 
Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance states that if one scenario may not be properly ignored 
then any scenario that resembles this un-ignorable scenario can also not be ignored. The 
previous description of the way in which the level of scrutiny comes to be raised 
actually appeals to the same features of our experience that Lewis is appealing to in 
developing this rule. However there are also differences in the way that Lewis’ rule is 
applied. In particular, Lewis introduces what he admits are entirely ad hoc restrictions 
to the rule that are explicitly formulated to rule out the possibility of scepticism.183 By 
contrast, I do not assume that we can so blithely rule scepticism out of court in such a 
manner. In fact I believe that we cannot do so and hence have no need of ad hocery. 
Further, Lewis focuses on scenarios which, if realised, would generate Cartesian 
scepticism; scenarios such as that we are radically deceived by an evil demon for 
instance.  
 
It must be conceded that when placed in the context of Cartesian scepticism and 
questions over the very possibility of knowledge then Lewis’ ad hocery has some 
limited plausibility. However we do not need forced resemblances with the scenario 
that we are at the mercy of some deceiving demon to raise the level of scrutiny 
sufficiently high that we lose any entitlement to knowledge that we may previously 
have had. On the contrary, the Pyrrhonian has insisted that all we require is 
                                                 
183 Lewis goes further and admits that he sees no way of removing the ad hocery. I take it that this is the 
(unrecognised) lesson of scepticism. We believe that it must be possible to avoid scepticism but cannot 
understand how we are entitled to do so. 
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resemblances between our current circumstances and those circumstances in which we 
found ourselves just a moment before Pyrrhonism broke out or could have broken out. 
In this context ad hocery looks far less plausible. It may be possible that we could know 
things, and this is not something that the Pyrrhonian would dispute. What the 
Pyrrhonian would dispute is whether, given resemblances between our actual 
circumstances and circumstances in which we would clearly have no entitlement to 
knowledge, we actually have an entitlement to knowledge in our actual 
circumstances.184 
 
Returning then to the earlier question, do the three norms identified in this section 
imply that scepticism can be disarmed just by paying it no mind? The answer is yes it 
does imply this, provided we can actually pull off the feat of ignoring the scenarios 
relevant to the emergence of scepticism. We may be able to do this for Cartesian 
scenarios, but we cannot consistently do this for Pyrrhonian scenarios. In this respect 
our epistemic situation is somewhat worse than Lewis supposes, for while Lewis does 
recognise that there is some instability in knowledge he supposes that we can 
intentionally avoid this instability. This is because Lewis believes that it is 
epistemological investigation that reveals the instability of knowledge, and that 
 
‘[u]nless this investigation of ours was an altogether atypical sample of epistemology, it will be 
inevitable that epistemology must destroy knowledge. That is how knowledge is elusive. Examine it, and 
straightaway it vanishes.’185 
 
However, if the Rule of Resemblance does not require the invocation of any scenarios 
that we would associate with uniquely epistemological investigation then it will not be 
only epistemology that destroys knowledge by inviting the emergence of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism. Everyday musings about resemblances between our current circumstances 
and circumstances in which we lose our entitlement to knowledge will do. While it is 
true that such musings will not warrant any general denial of the possibility of 
knowledge and will be contingent on our actual experiences for their plausibility, this is 
                                                 
184 As an additional note, I think that everything that Lewis says in this paper can be subsumed under his 
rules of Resemblance and Attention. Lewis notes the possibility of redundancy in his analysis. I think that 
redundancy is more than a possibility. 
185 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p.560. 
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quite enough to give us pause. Indeed knowledge is elusive, far more so than is often 
recognised. 
 
This section was originally directed towards answering an objection that was raised by 
Williams regarding a possible contextualist response to Pyrrhonism. We should now be 
able to see how this response would develop. Like Lewis, Williams thinks that it is 
actually an unusual feature of epistemological inquiries that does all the work in 
generating sceptical problems for us. Yet while this sounds plausible if we think in 
terms of Cartesian scepticism it is not so obviously true if Pyrrhonian scepticism is our 
concern. 
 
Cartesian scepticism is most naturally cast as asking questions of us that have a 
distinctly epistemological ring about them. Questions such as ‘are my first-person 
present impressions causally related in the right sort of way to whatever objects that 
cause them’ are an excellent example of this, and if we were to introduce questions of 
this sort then Williams’ objection that we have changed the direction of the analysis 
will gain some traction. However, referring to the identified norms (or to Lewis’ rules, 
appropriately modified) allows us to see that the questions with which the Pyrrhonian 
presents us are not of the same sort. The Pyrrhonian merely asks ‘Given the 
resemblance between your current circumstances and other circumstances in which you 
have turned out to lack knowledge, for what reason do you suppose that you are entitled 
to knowledge now?’ This question does not come with the same epistemological and 
metaphysical commitments as we find in Cartesian scepticism. There is no appeal to the 
priority of first-person present experience and no theory of perception that implies 
some kind of experiential ‘gap’ between the world and the perceiving agent. In fact all 
that the Pyrrhonian requires is that the identified norms or rules are the actual rules 
according to which we conduct our inquiries. 
 
So then, in what way is the Pyrrhonian changing the direction of the inquiry when he 
presents us with this resemblances and questions which start us on our path to 
Pyrrhonian scepticism? I suggest that there is no sense in which the Pyrrhonian is doing 
this, once Pyrrhonism is correctly understood. Take again our example of sitting in a 
history class. Were a student to ask ‘Teacher, how do you know that the world didn’t 
pop into existence just five minutes ago’ then the teacher might reasonably respond by 
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saying that they are studying history, and that when doing so such questions are ruled 
out of court. That is, they might take the student to be changing the direction of inquiry. 
But what if the students says ‘Teacher, isn’t is the case that you have drawn 
conclusions from similar evidence in the past and been wrong? How then can we trust 
you in thinking that your judgment in this case is correct?’ This does not seem to 
change the direction of inquiry, as the answer might be given in terms of appealing to 
issues of historical method, strength of sources etc. That is, the question could be both 
scepticism-inducing and historical. At least, that is what the preceding analysis of the 
way in which the level of scrutiny can be raised was intended to show. 
 
Williams’ objection, while powerful when directed against the Cartesian, has no force 
when directed at the Pyrrhonian because radical inquiry just is a version of everyday 
inquiry. This is guaranteed to be so because the Pyrrhonian exploits features of our 
everyday way of going about our inquiries that, in the right circumstances, can lead to 
our entitlements to knowledge and even reasonable belief being undermined. 
 
 iv) Further norms: the judgement of experts 
 
That the norms identified above correctly describe our inquisitive practices can be 
confirmed by applying them to a further specific example. To be of most use we ought 
to look at an example in which our normal inquisitive practices break down and see 
whether the identified norms can account for why this occurs. As we shall see, the 
identified norms do a fair job of accounting for our everyday inquisitive practices, and 
certainly do all the work that Lewis’ rules are designed to do, but are not by themselves 
sufficient. At the end of this section the outlines of a further norm shall be introduced. 
In the present circumstances it is useful to reapply an example that was originally 
introduced by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s example is as follows. 
 
‘Imagine that a schoolboy really did ask “and is there a table there even when I turn around, and even 
when no one is there to see it?” Is the teacher to reassure him – and say “of course there is!”? 
Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy will grow out of asking such 
questions.’ [OC.314] 
 
‘That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all.  
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 And it would be just the same is the pupil cast doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say 
on the justification of inductive arguments.- The teacher would feel that this was only holding them up, 
that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.- And he would be right. It would be 
as if someone was looking for an object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn’t see it there; then he 
closes it again, waits, and opens it to see if perhaps it isn’t there now, and keeps on like that. He has not 
learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned how to ask questions. He has 
not learned the game that we are trying to teach him.’ [OC.315] 
 
‘And isn’t it the same as if the pupil were to hold up his history lesson with doubts as to whether the 
earth really…?’ [OC.316] 
 
‘This doubt isn’t one of he doubts in our game. (But not as if we chose this game!)’ [OC.317.] 
 
OC.315 is of particular interest, for it is here that Wittgenstein notes that the questions 
the troublesome student asks must strike us as being illegitimate, and concludes from 
the fact that the student asks such questions that he has ‘not learned the game we are 
trying to teach him’. But in order to derive such a conclusion Wittgenstein must take it 
that regarding such questions as illegitimate is constitutive of this game.186 
 
In this above example the ostensible error of the troublesome student is to raise 
questions about the past existence of the earth in the midst of a history lesson that 
presupposes that the earth did indeed exist in the past. The immediate problem with this 
example however is determining who in this example has made a genuine mistake and 
why. The troublesome student seems to be asking a perfectly legitimate question that 
we have no trouble understanding. Taking this question in itself it is unclear why it 
does not deserve an answer. On the other hand the teacher in this example also seems to 
be correctly carrying out his duties qua history teacher. Were he not to dismiss the 
troublesome student’s question then his other students will learn nothing about history. 
The question is whether the identified norms can account for this dynamic. 
 
I submit that the identified norms are (partially) sufficient to the task. The norms 
identified earlier instruct us to inquire into any scenario that we genuinely find to be 
salient, but no other scenarios. If the troublesome student genuinely finds his question 
to be salient then the norms of inquiry will instruct him to inquire into the scenario that 
                                                 
186 This is not to say that Wittegenstein is in any way a foundationalist, as was discussed in chapter 1. 
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makes this question possible.187 Let us suppose that the scenario involved here is that 
the world popped into existence half an hour before the history class started.188 
However the teacher, qua history teacher, by definition does not and cannot find this 
scenario to be salient. To take the troublesome student’s scenario seriously would make 
carrying out his duties as a history teacher impossible, as learning anything about 
history presupposes that we take it that the world did really exist in the past. From the 
perspective of the teacher then, the troublesome students question should definitely be 
ignored and hence, again from the perspective of he teacher, he acts rightly in refusing 
to address the question. The reason why we have trouble identifying what has gone 
wrong in this example is that neither major party here has acted improperly in that both 
have embodied a respect for the norms that govern inquiry. To this point the identified 
norms do seem to give the correct account of the structure of our inquisitive practices. 
 
However if these norms tell the entire story then it would seem that we are at an 
impasse as no inquisitive process can continue as the two relevant agents have both 
acted correctly and yet call for incompatible inquiries to be undertaken. Yet clearly an 
impasse would not actually result in this classroom, as those scenarios taken to be 
salient by the teacher would take precedence and the history lesson would in fact 
continue. To account for this we need to introduce a further norm (or norms) that can 
resolve clashes over what is taken to be the most relevant scenario. 
 
Recognised experts may exclude from discussion any scenarios as they see fit, 
provided that the relevant expert does not find these scenarios to be relevant. 
 
When we consider Wittgenstein’s example of the troublesome student we see that 
ruling a range of scenarios out of consideration is in fact vital if any of our inquiries are 
to be carried out. The identified norms do a fair job of explaining how the range of 
these scenarios comes to be set. It also turns out that the breakdown of an inquiry can 
be accounted for in terms of the violation of these norms. Finally, we see in the above 
example more clearly than we did earlier that the violation of these norms comes with 
                                                 
187 Let us suppose that the student does genuinely find this question to be salient. Note that the norm of 
inquiry identified in chapter 3 would suggest that the troublesome student could even come to find the 
scenario embodied in this question to be commonsensical. If the troublesome student does not take the 
scenario that drives his question to be salient then he in clearly in violation of the norms of inquiry and 
the story stops here. 
188 There are in fact a number of scenarios that our troublesome student could have in mind. 
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clear sanctions. In the example above were the troublesome student to continue to press 
his question then the teacher would eventually have to take action, either firmly 
requiring that he remain silent for the duration of the lesson or, if necessary, asking him 
to leave the class. That is, not only will the violation of these norms bring with it 
judgements of irrationality, it will also come with more practical sanctions. 
 
 v) Further norms: memory and scepticism 
 
Let us take as a brief case-study the following plausible candidate for a general norm of 
behaviour: Trust Memory. Let us also examine this likely candidate to see whether the 
same sceptical conclusions that have been derived above seem likely to follow from its 
application. Are we entitled to this norm, and what would follow if we are? 
 
When examining practices the focus needs to fall on the consequences of engaging in 
some practice. For instance the practice of trusting memory could lead us to believe that 
the Wallabies had played a brilliantly entertaining style of Rugby against the All Blacks 
in a Bledisloe Cup match, based on the memory of sitting in the bar with friends and 
watching the match. If these events really did happen then we might be inclined to say 
that the practice of trusting memory is justified. If this is so, then we might also be 
inclined to make the further claim that the natural commitment to practice in such a 
way so as to trust memory is warranted, or that we are entitled to practice in this way. 
 
And yet circumstances can be found in which it is not entirely obvious that we are 
entitled to the particular practice of trusting our memory. Put another way, for what 
reason do we have some entitlement to respect the norm ‘trust memory’. Our memories 
may well be quite unreliable and we need not refer to ‘sceptical’ scenarios to recognise 
this. Differences in first-hand testimonies between different people viewing the same 
event suggest that our memory does not function as an unbiased record. We seem to 
remember some events quite vividly whilst other events are not noted at all. Moreover, 
what we remember is often coloured by an interpretation that we have given to an 
event, one for instance that reinforces what we already believe to be true; that the 
Wallabies play an entertaining style of Rugby for instance. Any of these factors could 
render our memory unreliable in any given instance, and none of them is in any way 
outlandish. Further, any of these factors could be at work without us being aware of it 
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or in fact ever becoming aware of it, perhaps even while we are sitting at a bar with 
friends. However if one is still unconvinced then cases of Alzheimer’s or senile 
dementia, neither of which is uncommon, do most definitely render memory 
unreliable.189 
 
For what reason then do we suppose that we are entitled to respect the norm ‘trust 
memory’? We can grant that we do respect this norm and hence that we do practice in 
such a way as to trust our memory. We can grant that we do take ourselves to be 
entitled to practice in this way, and even that we must (psychologically and 
pragmatically) respect this norm and hence practice in this way. However even granting 
these points the question of entitlement retains its force, as being psychologically or 
pragmatically compelled to practice in a given way, as we have already claimed, does 
not of itself say anything of an epistemic nature. But entitlement is an epistemic matter. 
 
Implications of Pyrrhonism thus understood 
 
 i) The force of Pyrrhonism and a challenge for reason 
 
If Pyrrhonism really can be developed from the above norms or rules then this presents 
a rather interesting challenge to us regarding how we conceive of the authority of 
reason. This can be brought out if we consider how we would judge those who 
flagrantly violate these norms, although first a possible misconception must be 
addressed. It might be supposed that such violation would be impossible because the 
level of scrutiny will automatically be set to include those scenarios that seem salient. 
However, to conclude that the level of scrutiny could never fail to be set at exactly this 
level is to overlook the possibility that we could attempt to shift the level of scrutiny at 
which we are operating by some sort of post-hoc conscious effort. For instance we 
could attempt to ignore certain scenarios that present themselves to us in a particularly 
salient way or we could give full consideration to scenarios that do not present 
themselves to us in a particularly salient way. 
 
                                                 
189 Observe also that it is also not uncommon for someone in the early stages of either of these diseases to 
be unaware of this. 
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Take first those who in practice ignore scenarios that actually do seem salient to them 
by not undertaking the necessary investigations into whether these scenarios obtain. 
That is, they artificially attempt to set the level of scrutiny lower than it is naturally set. 
Such people are thought to lack intellectual integrity, in addition to being careless and 
irresponsible. More forcefully, they can also be thought to be irrational in that they 
refuse to investigate possible scenarios that they would admit to themselves are highly 
relevant to their knowledge claims. What is interesting about this though is that the 
apparent irrationality is only temporary, as Lewis (in a very Humean fashion) observes. 
 
‘If you brought some hitherto ignored possibility to our attention, then straightway we are not ignoring it 
at all, so a fortiori we are not properly ignoring it. How can this alteration of our conversational state be 
undone? If you are persistent, perhaps it cannot be undone – at least so long as you are around. Even if 
we go off and play backgammon, and afterwards start our conversation afresh, you might turn up and call 
our attention to it all over again…You know as well as I do that continued attention to this possibility 
impedes our shared conversational purposes. Indeed, it may be common knowledge between you and us 
that we would all prefer it if this possibility could be dismissed from our attention. In that case we might 
strike a tacit agreement to speak just as if we were ignoring it; and after just a little of that, doubtless it 
really would be ignored.’190 
 
At the beginning of the process Lewis describes we are pictured as following the 
correct norms correctly and would be judged to be rational. Likewise at the end of the 
process Lewis described. But what is happening in the transition? Are we still acting 
rationally? I suggest that we are not, for we are ignoring a scenario that does appear 
salient to us, and we have no warrant for this sort of ignoring. Granted, ignoring this 
scenario may be required of our shared conversational purposes, and hence not ignoring 
it is rather inconvenient. Yet why suppose that these conversational purposes are the 
ones to which we ought to be directing our attention? Ought not our conversational 
purposes be directed by the demands of reason, and do not these demands direct us 
towards the inconvenient scenarios? 
 
As noted, the interesting feature here is that irrational behaviour, if persisted with for 
long enough, eventually becomes rational behaviour. This seems rather odd, for how 
can persistence in irrationality ever become rational? The solution to this puzzle is that 
reason successively provides warrant for both sceptical and anti-sceptical positions. 
                                                 
190 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p.560. 
 Page 160  
Neither can claim to represent our final epistemic state, and neither can defeat the other 
as they are equally rational. Exactly how this comes about, and the important role 
played by common sense in developing the unusual dynamic is the focus of 
considerable attention in chapter 3. 
 
That deals with those who would attempt to artificially lower the level of scrutiny 
through some post-hoc conscious effort, but what of those who would attempt to 
artificially raise this level? Such people inquire after scenarios regardless of whether 
they are ignored, properly or otherwise, and we have (not very nice) terms to describe 
such as these. We call these pedantic, nit-picking, impractical and engaging in inquiries 
of a purely ‘academic’ character (in the negative sense of that term). We generally 
show them little patience and consider their inquiries to be irrelevant. In extreme cases 
we label this behaviour as neurotic or paranoid and treat it by clinical means. That is, 
we regard people who undertake such inquiries to be acting irrationally, once again 
suggesting that there is some connection between the identified norms and the structure 
of reason.191 
 
With this said, we can now ask whether the shift to a heightened level of scrutiny 
envisaged here can be accommodated within our everyday practices. I believe that what 
has been identified above as norms of inquiry partly describe what it is to act rationally 
in any context. The above norms tell us that once a scenario strikes us as salient, once 
we cannot in good conscience ignore it, then we have no rational grounds for ignoring 
this scenario. Indeed, we are under a rational obligation to inquire into the possibility 
that such scenarios actually obtain and will normally feel ourselves to be unwarranted 
in claiming entitlement to knowledge (and perhaps reasonable belief depending on the 
exigencies of the case) until it has been shown to our satisfaction that these scenarios do 
not obtain. Thus, judging by these norms Pyrrhonism is both rational and 
commonsensical. 
 
 ii) Irreducible instability 
                                                 
191 Interestingly, if inquiries into scenarios that do not seem salient are undertaken as an innocent pastime 
then while odd this would not be irrational. However if such inquiries are undertaken in such a way as to 
preclude inquiries into scenarios that are taken seriously then it may be reasonable to consider such 
inquiries to be irrational. Hence, in both cases the violation of the above norm allows for the possibility 
that the violator of this norm can be judged to be irrational. 
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 The above analysis of Pyrrhonism implies that our entitlement to knowledge and 
reasonable belief is an unstable matter. In this respect Lewis is quite right, for doing 
epistemology does rob us of our entitlement to knowledge. However, I have attempted 
to show above that we need not engage in anything we would recognise as being 
distinctly epistemological for this to result. Engaging in everyday inquiries is a risky 
business in this respect, as even it can lead us into Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
 
However we ought not get carried away with these conclusions, for the above analysis 
does not imply that we ought always to be Pyrrhonian sceptics. Lewis is right again in 
saying that we can avoid the force of sceptical considerations by ignoring them – so 
long as we following certain rules that govern when ignoring a scenario is appropriate. 
In fact, Lewis does not go far enough, for not only are we right to sometimes ignore 
some scenarios, we are also right not to go searching for sceptical scenarios. This was 
the force of the third norm I developed above. 
 
This matches rather well with the phenomenology of sceptical doubt. Even those who 
are prone to feel the full force of scepticism do not do so all the time, although we must 
accept the reality that they do so sometimes. Moreover, even those who have been 
prone to feel the full force of scepticism, such as Hume in the Treatise for instance, 
have not come to regard being perpetually trapped in sceptical doubt as a rational 
stance. Nor have they concluded that being perpetually immune to scepticism is a 
rational stance. The above analysis suggests why this might be the case. Neither 
Pyrrhonism nor anti-Pyrrhonism represents our final epistemic position, although both 
is equally rational. 
 
Thus we are left with the conclusion that sometimes we ought to be Pyrrhonian 
sceptics, and sometimes we ought not be. However where Lewis is wrong is that the 
force of this normative consideration derives from the demands of reason and not from 
pragmatic considerations as he supposes. That is, responding to the demands of reason 
leads us to both Pyrrhonian scepticism and thoroughly anti-sceptical positions. 
However what this analysis has not provided is some way of integrating these two quite 
different perspectives, and this is because there really is no way in which these 
perspectives can be integrated. Each is, after all, equally rational.  
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 While this might leave us with a certain amount of dissatisfaction I remain unconvinced 
that this dissatisfaction is reasonable. The dissatisfaction we might feel could reflect 
nothing more than an unwarranted assumption that we have the ability to understand 
ourselves, and I see no reason why this must be the case. Indeed, I believe we need to 
be more Humean on this point, and adopt the perspective on these matters that he 
expresses in the following way. 
 
‘When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; though 
we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our 
most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the 
mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most 
extraordinary phenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any further progress is enough to satisfy 
the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, 
and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their 
conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment 
and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of 
our philosophy.’ [T.xvii] 
 
iii) Conclusion: The challenge of Pyrrhonism 
 
The shift to a heightened level of scrutiny has been legitimised by appeal to a respect 
for norms of inquiry that do not require any special philosophical commitments to 
move us to Pyrrhonian scepticism. It turns out that not involving ourselves in these 
inquiries would in the right circumstances be irrational. We have also provided a 
mechanism by which raising of the level of scrutiny as a consequence of specific 
observations can come to have consequences for knowledge claims not originally 
involved with these observations. It has also been shown that if the level of scrutiny is 
raised to a sufficiently high level then radical scepticism can result. Together these 
make it clear that deriving a radical scepticism even while respecting the norms that 
govern our everyday behaviour is quite comprehensible. Essentially, the argument to 
this point has been that if certain uneliminated but eliminable possible defeators 
become salient to us then reason demands that we withdraw any claims we have to be 
entitled to knowledge (or even reasonable belief, depending of the exigencies of the 
case). To reiterate, if Pyrrhonism emerges in the way described in this chapter then it 
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will be radical, serious, rational and commonsensical. If one wishes to defend CSN, 
then Pyrrhonian scepticism must be taken very seriously. In fact the only obvious way 
forward at this point would be to concede that CSN is in fact an inherently sceptical 
position or abandon CSN completely. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Hume’s Title Principle and perspectivist scepticism 
 
Outline 
 
This chapter develops a ‘perspectivist’ account of the place of scepticism in our 
intellectual lives, inspired in large part by the work of David Hume.192 Chapter 2 has 
already established that Pyrrhonian scepticism is radical, serious and commonsensical 
because the shift to a heightened level of scrutiny is driven by features of our everyday 
epistemic practices and not by prior dispensable philosophical commitments as 
Williams supposes. However chapter 2 also raised difficult questions over whether 
Pyrrhonian scepticism could truly be rational, in that it does not appear to be rationally 
integrable into a common sense perspective. If Carol Rovane is correct to argue that 
personhood is derived from our ability to rationally integrate our beliefs, desires, etc, 
then the presence of legitimate sceptical doubt that cannot be integrated into an overall 
integrated view offers nothing less than a challenge to personhood.193 Some have been 
tempted to view sceptical doubt as an insertion of irrationality into an otherwise rational 
life, perhaps thinking of them as moments of temporary insanity.194 However chapter 2 
has already shown why this will not do, in that the Pyrrhonian is simply applying the 
standard norms of inquiry in generating Pyrrhonism. Thus if we are entitled to the 
norms that govern common sense, and if we are to judge Pyrrhonism to be an instance 
of madness, then we must also judge the common sense perspective to be insane. At 
least, such would be the judgement of the Pyrrhonian and there is no reason yet to 
favour one perspective over the other. Chapter 3 turns to Hume to better understand the 
dynamics involved here as he does an excellent job of not allowing these tensions to 
collapse into a false consistency. 
 
                                                 
192 The reason for placing ‘perspectivist’ in scare-quotes is to indicate that no philosophically loaded 
account of perspectivism is intended, and especially not any claim invoking the idea that the truth of the 
matter is relative to the context from which we make truth-claims. Briefly, the reason that the 
perspectivism here, essentially Hume’s perspectivism, doesn’t collapse into a philosophically loaded 
version of perspectivism is it is remains uncommitted as to whether there are good reasons to privilege 
one perspective over another. In the absence of good reasons to privilege one perspective over others the 
perspectivism here refuses to grant for instance that the objective view is any better than the subjective 
view, or that the ‘philosophical’ view is better than that of ‘common sense’, or the opposite. 
193 Carol Rovane, “Rationality and Persons,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, ed. Alfred R Mele 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2004). 
194 This seems to be Reid’s view, or at least one of Reid’s views. He seems to have had several. 
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The best way of approaching Hume’s account of the place of tension in our intellectual 
lives is by first examining the best arguments, drawn from Hume, supporting the 
contention that common sense is normative and anti-sceptical. As it turns out the same 
arguments that support this thesis would also grant normativity to Pyrrhonian 
scepticism. However the arguments presented for the normativity and seriousness of 
scepticism do not overturn arguments to the effect that scepticism is not serious and not 
normative. Faced with the normativity and seriousness of both scepticism and non-
scepticism the second part of this chapter attempts to develop a Hume-inspired 
perspectivism. This is necessary if we are to make sense of the place of scepticism in 
our cognitive lives. 
 
An interesting consequence of the analysis that follows is that virtually everything that 
has been said recently by Don Garrett in his recent paper on this matter can be accepted 
– everything that is except the claim that Hume is at most a mitigated sceptic.195 That 
is, this analysis takes advantages of Garrett’s reading of Hume, in particular his 
attention to the Title Principle as a norm derived antecedent to Hume’s initial inquiries. 
Where Garrett does wrong is not giving the Title Principle a central place. Nor is 
Garrett wrong to suppose that Hume can reasonably take some beliefs and knowledge 
claims to be rationally justified. Quite the contrary. Garrett’s mistake is thinking that 
the Title Principle provides warrant only for non-sceptical beliefs, as it provides merit 
for both sceptical and non-sceptical beliefs and knowledge claims, and that of course is 
the problem. At least, that it what I shall argue in the reading of the Title Principle that 
follows. While this reading at several points goes quite a way beyond what Hume 
strictly argues I would defend the contention that it represents what Hume should have 
said when pressed on the idea of the normativity of scepticism. Even though Garrett’s 
more recent paper on this matter makes many points that are relevant to this discussion 
his clearest exposition of the Title Principle remains the earlier paper, at it is to that 
paper towards which attention shall be directed in the following analysis.196 
                                                 
195 Don Garrett, “Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's 
Philosophical Project,” Philosophical Studies 132, no. 1 (2007). 
196 It is for much the same reason that less attention is given to Garrett’s book than one might otherwise 
have expected. However for a related exposition of the Title Principle see Don Garrett, Cognition and 
Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) especially pp.208-215, 
232-237. Much of what I say in what follows in this chapter is in fact guided by exposition of Hume 
provided in this work, with the exception of the idea that Hume is at most an intermittent, mitigated 
sceptic. 
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 Hume’s ‘Title Principle’ and natural justification 
 
 i) The Title Principle 
 
As read by Don Garrett, Hume presents us with an argument for the conclusion that 
some of our more important commitments are justified, even though they lack rational 
justification. Central to Garrett’s argument is a distinction between epistemic merit and 
rational support. A commitment has epistemic merit ‘if and only if it deserves or is 
worthy of belief or assent”.197 A commitment has rational support “if and only if it has 
epistemic merit because of the manner in which it is produced by reason”.198 For 
instance a commitment could have rational support if it resulted from a series of valid 
deductions from premises known to be true.199 Garrett is quite clear that if some 
commitment has epistemic merit then we have some entitlement to it. 
 
Thus far the distinction Garrett has introduced is hardly controversial, as all it amounts 
to is the distinction between our having an entitlement to a commitment and that 
commitment being produced through some rational process. After all, to say that a 
commitment is such that it deserves or is worthy of assent is just to say that we have an 
entitlement to that commitment. In this sense Garrett’s terminology is apt to mislead, as 
talk of epistemic merit is likely to lead us to think in terms of knowledge. However, 
Garrett does not actually say that a commitment having epistemic merit implies that the 
commitment is true, and certainly does not imply that the commitment is true in virtue 
of someone being entitled to it. Hence that we are always dealing with instances of 
knowledge when dealing with cases of epistemic merit is not assured. If one wished to 
avoid the misleading impression created by Garrett’s terminology then a better term 
than ‘epistemic merit’ would be ‘doxastic merit’, as this does not carry the implications 
                                                 
197 Garrett, “'a Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of Man,” 
p.80. Of course, to be acceptable any attribution of epistemic merit must mention who it is that holds the 
commitments and must specify the circumstances in which they do so. The commitment ‘that I am sitting 
at a table’ may well have epistemic merit when I actually am sitting at a table, have my eyes open and 
such, however the same commitment if held while I am dreaming would not have epistemic merit, even 
if I happen to be dreaming while sitting at a table. I shall assume that Garrett intended these further 
specifications. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Garrett of course makes clear that just being produced by reason need not convey epistemic merit as 
reason can also function erroneously, by making a series of invalid deductions or by accepting both 
conjuncts of a contradiction for instance. 
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that knowledge is necessarily intended.200 At times I shall speak instead of rational 
justification, as often that is the concept that Garrett intends. However, ultimately 
epistemic merit will be shown to be a broader concept than rational justification, as the 
presence of rational justified does nor exhaust all the ways in which a commitment 
might come to have epistemic merit. 
 
Garrett insists, as a supporter of CSN would also insist, that having rational support is 
not the only way in which someone could come to be entitled to a commitment. The 
inspiration Garrett finds for taking this perspective on the nature of Hume’s scepticism 
derives largely from his interpretation the Title Principle. This Title Principle is found 
in the conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise and is as follows. 
 
‘Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does 
not, it can never have any title to operate upon us.’201  
 
As understood by Garrett this Title Principle is a prescriptive principle to which we can 
refer to determine which beliefs to accept and which to reject. That is, it is a norm 
governing inquiry, in the same general category as those identified in chapter 2. In 
Garrett’s words: 
 
‘[t]he solution is that Hume is not a general unmitigated theoretical sceptic; instead he accepts the Title 
Principle because he finds that it provides a prescriptive epistemic principle which he can both follow 
and approve…The Title Principle allows for the possibility that some beliefs have epistemic merit and 
that some of them have this merit as a result of their production by reason.’202  
                                                 
200 Even ‘doxastic merit’ can be misleading for if truth is not assured then it remains unclear why such a 
belief is meritorious at all. We shall return to the question of why Garrett may have been led to introduce 
such misleading terminology towards the end of the chapter. 
201 Hume, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, A Treatise of Human Nature I.IV.7, p.270. This principle, under 
this name, was introduced in chapter 1 in the process of giving a brief outline of an argument for natural 
justification. 
202 Garrett, “'a Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of Man,” 
88-89. Unfortunately this statement is somewhat cluttered with terms deriving from Garrett’s 
categorization of Hume’s scepticism. This categorization occupies the first half of Garrett’s paper. To aid 
in comprehending what Garrett intends the relevant terms have been explicated below. 
1) Character – theoretical, prescriptive or practiced. This is the most complex axis, as it has three 
components, one of which divides into two further sub-components (see 1a below). The essence 
of categorization along this axis is determining for which regions the scepticism in question 
carries consequences. So theoretical scepticism carries consequences for theories of knowledge 
but of itself carries no consequences for our practical lives or our norms of proper conduct. Thus 
being a theoretical sceptic about the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime 
for instance does not entail that one takes it that one ought to doubt this effectiveness. Nor does 
theoretical scepticism entail that one actually doubts this effectiveness. Prescriptive scepticism 
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about the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent entails thinking that one ought to 
doubt this effectiveness but does not entail either theoretical support for this prescription or 
actual doubt concerning the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime. Such 
practicing scepticism is exhibited perhaps in rote-learned but unthinking obedience to received 
dogma, often but not exclusively religious. Finally, practiced scepticism entails actual doubt, but 
neither prescriptions to doubt nor theories supporting doubt and could perhaps be expressed in 
terms of a ‘gut instinct’ or some such. Each can obviously appear independently of the others, 
although in reality they often appear in some combination. 1a) Theoretical – rational support or 
epistemic merit. This sub-categorization further defines what kind of theoretical scepticism is 
intended. Rational support scepticism, following Garrett’s usage, suggests that the target 
proposition does not have rational support. To have rational support a belief must arise from 
reason in the correct way, through a series of valid deductions from plausible and accepted 
premises for instance. To have epistemic merit a belief must be such that it could, in the right 
circumstances, be reasonable to claim that it amounted to knowledge. Designating scepticism as 
theoretical will indicate that it meets the conditions of both sub-categorizations. Designating it 
as only one of these sub-categorizations will indicate that it meets the conditions only for he 
designated sub-categorization. 
2) Domain – general or limited. General scepticism calls into question all our beliefs, limited 
scepticism calls into question only those beliefs in a specified domain or domains. 
3) Degree – unmitigated or mitigated. This axis provides a measure of the strength of the 
scepticism, and is intended to capture how radical scepticism is. Mitigated scepticism towards 
some proposition argues that the justification for that proposition is less than normally supposed 
or in some other way falls below what we normally deem to be acceptable. So for instance after 
finding more research supporting the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime 
than research against of this effectiveness, but also finding that research against this 
effectiveness is not negligible I may come to a mitigated scepticism regarding the effectiveness 
of capital punishment as a deterrent. This does not entail that I think that the proposition that 
capital punishment is an effective deterrent has no justification whatsoever. It is just that the 
amount of justification available is not as high as it could be, or as high as I would wish it to be 
or as high as specified by some other standard because this justification has been undermined by 
the existence of some justification for the contrary proposition. Were I to conclude that the 
proposition that capital punishment is an effective deterrent has no justification whatsoever then 
this would represent unmitigated scepticism with respect to this effectiveness.  
Obviously, determining the degree of a given scepticism requires that we first understand what 
is to count as justification per se and also what is to count as an appropriate level of 
justification. If we stipulate that justification only counts if we can defeat all relevant defeaters 
then what we deem to count as justification per se will be responsive to the level of scrutiny at 
which we are operating at the time. So at a sufficiently high level of scrutiny, a level for instance 
at which we cannot defeat all possible defeaters to our knowledge claims, it may turn out that all 
scepticism is unmitigated since nothing will count as justification. Interestingly this leads to the 
conclusion that Fogelin’s Pyrrhonian scepticism must be, at least at times and towards certain 
targets, a variety of unmitigated scepticism. 
However introducing unmitigated scepticism is not the only way in which scepticism can be 
made radical. Provided that the standard for what is to count as an acceptable level of 
justification is made sufficiently strict then mitigated scepticism will also be radical. For 
instance if justification is only deemed to justify accepting a belief if it provides overwhelming 
support (using something akin to the ancient Academic’s pro/contra method of analysis) then 
radical prescriptive scepticism will result. I may for example conclude that the proposition that 
capital punishment is an effective deterrent does not have an acceptable level of support on the 
grounds that only 99 out of every 100 published assessments of its effectiveness supports this 
effectiveness, which is not enough to warrant a prescription to believe. Note that on this strict 
standard I ought to doubt a great many other beliefs also, and so the scepticism generated here is 
quite radical. However I would not conclude that the proposition that capital punishment is an 
effective deterrent of crime has no justification, just that its justification is not sufficiently high 
to warrant acceptance, and so the resultant scepticism is still mitigated. 
A final complication emerges here if we choose to define the acceptability of justification in 
terms of the maximum level of scrutiny at which this justification retains its justificatory force. 
On such a definition acceptability becomes an all-or-nothing affair and an unacceptable level of 
justification comes to mean no justification at all. Hence mitigated scepticism collapses into 
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 Garrett’s description of the Title Principle makes it quite clear that not all the 
commitments having epistemic merit are meritorious in virtue of finding their source in 
reason, although some do have such a source. It is also clear that Garrett takes this Title 
Principle to undercut Hume’s scepticism to the extent that some commitments have 
epistemic merit even though they lack rational support. The full anti-sceptical force of 
this becomes apparent when we realise that the commitments falling in this category 
include the commitment to the uniformity of nature, the existence of external bodies, 
the existence of other minds and the commitment to the coherence of identity claims 
generally. This is no small thing, as it means that for all his talk about the lack of 
rational support for many of our most important commitments Hume’s sceptical 
conclusions do not warrant his modifying the propositional attitude he takes to these 
commitments. On this reading Hume’s conclusion that some of our commitments lack 
rational support reveals an interesting fact about the kind of justification held by some 
of our commitments but little more than that. On this reading we also encounter the 
idea that scepticism is vain in attempting to generate doubt by pointing out that some 
commitments lack a kind of justification that is not in this case required. Only being 
captured by a false image of what the structure of our commitments ought to be could 
possibly convince someone that the scepticism Hume does generate is actually serious. 
 
However if this is Hume’s view of scepticism some questions remain unanswered. For 
instance how can Hume reasonably take the Title Principle to be normative? What is it 
exactly about ‘reason being lively and mixing itself with some propensity’ that would 
warrant the normative claims Hume wants to make? After all, ‘reason being lively…’ 
looks to be a natural fact, and not an appropriate basis for normative claims on Hume’s 
view. To begin to answer this question we of course need to understand what ‘reason 
being lively…’ amounts to, which requires some knowledge of Hume’s theory of 
belief, for as it turns out the Title Principle is a restatement and refinement of this 
theory of belief. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
unmitigated scepticism when using such a definition which is of course undesirable if we wish 
this categorization to be meaningful. Given this difficulty it is necessary to stipulate that the 
method intended when determining what is to count as an acceptable level of justification is 
defined in terms of a pro/contra analysis of the justification available at a fixed level of scrutiny 
rather than in terms of the level of scrutiny at which the justification itself retains its 
significance. 
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As is well known, according to Hume a belief is a vivacious idea.203 However vivacity 
comes in degrees. Hume’s point is that when an idea has a sufficiently great amount of 
vivacity a belief inevitably results from our considering the idea. This means that for 
Hume there is a very real sense in which beliefs are forced upon us. That is to say, as 
Hume sees things the process of belief formation is not one over which we have any 
control, and not one that needs to be explained by reference to our will. Rationally 
speaking, Hume conceives of the agent as quite passive in belief formation, at the 
mercy of their non-rational natural characteristics.204 The point for which Hume seems 
to be arguing is that for any commitment actually held by someone there are two 
distinguishing properties. First is propositional content, which determines what the 
commitment is about. Second is the vivacity attached to this propositional content. It is 
the vivacity, or more correctly the degree of vivacity, which determines whether the 
propositional attitude taken towards the propositional content of the commitment 
amounts to belief. Greater degrees of vivacity result in us taking the propositional 
attitude of belief to some propositional content. Lesser degrees of vivacity may only 
lead to us merely entertaining the possibility of this content. So the question is where 
this vivacity comes from and how its origin warrants normative claims on behalf of the 
Title Principle. We can go some way to answering this question by placing the Title 
Principle in its original context, at which point Hume makes the following claim. 
 
‘In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or 
water refreshes, ‘tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise. Nay if we are 
philosophers, it ought only to be on sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to 
employ ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity…’205 
 
The phrase ‘because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise’ is indicative of 
Hume’s position that beliefs are forced on us, placing the Title Principle in the context 
of his general theory of belief. Of equal interest is the reference to inclination, and what 
activities we may feel like pursuing. Such language immediately calls to mind Hume’s 
description of belief as “more properly an act of the sensitive, than the cogitative part of 
                                                 
203 Hume also uses the term ‘lively’ to capture the same property of a belief. 
204 See Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy pp.208-213. Garrett’s analysis of the 
various means by which some ideas come to have vivacity attaching to them makes it quite clear that 
reason plays no significant role in this dynamic. Those roles are left to the senses and memory. I follow 
Garrett in thinking that this all by itself does not warrant any radically sceptical conclusion. See Garrett, 
Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy p.215. 
205 Hume, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, A Treatise of Human Nature I.IV.7, p. 270. 
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our natures.”206 That is, a belief is a sensation adopted without any decision being made 
to have the sensation, in much the same way that we could sense (by sight) that the 
cover of a book is blue or feel a pain in our leg. 
 
It might be suspected that none of this has much to do with the Title Principle. So far 
we have been talking about vivacious beliefs, but the Title Principle concerns reason 
being lively. To counter this objection it should be observed that for Hume liveliness 
and vivacity are synonymous.207 Further, Hume also argues that reason operates only in 
one of two ways; either discovering relations between ideas (analytic, a priori 
reasoning) or by discovering matters of fact (synthetic , a posteriori reasoning). We 
also know that Hume shares with Locke and Berkeley the fundamental tenant that all 
our reasoning is mediated by ideas, and hence that even reasoning concerning matters 
of fact such as causal claims must be directed immediately to ideas at least in the first 
instance.208 Further, we also know that reason is incapable of enlivening an idea by 
itself, meaning that any vivacity or liveliness which is present must have already been 
present or have been introduced by a source separate to reason.209 Putting these points 
together leads to the conclusion that reason can only be lively if the idea about which 
we reason is itself lively. Hence when Hume says ‘Where reason is lively’ this must be 
equivalent to saying ‘where the ideas about which we reason are lively’, and as we have 
seen this amounts to saying ‘where we are forced to believe the propositions about 
which we reason’. 
 
On this reading the Title Principle could be given the following gloss. 
 
“If and only if 
1) we are forced to take the propositional attitude of belief towards those 
propositions about which we reason, and  
2) this reasoning mixes itself with some propensity, 
                                                 
206 Ibid. I.IV.I, p.183. 
207 [T I.iii.vii. p. 97, I.iii.viii. p.98] 
208 [T I.i.i. p.1] 
209 Indeed, Hume argues that reasoning tends to always diminish the amount of vivacity an idea has. See 
[T I.iv.ii]. For a complete exposition of Hume’s arguments concerning diminishing probabilities that 
seem to sit at the heart of his concerns, including the many problems with this argument, see Robert J. 
Fogelin, Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature, International Library of Philosophy. 
(London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) pp.15-20, Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in 
Hume's Philosophy pp.222-228. 
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then a proposition has epistemic merit, and so ought to be believed.” 
 
The highlighted second clause deserves attention, as it is this clause that may be 
responsible for the normativity Hume believes is warranted by the Title Principle. This 
can be seen by considering what would happen if the second clause were removed. In 
this case the Title Principle would state as a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
normativity of belief that we be forced to so believe. However this is both highly 
implausible and not an argument we would have expected of Hume. Thus we need to 
ask what ‘reasoning mixing itself with some propensity’ means, and whether this clause 
can provide some warrant for normative claims.  
 
ii)  Propensity to believe in accord with our telos 
 
Another possible way of reading this propensity would be to take it in a teleological 
sense, introducing a principle something like ‘you ought to believe (or more generally, 
commit) in such a way as to progress towards your telos’. The problem with such an 
approach is that the details of the telos are bound to be metaphysically loaded and 
hence contentious. Adding to the contention is the fact that there are several plausible 
ways of understanding what this telos may be. Further, taking such a reading also takes 
us some considerable way beyond what Hume explicitly says. However, the immediate 
concern is finding a reading of the telos that is acceptable when placed in the context of 
CSN. This means that it must imply the minimum of metaphysical commitments and of 
course must also avoid any implication that the lack of rational justification for a 
commitment makes that commitment unjustified simpliciter. 
 
An explication of the telos acceptable within the context of CSN might be the 
following: 
 
• The human telos is to hold commitments only if they are rationally justified. 
 
Pursuing such a telos leads to the claim that one ought to adopt a commitment only if it 
is rationally justified. On the surface this might seem like a poor choice for an 
acceptable telos, particularly in view of its rationalistic overtones. However this 
impression can be removed if we were to argue that the adoption of some commitments 
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is constitutive of the only context in which rational justification is possible by appealing 
to the transcendental argument, essentially Strawson’s argument, for CSN. In that case 
normativity is assured as rationality is a fundamentally normative concept.210 However 
this does not mean that all commitments lacking rational justification should be 
jettisoned, as some of these are required for rational justification to be possible. The 
explication of the telos above should be adapted to reflect this more clearly, resulting in 
the following reading of the telos. 
 
• The human telos is to hold commitments only if they are either 
o rationally justified, or 
o constitutive of the proper context in which rational justification is 
possible 
 
More simply, we could say that the human telos is to be rational, where this requires us 
to adopt some commitments which are not rationally justified. Hence this approach 
provides us not just with an account of the place of rational justification but also 
provides us with an account of rationality. As will emerge, providing such an account is 
crucial for accounting for normativity. 
 
Taking this reading of the propensity mentioned in the Title Principle means that the 
Title Principle can now we explicated in the following way. 
 
“If and only if 
1) we are forced to take the propositional attitude of belief towards those 
propositions about which we reason, and  
2) either (rational justification can be provided for these propositions or 
holding commitments with this propositional content is required if rational 
justification is to be possible)211 
then a proposition has epistemic merit, and so ought to be believed.” 
 
                                                 
210 Precisely because rationality is a more clearly normative concept than is nature, and in this chapter we 
are directly concerned with normativity, Argument 2 for CSN will be more in focus than will be 
Argument 1 for CSN. 
211 As should be clear from chapter 1, this idea of reason-constituting commitments is a very Strawsonian 
point, and for further comments on this idea I direct the reader back to the exposition of CSN given in 
that chapter. 
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At this juncture it is interesting to ask what might be the content of those commitments 
that are in some way constitutive of rationality. In answering this question Reid proves 
to be surprisingly helpful.212 Summarising Reid’s position Rysiew makes the following 
claim. 
 
‘My suggestion is that Reid regards the first principles of common sense as constitutive principles – they 
are constitutive (for us, given our nature) of cognizing at all…And because (for us, given our 
constitution) the first principles create the very possibility of cognizing at all, there is a very real sense in 
which (given our nature) we literally cannot imagine creatures for whom those principles are nothing – 
creatures who do not take their truth-oriented faculties to be reliable on the whole; who do not see life 
and intelligence in each other; who do not think that the things which they clearly and distinctly perceive 
really exist; and so on.’213 
 
So according to Reid the content of those commitments constitutive of rationality is the 
content of the first principles of common sense, and Rysiew’s account above indicates 
the kind of principles Reid had in mind. These principles include that our senses are 
reliable, that there are other minds and that there is an external world. Reid also 
includes principles such as that memory is reliable, that there is a correlation between 
certain kinds of behaviour and certain emotions and that the future will in general 
conform to the past (the principle of induction).214 Note that not everything taken as 
commonsensical ought to be thought of as a first principle of common sense. What we 
take as commonsensical can include propositions that are quite open to change. For 
instance it may have once been taken as commonsensical that werewolves are a serious 
threat to peasants living near dark forests. Such propositions as this ought not be 
thought of as first principles of common sense. 
 
This suggests that there are at least two categories within what we commonly call 
common sense that need to be distinguished. Merely drawing the distinction in terms of 
what we take for granted blurs the matter, as we could, and people have, taken virtually 
                                                 
212 At least, the reading of Reid put forward by Rysiew proves to be quite helpful. Whether this reading 
really does represent Reid’s considered view is debated. See Patrick Rysiew, “Reid and Epistemic 
Naturalism,” Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 209 (2002). 
213 Ibid.: pp.449-450. 
214 For the most comprehensive list Reid provides see Reid, Works Now Fully Collected: With Selections 
from His Unpublished Letters, Papers, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations EIP VI.iv. 441a-452a. 
Here Reid provides examples of twelve first principles, although he acknowledges that this list is not 
comprehensive. In fact at no point does Reid attempt to provide a comprehensive list of these principles, 
although he does say that such provision would greatly benefit philosophy. 
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anything for granted. We could perhaps attempt to draw this distinction in terms of 
levels of entrenchment, suggesting that some propositions of common sense are easier 
to give up than others. No doubt some propositions can be more easily given up than 
others, particularly when we examine the development of beliefs over long time 
periods, although if a proposition can be abandoned in this way we might wonder 
whether it was ever commonsensical. Given the role attributed to first principles by 
Reid (and Moore also) above it would be surprising if it were actually possible for our 
attitude to these commitments could change. This is not to say that common sense is 
defined solely by the attitude we take towards it of course, for that is not something 
Reid would accept. However even for Reid there are clearly strict limits to the attitude 
that we can take to this content, and Reid is quick to criticise the sceptics for attempting 
to maintain impossible attitudes in this regard. 
 
More helpful than thinking in terms of propositional attitudes would be thinking in 
terms of how, or even whether, this propositional content is learnt. I take it as one of 
Wittgenstein’s greatest insights in On Certainty is that we do not actually learn, for 
instance, that teachers are reliable. We just learn facts about the world from teachers. 
Nor, I take it, do we learn that our senses are reliable or that other people have minds. 
We just learn to do things with our senses and how to treat other people. This suggests 
that the first principles of common sense are seen most clearly as those that make our 
everyday practices possible, including our practice of providing justification for our 
commitments. Given that we take these everyday practices to be rational practices, we 
would also expect that judgements of rationality and irrationality would match 
instances in which these commitments are respected and disregarded respectively. 
 
There is some sense in taking those commitments constitutive of rationality to be what 
Reid calls the first principles of common sense. For one, such an approach harmonises 
with our judgements of irrationality and insanity. Someone who genuinely and 
persistently took their senses to be chronically unreliable would be judged to be insane 
as would someone persistently denying the principle of induction be judged to be 
insane.215 Further, there is no obvious instance we can point to in which we learnt that 
                                                 
215 At least, that is how we would judge others who acted in this way, although it is not so obvious that 
we would judge ourselves in this way, provided we made our sceptical arguments for reasons we took to 
be compelling. Scepticism is much more problematic when shifted into the first-person. Even so, the 
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the senses are reliable, that there is an external world or that other people have minds. 
Rather, we need to already have these commitments to learn anything else. Finally, 
such a view of common sense also explains why attempts to find rational justifications 
for these commitments have (even when satisfying – and that is not very often) failed to 
connect up in the right way with the manner in which we actually hold these 
commitments. That is, presenting reasons for holding common sense commitments 
never quite seems to capture the actual reasons for which we hold these commitments. 
Unsurprisingly, such a reading is also consistent with the view found in CSN.216 
 
With these considerations in mind we can now make a further refinement to the Title 
Principle. The Title Principle is now understood to state that: 
 
“If and only if 
1) we are forced to take the propositional attitude of belief towards those 
propositions about which we reason, and  
2) either (rational justification can be provided for these propositions or the 
propositions about which we reason are first principles of common sense) 
then a proposition has epistemic merit and ought to be believed.”217 
 
It was noted earlier that taking this reading of the Title Principle provides us with an 
account of rationality. That observation can now be refined by noting that the 
rationality considered here is a distinctly human form of rationality. The reason for this 
is that the commitments constitutive of this rationality are distinctly human 
commitments, in that they are the first principles of common sense, and while humans 
naturally adopt these principles there is nothing to say that they are necessary for all 
                                                                                                                                              
point at present is to develop the strongest anti-sceptical line of attack that can be developed from Hume 
and see where this takes us. Eventually it shall emerge that even this reading ultimately warrants the 
claim that we are entitled to Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
216 For the moment this reading of the place of common sense will be sufficient, however as it will 
eventually need to be revised something needs to be said about what revisions will be required. First, 
appealing to Reid makes what we recognise to be the first principles of common sense appear to be static 
and universal. I will ultimately suggest that this is misguided, as what we recognise as the first principles 
of common sense is sensitive to the mood we happen to be in when we make this assessment. 
217 Given the distinction between first principles of common sense and other propositions taken to be 
commonsensical implies that we ought to regard propositions taken to be commonsensical but not 
actually first principles of common sense as rationally justified. This is because such commonsensical 
propositions must have been derived, or at least be derivable, from first principles of common sense. 
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agents. For this reason the normativity guaranteed by this account of rationality is 
limited to grounding claims as to what humans ought to believe.218 
 
This is advantageous for it means that the reading of the Title Principle developed here 
avoids the heavy metaphysical commitments involved with arguing for an 
understanding of rationality unconditioned by the unique properties of the rational 
agent. There is no implication in the understanding of rationality developed here that it 
is something akin to Descartes’ ‘natural light’ or the view (arguably inherited from 
Plato but probably much older than the Greeks) that rationality allows us to see the 
world as God sees it. The rationality of humans is human rationality.219 Observe that 
this idea coheres well with the idea that those commitments which have epistemic merit 
are not made true just on that basis. Indeed it makes sense to think that there is no 
necessary connection between a commitment being natural for a human to adopt and 
the content of that commitment being true. In recognition of this Hume exhibits a desire 
to distance himself from the claim that the commitments we are forced to accept are 
themselves true.220 Instead Hume seems to think that the best outcome we could hope 
for in developing such theories is that they be in some way useful. 
 
However our development of the Title Principle cannot stop here if we wish it to be of 
use when analysing CSN, as CSN makes it quite clear that it is not enough that we are 
forced to hold a belief in addition to there just happening to be some rational 
justification for that belief. CSN only considers rational justification to be relevant if it 
can be shown that we believe because of this rational justification. Justification must be 
our justification. It was for this very reason that CSN dismissed not just scepticism but 
refutations of scepticism also, for in neither case are the reasons presented for belief or 
disbelief our actual reasons for these attitudes.221 As it currently exists the Title 
                                                 
218 We see at this point where Argument 1 for CSN might be useful for the present exegesis, 
unsurprisingly given that Hume developed a version of this argument himself. In fact the constant 
interplay between these two arguments is an interesting feature of CSN itself. 
219 However, while some humans may have a rationality with structure in which the Title Principle plays 
an important role, why must we suppose that all humans have a rationality so structured? This question 
cannot be answered until the final revisions are made to the Title Principle itself. 
220 See for instance [T.I.iv.vii. p.272] where Hume says “we might hope to establish a system or set of 
opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop’d for) might at least be satisfactory to 
the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination.” 
221 One would to well to keep n mind however that doubt can also be natural, and while the Title 
Principle has not yet expanded its range to include doubt it will not be not long before we see it put to 
this use. 
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Principle does not provide for the right sort of connection between belief and 
justification, and hence some adaptation is required. In the context of CSN the obvious 
choice is to require that a rational justification sometimes just is a psychological cause 
of belief, and that it is only at those times when a rational justification does function in 
this way that epistemic merit results. This idea is not foreign to Hume, as he explicitly 
casts the reasons we respect the law of non-contradiction in both logical and 
causal/psychological terms, where appeal to logic is not sufficient to explain why we 
revise any of our commitments. Instead this revision is cast in psychological and 
fundamentally causal terms, although it does begin with the recognition of logical 
relations. Hume’s statement is worth repeating in full, and is found below. 
 
‘Nothing is more certain from experience than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions 
gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or from within; from the opposition of 
external objects, or from the combat of internal principles. On the contrary, whatever strikes in with the 
natural propensities, and either externally forwards their satisfaction, or internally concurs with their 
movements, is sure to give a sensible pleasure. Now, there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of 
the identity of resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy 
in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness.’ [T.I.iv.ii. pp.205-206] 
 
With this in mind we must replace the conjunction connecting the first and second 
clauses of the Title Principle with a causal term. We should also adapt the Title 
Principle to more explicitly reflect the recognition of logical entities as the starting 
point for this causal process. Hence, the Title Principle can now be given its final 
revision. 
 
“If and only if 
1) we are forced to take the propositional attitude of belief towards those 
propositions about which we reason, because  
2) either (we recognise that rational justification can be provided for these 
propositions or we recognise that the propositions about which we reason 
are first principles of common sense and so constitutive of rationality) 
then a proposition has epistemic merit and ought to be believed.” 
 
With this final revision in place we may well ask a question that was earlier deferred. 
Why is it that all humans have to respect the Title Principle? This question has been 
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made more difficult to answer than it might otherwise have been by the fact that the 
perspectivism developed here needs to avoid philosophical commitments, and 
particularly metaphysical commitments, wherever possible. In might strike one as 
rather odd then that the solution would be found in again appealing to the idea of the 
human telos. Nevertheless, a teleological approach can prove to be quite helpful. It 
must simply be asserted that the human telos includes taking the correct propositional 
attitudes, where correctness is measured not in terms of truth but in terms of epistemic 
merit.222 According to this teleological reading of the Title Principle, being attentive to 
the demands of rationality can aid us in achieving this telos as there exists in humans a 
mechanism whereby the recognition that a proposition is either rationally justified or a 
first principle of common sense leads to a more correct (in terms of epistemic merit) 
distribution of propositional attitudes.223 The ‘deep’ reason why the commitments 
granted epistemic merit by the Title Principle are then normative is because they allow 
us to achieve the human telos. 
 
Of course this just pushes the question of normativity further back, by inviting the 
question of why we ought to pursue this human telos, and even whether this telos is 
appropriate to all humans or just some. However, no justification for the pursuit of the 
telos can be given as the concept of a telos is a foundational term in the system 
developed here. To ask why we ought to pursue this telos is to fundamentally 
misunderstand what a telos is, for the concept of a telos is an inherently normative 
concept. In order to answer both the question of whether all humans must respect the 
Title Principle and the question of why this telos ought to be our telos we must 
dogmatically assert that this is the human telos. 
 
 iii) Interlude: A Pyrrhonian assessment of our epistemic situation 
 
                                                 
222 Remember that epistemic merit does not guarantee truth, which is why it was argued earlier that the 
terms ‘epistemic merit’ is in fact misleading.  
223 The reader should be aware that little if any support for an explicitly teleological reading of the Title 
Principle in the Treatise, and hence this reading cannot be considered to be Hume’s considered view. I 
would argue however that Hume does definitely want to collapse the rational and the psychological, and 
is right to hold that the recognition that a proposition has rational support can itself be a cause of belief. I 
would also argue that Hume did think that the resulting beliefs were normative. Further, I would also 
argue that Hume should have augmented his position with the teleological line of thought presented here, 
for without some augmentation normativity remains a mystery. Hence I take it that the view presented 
here is not Hume’s view but is what Hume should have said when pressed on the normative question. 
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Lest confusion immediately result, it must be emphasised that the Pyrrhonian knows 
full well that dogmatic assertions of this sort cannot be appropriate for the proper 
grounding of any idea. Hence making dogmatic assertions is never a Pyrrhonian 
activity. However pointing out that any claims to normativity in the Title Principle rely 
on nothing more than dogmatic assertion is a very Pyrrhonian activity, and I take it that 
this is what the Pyrrhonian would do. The Pyrrhonian would point out that that at some 
point we cannot continue to provide any reasons to think that we must accept the Title 
Principle. Exactly the same move would be made regarding the norms of inquiry 
identified in the previous chapter. Granted, in each case the norms of inquiry and the 
Title Principle capture how we actually go about our everyday epistemic practices but 
the Pyrrhonian wants more than an accurate description of what we actually do. He 
wants an account of why we are right to do it. His point is that whenever we reflect on 
our everyday practices with the aim of explaining how we are warranted to practice in 
this way we fail, falling prey to a dilemma. That dilemma is that either we have no 
warrant to our everyday epistemic practices or that if we do then we have an equal 
warrant to Pyrrhonian scepticism. Chapter 2 demonstrated to us the strength of the 
second horn of the dilemma. The above observations on the necessity and dogmatic 
character of a teleological reading of the Title Principle shows us the problems 
associated with the first horn of this dilemma. 
 
iv) Hume’s possible confusion: Psychology and Reason 
 
We must finally ask whether the Title Principle is a rational or a psychological 
principle, to which the Humean reply must be that the question imposes a false 
dichotomy. Rational justifications are, sometimes, psychological causes. Thus far 
Hume is quite correct. However, Hume may be going further than this and attempting 
to provide for normativity by collapsing the rational and the psychological, possibly as 
part of an overarching strategy of naturalising reason. Yet psychology and rationality 
are different concepts, and so how can this collapse be possible? We have already seen 
in chapter 1 and the analysis of McDowell some good reasons to be suspicious of any 
such moves. Must we not conclude that Hume is confused at this point? If we take 
Hume as saying nothing more than that it just happens to turn out that for humans, the 
recognition that a proposition is rationality justified sometimes leads to the formation of 
a commitment with an associated propositional content then we need not make any 
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such negative appraisals. However, if Hume is attempting to ground normativity then 
such a negative appraisal is appropriate. My view is that we ought to read Hume as 
presenting a dilemma for anyone who would appeal to common sense, in fact as 
presenting the same dilemma with which the Pyrrhonian is concerned. That at least 
seems to capture the force of Hume’s picturing us as trapped ‘betwix a false reason and 
none at all’ towards the end of Part 1 of the Treatise. I shall return to this theme in the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
 
Scepticism and epistemic merit 
 
While I believe that the above explication of the Title Principle is the best available 
way of making sense of the Title Principle, and particularly the difficult relationship 
between that principle and normativity, even granting that the Title Principle is 
normative raises some interesting questions concerning scepticism. In particular we 
might ask whether scepticism could have epistemic merit, understanding that epistemic 
merit can be determined by referring to the Title Principle.224 Garrett clearly thinks that 
scepticism cannot be granted epistemic merit in this way, as the Title Principle was 
initially introduced as a way of avoiding sceptical conclusions. This section argues that 
in fact the Title Principle grants epistemic merit to scepticism. However before this can 
be explored further some points from chapter 2 need to be introduced. 
 
As we have seen, Garrett argues that Hume’s scepticism does not have any epistemic 
merit as it does not fall under the governance of the Title Principle. This is a mistake, as 
good arguments can be presented to support the idea that at least on occasion Hume’s 
scepticism does meet the conditions established in the Title Principle for the attribution 
of epistemic merit. Chapter 2 has already shown that Pyrrhonian scepticism can be 
derived from common sense, once the scope of common sense is expanded to include 
norms of inquiry. Hume provides us with an excellent case study of exactly just such a 
derivation of radical and serious scepticism from common sense. In numerous passages 
throughout the Treatise, and particularly in the closing sections of Book 1, we find 
Hume caught in what appears to be a genuine sceptical crisis that seems to be making a 
                                                 
224 More correctly of course we need to ask whether any propositions we normally take to express 
scepticism could have epistemic merit, as epistemic merit accrues to propositions. I shall assume that 
when I speak of the epistemic merit of scepticism I mean the epistemic merit of those propositions we 
take to be characteristic of scepticism. 
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serious impact on the structure of his commitments. Here are two paradigmatic 
examples in which Hume is explicitly sceptical of both our senses and our broader 
cognitive faculties. 
 
‘This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be 
radically cur’d, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes 
may seem entirely free from it. ‘Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or 
senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the 
sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always 
encreases, the farther we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it.’ 
[T.I.iv.ii. p. 218] 
 
‘My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, 
weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And 
the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me 
resolved to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that 
boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with 
melancholy; and as ‘tis usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding 
my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present subject furnishes me with in such 
abundance.’ [T.I.iv.vii. p. 264] 
 
Further, looking back at these passages it is clear that at these times reason is very 
lively and, consistent with Hume’s theory of belief, is forcing him to adopt the 
proposition attitude of belief to the propositions into which he is inquiring. Indeed, 
these passages and others like them display Hume’s beliefs at their most vivacious, 
particularly the latter passage. Hence the first clause of the Title Principle is fulfilled. 
So then are Hume’s sceptical beliefs also the result of recognising the presence of some 
rational justification for these beliefs? That is, are these beliefs the result of exposure to 
arguments? Quite clearly they are. In each of the above passages a reference is made to 
the outcome of his previous inquiries, and when placed in their broader context these 
inquiries can be easily shown to include numerous arguments to the effect that our 
cognitive faculties are chronically unreliable. Given that we are dealing here with 
beliefs being forced on Hume as the direct result of recognising the presence of rational 
justification it is difficult to see why these passages ought to be excluded from falling 
under the scope of the Title Principle and hence as having epistemic merit.  
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If this is correct then the Title Principle has a significantly broader application than 
Garrett allows, in that it provides epistemic merit to both sceptical and non-sceptical 
beliefs. However there is no particularly good reason to think that either the sceptical or 
the anti-sceptical recommendations of the Title Principle are to be given precedence. 
Certainly the Title Principle itself could give us no guidance in this regard, as both the 
sceptical and anti-sceptical arguments meet its requirements equally well. Thus we are 
left with a somewhat uncomfortable and unsatisfying perspectivism as we are unable to 
reject any of the recommendations of the Title Principle if we accept some. Looking 
back at the Title Principle as constructed here this should be expected, as there is no 
reference in this principle itself to the content of the propositions given epistemic merit. 
In this sense the Title Principle is blind to scepticism. 
 
Earlier it was stated that it would be important to argue that the recognised content of 
common sense is mood-sensitive. We now see exactly why this is, as the argument 
presented here is open to the objection that the justification for scepticism must be 
illusory. This is because this rational justification, to be legitimate, must exists within 
the context provided by the first principles of common sense. Yet as introduced so far 
these first principles include propositions that contradict those given rational 
justification. Hence scepticism cannot possibly be serious, or if it is must be illusory 
since the recognition of rational justification on which it rests cannot possibly be 
genuine. However, if we take Hume seriously then we are forced to concede that not 
only does rational justification exist for propositions contradictory to the first principles 
of common sense but more importantly that Hume genuinely includes these 
propositions among his commitments. That is, taking Hume seriously forces us to 
recognise that scepticism is serious. 
 
This reveals a tension in the explication of the Title Principle given to this point. As 
explained so far it is impossible that the Title Principle could ever grant epistemic merit 
to scepticism, and equally impossible that scepticism could be serious. However if 
Hume teaches us anything it is that scepticism actually is serious. If we are to hold onto 
Garrett’s insight that the Title Principle is central to Hume’s exposition of what we 
ought and ought not to accept, as I think we should, then the Title Principle requires 
serious revision. The most promising approach is to further clarify what we take to be a 
first principle of common sense. Ultimately it will be argued that what we recognise to 
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be the content of common sense is not static, but is instead sensitive to the mood we are 
in when we make this assessment. However before this argument can be deployed we 
need first to map out in general terms how mood makes an appearance in the way 
Hume deals with scepticism. 
 
Unstable beliefs, common sense and mood 
 
Interestingly, the conclusion that scepticism can have epistemic merit takes advantage 
of another distinctive feature of Garrett’s interpretation of Hume’s scepticism. Garrett 
is correct to argue that Hume’s scepticism in Book 1 of the Treatise is consequent 
rather than antecedent. By this Garrett means that Hume’s scepticism results from his 
discoveries concerning the origin of many of our beliefs and so emerges only after 
these inquiries have been conducted. Antecedent scepticism on the other hand emerges 
before any inquiries have been undertaken, usually by thinking in general terms about 
the possibility of meeting the standards required for knowledge or justified belief. Be 
that as it may, the point is that the scope of Hume’s scepticism is contingent on the 
outcome of his actual inquiries. Early in Book 1 of the Treatise it looks as if Hume is 
going to have no particular difficulties with scepticism. Garrett has convincingly shown 
that even Hume’s conclusions regarding induction are not genuinely sceptical in the 
context in which they first emerge, as at this point all these arguments show is that 
inductions are not performed by reason. It is only later in the Treatise that these 
conclusions are put to sceptical purposes.225 However in the early stages of the 
Conclusion to Book 1 it appears as if Hume will conclude exclusively with a potent 
form of scepticism, as the previous quotes demonstrate. It is only several pages into the 
conclusion that the Title Principle emerges to force us to recognise the epistemic merit 
of some beliefs.  
 
Garrett is right to emphasise the consequent nature of Hume sceptical conclusions. 
Where I diverge from Garrett is over whether or not Hume’s inquiries ultimately lead 
him past the potent form of scepticism we see in the conclusion of the Treatise and to a 
stable non-sceptical (or only moderately sceptical) point. Garrett summarises his 
position as follows. 
                                                 
225 Garrett, “'a Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of Man,” 
pp.73-74, 81-82. See also Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy p.91-95. 
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‘Thus, naturalism leads naturally to a crisis of unmitigated practicing skeptical doubt, and the 
psychological defeat of that unmitigated practicing doubt incorporates the adoption of the only principle 
of epistemic merit that can now sustain a return to naturalism [i.e. the Title Principle]. This return to 
naturalism can occur, however, only in conjunction with a prescriptive and epistemic merit skepticism 
that is both constant and general – but mitigated.’226 
 
It is not as if there is no support for taking the view that potent scepticism is merely a 
phase through which we move in our evolution towards a more settled naturalism.227 
Particularly important in developing this reading is the passage towards the end of 
Book 1 of the Treatise where Hume seems to express precisely this view. Here Hume 
seems to say quite clearly that his inquiries will eventually lead him to a position from 
which it will be quite proper to make non-sceptical pronouncements, as we see below. 
 
‘Nor is it only proper that we shou’d in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate 
philosophical researches, notwithstanding our sceptical principles, but also that we should yield to that 
propensity, which inclines me to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in 
which we survey them in any particular instant. It is easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, than 
to check ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which always arises from 
an exact and full survey of an object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, 
but even our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, it is evident, it is certain, it is 
undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent.’228 
 
However if scepticism can equally well be granted epistemic merit by the Title 
Principle, as has been argued above, then statements such as this cannot be used in any 
straightforward way to support an evolution beyond potent scepticism. At this point 
appealing to Garrett again becomes interesting. He makes the following point. 
 
‘Because of these ultimate epistemic norms, those who rely on approvable forms of reasoning—at least 
when reasoning from approvable uses of memory or the senses, or when reasoning demonstratively—
have epistemic reasons for the resulting beliefs and so have reasons-based status-justification; and in 
                                                 
226 Garrett, “'a Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of Man,” 
90. 
227 This is in fact precisely what Garrett concludes in his more recent paper. See Garrett, “Reasons to Act 
and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project.” 
228 Hume, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, A Treatise of Human Nature I.IV.7, p.273. Italics original. This 
quote is particularly important if we take the reference to a propensity to be a implicit reference to the 
Title Principle. 
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holding beliefs as the result of such approvable reasoning, they are justly or appropriately responsive to 
epistemic reasons, and so have reasons-based process-justification.’229 
 
The problem the preceding analysis proposes is that the identified norms do not 
themselves guarantee that we will always be led in an anti-sceptical direction. This is 
not to say that there are no norms or that they do not provide us with justifications. To 
repeat, Garrett is correct on both these points. However if scepticism also has epistemic 
merit in addition to non-sceptical positions then rather than an evolution away from 
scepticism in Hume’s we ought to speak of continual revolutions.  
 
To support the idea of an evolution beyond potent scepticism we would need to 
establish that our propensities will always eventually lead us away from scepticism 
rather than towards it. Only then will reference to the Title Principle be able to grant 
epistemic merit to non-sceptical propositions but not to sceptical propositions. I do not 
believe our propensities always function in this way and nor can I find any evidence to 
think that Hume thought that they did. In fact there is every reason to think that Hume 
thought this was not the case, as there are several occasions in which Hume appears to 
be caught in scepticism. We see in the following passage that Hume’s scepticism 
emerges out of his inquiries, in this case his inquiries into the nature of our cognitive 
faculties. 
 
‘For I have already shewn that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general 
principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either 
in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by means of that 
singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views 
of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those which are 
more easy and natural. Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate 
reasoning is ever to be received?…If we embrace this principle, and condemn all refined reasoning, we 
run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely 
the human understanding. We have therefore no choice left, but betwixt a false reason and none at all.’ 
[T.I.iv.vii. p.267] 
 
It is out of conclusions of this sort that a higher-level scepticism develops, where this 
scepticism targets not specific propositions such as that there are other minds but 
                                                 
229 Garrett, “Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical 
Project,” p.15. 
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instead calls into question the value of inquiries into the reasons why we believe one 
thing rather than another, as all such inquiries lead to is further doubts. Hume notes that 
 
‘[t]his sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady which can never be 
radically cured, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chase it away, and sometimes 
may seem entirely free from it. It is impossible, upon any system, to defend either our understanding or 
senses; and we but expose them further when we endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the 
sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always 
encreases the further we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and 
inattention alone can afford us any remedy.’ [T.I.iv.ii. p.218] 
 
However nor is it the case that our propensities always take as towards scepticism, and 
there are many occasions on which Hume displays a high degree of confidence that 
philosophical activity will produce something of value, and not always lead to further 
doubts. He describes these times of confidence in the following personal language. 
 
‘At the time, therefore, that I am tired with amusement and company, and have indulged a reverie in my 
chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally 
inclined to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the 
course of my reading and conversation… I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the 
instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments 
spring up naturally in my present disposition; and should I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself 
to any other business or diversion, I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of 
my philosophy.’ [T.I.iv.vii. p.271] 
 
Observing that we are at times led to respond in different ways to the very same 
inquiries naturally calls us to attempt some explanation of the source of the variability 
of these responses. Here again Hume proves to be helpful, for he points out that the 
response we make to the outcome of our inquiries is sensitive to mood we are in when 
we make that response.230 So for instance Hume’s inclination to abandon all inquiry is 
attributed to his being at that time under the influence of a ‘splenetic humour’, and in 
these moods he resolves 
                                                 
230 Hume also speaks of mood in a rarely extended way in the appendix, in a section appended to p.123 of 
the Treatise. Here however he is quite negative about the influence of mood, and this would seem to 
contradict the argument about to be introduced. This is a matter for extended discussion, and I will argue 
that the thrust of Hume’s argument is correct as presented in the Appendix but does not contradict the 
argument derived below from the body of the work. However further discussion will have to wait until 
chapter 5. 
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‘never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For those are my 
sentiments in that splenetic humour which governs me at present… No: if I must be a fool, as all those 
who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. Where I 
strive against my inclination, I shall have a good reason for my resistance; and will no more be led a 
wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages, as I have hitherto met with. These are the 
sentiments of my spleen and indolence; and indeed I must confess, that philosophy has nothing to oppose 
to them, and expects a victory more from the returns of a serious good-humoured disposition, than from 
the force of reason and conviction.’  [T I.iv.vii. p.269-270] 
 
Glancing back at the statements that express this more positive attitude towards inquiry 
we see a similar theme emerge. Hume states that the periods during which he looks 
favourably on inquiry come directly after a period of calmness and meditation during 
which his mind is ‘all collected within itself’. Note however that the evidence to which 
Hume is responding when he makes these disparate responses is the same in each case. 
This raises the possibility, one which I believe we ought to accept, that as Hume sees 
things our mood decisively effects our judgement of the evidence, and even what we 
take to be commonsensical. 
 
Garrett is to be commended for paying some attention to the influence of moods, as not 
all commentators give it this special attention. Further, as far as it goes what Garrett 
says in quite correct. That is, Garrett notes that Hume’s more strongly sceptical 
statements come under the influence of a specific mood, and we can do no better than 
restating his own summary; 
 
‘[i]n this splenetic state of mind, the positive cultivation of reason through philosophy appears to be a 
way of torturing oneself to no good purpose, and hence something best avoided.’231 
 
Garrett is also quite right to point out that this splenetic mood is also quite unstable, 
although what we ought to conclude from this instability remains unclear. We should 
not be too hasty in dismissing a mood just because it is unstable, for all moods display 
some instability. Were this not the case we would never shift from one mood to 
another. In fact it should be fairly clear from what has been said above that I take it that 
Garrett has paid insufficient attention to the instability of what we might think of as 
more positive moods such as curiosity and optimism. If it genuinely is the case that 
                                                 
231 Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy p.233. 
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Hume’s attitude to his conclusions is decisively shaped by his mood then this raises 
another way of reading those statements which are commonly taken to support the 
evolutionary view of his position. It would be helpful to repeat these claims. 
 
‘Nor is it only proper we should in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical 
researches, notwithstanding our sceptical principles, but also that we should yield to that propensity, 
which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light in which we 
survey them in any particular instant. It is easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, than to check 
ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact 
and full survey of an object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, but even 
our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, it is evident, it is certain, it is undeniable; which a 
due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent.’ [T I.iv.vii. p.273] 
 
Earlier it was possible to read this statement as supportive of the idea that Hume’s 
robust scepticism evolves into a more settled anti-sceptical (or only minimally 
sceptical) naturalism. However given the considerations presented above this no longer 
seems possible. In fact there is every reason to think that Hume’s sceptical conclusions 
have epistemic merit if anything does, as we have seen. So then, when Hume at the end 
of Book 1 of the Treatise makes obviously non-sceptical pronouncements these cannot 
be understood to derive from the conclusion of his inquiries. These conclusions are 
thoroughly sceptical in nature. Rather we must attribute these non-sceptical 
pronouncements to the mood Hume is in when he makes these pronouncements. It just 
so happens that when Hume writes the final passages of the conclusion of Book 1 he is 
in a confident and calm mood. However we must keep in mind that there is nothing to 
suggest that he will always remain in this mood. Indeed, his own experience should 
teach him otherwise.  
 
Mood and perspectivism 
 
 i) Clarifying mood 
 
To date the term ‘mood’ has been used in a fairly loose sense, and no effort has been 
made to provide a definition for this term or to distinguish it from other closely related 
terms like feelings and emotions. An attempt will now be made to remedy this 
situation, although the reader should be aware that the correct analysis of moods is 
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contentious and so any suggestion is bound to meet resistance. In the present analysis I 
shall distinguish between moods and emotions, and shall also distinguish between 
moods and feelings. The reason for distinguishing between moods and emotions is 
twofold. First, there is the commonly raised observation that emotions are intentional 
while moods are not. That is, emotions are directed towards or about some specific 
object, for instance my anger could be directed towards, or be about, the drunken 
hooligans yelling abuse at each other outside my house at night and stopping me from 
getting to sleep. While I might be in a bad mood because of these circumstances I am 
not in a bad mood about or towards the hooligans. Moods do not take any specific 
object, in that a mood biases the view we take of every object which happens to come 
to our attention. We know this well, for instance when we find ourselves snapping at 
our wife just because we have been put in a bad mood by the noisy hooligans.232 
 
The second reason for distinguishing between moods and emotions is related to the 
first, in that moods often survive over long periods of time, whereas emotions do not. In 
general, emotions disappear or at least diminish in strength when the object towards 
which they are directed disappears from view. This is not the case with moods for the 
simple reason that moods do not take any particular object and so can survive any 
particular object disappearing from view. For this reason it is reasonable to talk of 
someone being in a certain mood even when they are not focused on any object. So for 
instance we can and do speak of someone being in a bad mood even when at that 
moment they are not snapping at anyone, breaking furniture or showing any other signs 
of their mood. What we mean when we say someone is in such a mood is not that they 
are responding negatively to someone or something right now, but that they will be 
inclined to respond negatively to whatever next comes to their attention. 
 
Implicit in this second reason for distinguishing between a mood and an emotion is a 
further distinction between a mood and a feeling. Because a mood can be present 
without focusing on any object and without exhibiting itself in any behaviour it is also 
                                                 
232 Granted, DeLancey has recently argued that moods are very weak basic emotions partly on the 
grounds that sometimes emotions either do not have an object or that the object is so unclear that it 
cannot be determined. See Craig DeLancey, “Basic Moods,” Philosophical Psychology 19, no. 4 (2006). 
The other reason DeLancey finds for arguing that moods are emotions is that it appeals to his sense of 
parsimony, and does not require any further theories of the mind to make it convincing. However I do not 
see why viewing moods as different to emotions would not by its very complexity lead to a positive 
research agenda. In such cases adhering to parsimony can be stifling of advancement. 
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conceivable that a mood could be present without there being any associated feeling. 
For instance we can be in a bad mood without feeling angry or irritated, just as long as 
we aren’t focusing on any object which would elicit such a response. Further, Sizer has 
convincingly argued that appeals to feelings and moods (and emotions also, although 
the focus here is on moods) perform different explanatory roles. An appeal to moods 
(and emotions) is made in order to explain our behaviour, in that it plays a causal role 
in determining our behaviour. However feelings do not have such a causal role to play, 
as they are better understood as being consequences rather than causes.233 Sizer states 
the essence of this argument in the following way. 
 
‘Consider a case where a friend comments that you have been irritable all day. You object (angrily) at 
first, but then agree upon further consideration of the facts. What are the relevant facts? What is it that 
you examine to make this determination? It is not your feelings; you do not search about in your 
conscious experience for an irritable sensation. If you did, you would not find one that is uniquely 
indicative of irritability. Irritability and anxiety, for example, tend to feel very similar. But they are 
certainly very different moods. The relevant facts here are the pattern of thoughts and behaviors you have 
exhibited throughout the day. You realize that you have snapped at anyone who came near you, broken a 
few pencils and even now resent having your irritability pointed out to you. In other words, you 
recognize your mood by examining the patterns of thoughts and behaviors, by reflecting on how you 
have thought about and approached the world today, not by considering how you feel.’234 
 
With these distinctions in place we now have a fairly clear idea of what a mood is not, 
in that mood is neither an emotion nor a feeling. We also know that moods bring about 
more global changes than do emotions, in that they do not focus on any particular 
object, and hence moods shape the way we respond to any and every object that comes 
to our attention. The question then is how far the influence extends, and what light an 
appeal to mood can shed on the place of scepticism in our intellectual lives. More 
immediately though we need to understand how mood effects the attitude we take 
towards common sense. 
                                                 
233 This is easier to demonstrate in the case of strong emotions such as fear. Reserving talk of emotion to 
psychological states and feelings for conscious awareness of those states, we can say that the emotion of 
fear is the psychological state, which in turn causes a heightened heart rate, hairs on the back of the next 
to stand up etc. The feeling is the consciousness awareness of having a heightened heart rate, hairs 
standing one end etc. But then the emotion causes the feeling and subsequent actions and not the other 
way around. Following Sizer, we can then view the feeling as being a mental alert to the presence of an 
emotion which allows us to reflect on the circumstances which give rise to this state and hence allows us 
to learn something useful about these circumstances. Without this alert we would be in a position to learn 
anything from our emotions. 
234 Laura Sizer, “What Feelings Can't Do,” Mind and Language 21, no. 1 (2006): p.132. 
 Page 192  
  ii) Mood and common sense 
 
Recall that in chapter 1 it was argued that, according to the perspective taken by CSN, 
there is such a thing as natural commitment, and these natural commitments, even if 
contingent, are also common to all humans. These common natural commitments are 
what each of Sextus, Hume, Reid and Strawson identify as common sense, Reid more 
explicitly than the others. Second, all four also take it that appealing to the naturalness  
– in the sense in which each understands nature – of common sense explains why 
justificatory inquiry directed towards common sense is vain.235 As it turns out, our 
taking common sense to be commonsensical is insensitive to the outcome of 
justificatory inquiry into common sense. It also emerged in this chapter that while the 
content of common sense is in fact fixed, it was not due to the content of these 
propositions alone that it counts as commonsensical. 
 
To repeat some further claims from chapter 1, it is accurate to say that it is 
commonsensical to take such-and-such an attitude to specifiable content. In this way 
CSN sidesteps debates over whether common sense is to be defined in terms of content 
or in terms of attitude. In fact both attitudinal and content-based appeals are required to 
do justice to common sense. Appealing exclusively to attitude is inadequate as the 
natural attitudes important for common sense cannot be maintained when directed 
towards just any proposition. Some propositions really do have a special place in our 
cognitive economy, as we have seen above in the exposition of the Title Principle. 
However simply listing these propositions is also inadequate as it leaves unexplained 
why these propositions are special. 
 
The present analysis of moods makes some sense when placed in the context of this 
broader understanding of common sense. Moods, analysed above, produce global 
effects in the way we respond to the world. However, earlier work on the Title Principle 
has already suggested that how we respond to the world is shaped by common sense. 
To bring these ideas together we might suggest that our mood decisively effects what 
we take to be commonsensical. We see here the importance of including an attitudinal 
                                                 
235 Detail of what each takes to be the relevant description of nature/natural is found in chapter 1. 
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component in common sense is important as moods is sensibly taken to have some 
immediate impact on our attitudes. However, it would be implausible to give to our 
mood a free reign in determining what we take to be commonsensical, for it does seem 
that there are some things that no one can take to be commonsensical. This is why an 
exclusively attitudinal account is inadequate. An appeal to the importance of specifying 
in advance the range of possible contents that common sense could have places an 
important limit on what moods can do. 
 
One outcome of this way of bringing together the importance of both the Title Principle 
and common sense is that it emerges that common sense must play a mediating role in 
our cognitive economy, standing between our mood and our other beliefs and actions. 
According to this way of understanding moods they do not directly effect our normal 
beliefs and actions. It is via altering the content of what we take to be commonsensical 
that mood attains this efficacy and it only does so because common sense has been 
revealed to constitute the proper context for the application of reason. 
 
There are certain benefits to this idea of a mediating role for common sense, in that 
placing common sense between moods and beliefs allows for a clearer way of 
explaining how it is that moods can impact on propositional contents. We have said 
above that moods are neither feelings nor emotions and do not target any particular 
object. The same observations also warrant the claim that moods are not beliefs. 
However if moods are neither feelings, emotions or beliefs then it remains a mystery 
how it is that they have any effect. The solution is that a mood is adequately described 
by specifying that unique content of common sense that the mood activates. That is, 
being in a bad mood is the same thing as having a set of commitments taken to be 
commonsensical with such-and-such a structure. Hence what distinguished one mood 
from another is only secondarily the different behaviours and reactions that we can 
observe. The primary distinguishing feature of one mood against another is actually the 
structure of common sense particular to that mood. 
 
Taking this view of the relationship between mood and common sense carries several 
implications for how we ought to understand common sense in particular. First, the 
content of common sense cannot be fixed, or at least not in its entirety. In order for the 
influence of mood to have any real importance then different moods must be allowed to 
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influence the attitude we take towards common sense, and in turn lead to the 
restructuring of common sense itself. However if the content of common sense is 
variable, then since this content structures rationality (at least for us) then we can no 
longer speak of rationality in a univocal sense. There will in fact be as many 
rationalities as there are moods, and hence the set of propositions for which rational 
justification can be provided may be broader than we initially realised. 
 
Note also that if we abstract away from the influence of any particular mood and 
consider the complete set of propositions for which rational justification can be given 
we see that this set may contain contradictions. There is no guarantee that what is 
recognised as commonsensical under one mood is consistent with what is recognised as 
commonsensical under all other moods. Recognising this takes us one step closer to a 
better understanding of the rather unsatisfying perspectivism that originally emerged at 
the close of chapter 2. We now see that coming to a sceptical perspective is 
comprehensible even if we start from a commonsensical perspective by suggesting that 
the sceptical mood changes what we take to be commonsensical and hence allows 
rational justification to be provided for scepticism without contradicting the first 
principles of common sense. Those principles have now changed, and so allow 
scepticism to be possible. 
 
 iii) Another brief comment on Williams’ objection to Pyrrhonism 
 
The above comments should not be read as providing any succour to Williams 
regarding the idea that there really is a difference between Pyrrhonism and common 
sense. It is not the case that a change in our mood changes the details of the norms of 
inquiry identified in chapter 2, and it is important to the argument here that these norms 
do not change. These norms must capture our everyday epistemic practices such that in 
developing Pyrrhonism on this basis it is developed from common sense. However, 
what does change is our perception of what are the appropriate conditions in which 
these rules are to be applied. From an everyday perspective we do take ourselves to be 
entitled to ignore some scenarios, excluding these scenarios from the range of 
possibilities into which we feel ourselves obliged to inquire. That is, we take it as 
commonsensical at these times that some possibilities are not worthy of our attention. 
Yet when our mood changes, and thus when what we take to be commonsensical is 
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restructured, it can happen that scenarios that were previously ignored are now not so. 
We now take it as commonsensical that these scenarios are relevant. However the basic 
rules that we apply in each case remain constant throughout. 
 
The only way of supporting the conclusion that Pyrrhonism is not genuinely 
commonsensical would be to show that it invokes different application conditions for 
common sense rules than does actual common sense. However, this would require 
building a particular set of application conditions into common sense and for what 
possible reason should we favour this set of application conditions rather than another? 
Only a bald-faced dogmatism can recommend one set of applications without 
presenting reasons for the recommendation. Chapter 2 has shown that despite very good 
attempts being made it has not yet been shown that there is a reason to favour one set of 
application conditions over another. Thus even though common sense can undergo 
changes in its structure this does not endanger the claim that Pyrrhonism is 
commonsensical. 
 
Common sense, norms and natural commitment. 
 
 i) Common sense and mood 
 
Allowing mood to play the role designated here, and hence to shape what we take to be 
commonsensical, has a certain amount of explanatory power. For instance altering what 
we take to be commonsensical could explain why moods other than the one we happen 
to be in at a given time sometimes strike us as irrational and even incomprehensible at 
that time. For instance, someone in deep depression fails to comprehend how any 
rational person could ever be in an ebullient mood, and visa versa. For someone in deep 
depression the world just isn’t an attractive place, and that it isn’t attractive is taken as 
commonsensical. Hence when they encounter someone in an ebullient mood such a 
person must strike them as being under the influence of drugs or some such, or just as 
completely idiotic. As a result, when someone trapped in deep depression hears 
someone else say ‘cheer up, it’s ok’ that phrase must just sound hopelessly question-
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begging. Why should they cheer up? Not because the world is a happy wonderful place, 
as they must take it that it is commonsensically not so.236 
 
Mood shaping what we take to be rational via influencing what is taken to be 
commonsensical could also explain why arguments against scepticism have 
consistently failed to impress those actually caught in scepticism. Typically, such 
arguments have struck genuine sceptics as hopelessly question begging. What these 
anti-sceptical arguments consistently fail to take account of is that our senses/reason 
cannot be relied upon until it has been proven to be reliable, since for sceptics the 
necessity of proof regarding this reliability is itself commonsensical. Similarly, 
arguments for scepticism strike non-sceptics as deeply misguided by demanding that 
we prove what we already commonsensically know; that our senses and reason can be 
relied upon at least generally. Yet while judgements of rational justification are relative 
to the mood we are in when we make these judgements this does not mean that all 
judgements of rational justification are on an equal footing. It may well be the case that 
there is a privileged mood which when occupied allows one to make judgements of 
rational justification that are privileged against judgements made when in other moods. 
Of course it may not turn out this way as well, however no position one way or the 
other has been taken regarding that question. 
 
However, even if everything which has been said here about the influence of mood on 
common sense is correct, the representation of common sense itself is still misleading. 
Mood exercises an influence at a global level. The sceptical mood for instance effects 
our attitudes to all the first principles of common sense identified by Rysiew (in turn 
expounding Reid) all at once. Recall that the propositions forming this content include 
that there are other intelligent beings like me in the world, that my senses are reliable, 
that the future will in general conform to the past, etc. When in the sceptical mood we 
come to regard none of these propositions as first principles of common sense. In 
general doubting this kind of proposition is an all-or-nothing affair, in that we either 
doubt all of them or none of them, more often doubting none of them of course. Yet this 
                                                 
236 We might even want to suggest that perspectives structured by radically different conceptions of 
common sense and different moods are in fact incommensurable, taking our cue from Taylor in 
understanding incommensurability. See Charles Taylor, “Rationality,” in Rationality and Relativism, ed. 
Martin Hollis (Cambridge: Mit Pr, 1982). 
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is difficult to account for if we think of the content of common sense in terms of 
discrete propositions towards which we adopt the propositional attitude of belief. 
 
I would argue that we need to think of the content of common sense as coming pre-
packaged into a large and perhaps nebulous collection. This would explain why 
scepticism is generally an all-or-nothing affair when targeting what are here being 
called the first principles of common sense. Further, I would also argue that this content 
includes not just propositions but also includes emotional responses, desires, 
inclinations to act in certain ways and disinclinations to act in other ways.237 Hence 
when mood alters common sense it alters not what just what we take to be true but also 
alters our emotional state and motivates us to undertake certain activities.238 
 
 ii) Towards an account of common sense 
 
Towards the conclusion of chapter 2 it was noted that the first principles of common 
sense emerge most clearly in our everyday practices in that they make these practices 
possible. We can now see more clearly why this is so, in that the content of common 
sense includes motivations, emotions, inclinations and commitment to various 
fundamental propositions such as that reference books can be relied upon. That is, this 
content will become evident when we engage in the specific practices a given mood 
inclines us towards. When we are in a sceptical mood one of these practices will be to 
go about saying that nothing is certain, coupled with a strong aversion to any 
engagement in inquiry and an intolerance to anyone claiming to know anything. When 
in a non-sceptical mood we will be motivated to engage in inquiry and to accept with 
generosity the claims of others to know various things. 
 
Common sense provides the proper context for our everyday practices. Yet to 
determine the structure of common sense we have seen above that we need to look to 
our everyday practices. Hence it is not surprising that one would sometimes encounter 
the claim that inquiries (as one of the everyday practices in which we engage) find their 
                                                 
237 That emotions and feelings could be included as part of a pre-packaged common sense, itself shaped 
by mood, is part of why it was important to distinguish between mood and emotion. 
238 These themes will become very important in chapter 4. 
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terminus in our practice rather than in any foundational premises of the sort Reid 
identifies. For instance Wittgenstein makes the following points. 
 
 ‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;- but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ [OC 204] 
 
 ‘If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a calculation of his teacher’s? But 
these explanations must after all sometime come to an end. Will he also be taught that he can trust his 
senses – since he is indeed told in many cases that in such and such a special case you cannot trust them? 
– 
Rule and exception.’ [OC 34] 
 
‘In certain circumstances, for example, we regard a calculation as sufficiently checked.  What gives us a 
right to do so? Experience? May not that have deceived us? Somewhere we must be finished with 
justification, and then there remains the proposition that this is how we calculate.’ [OC 212] 
 
‘Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceeding.’ [OC 229] 
 
Wittgenstein’s point in speaking in this manner is to point out that it is our practice that 
ultimately provides the ground for our justifications and not any sort of first principles. 
That is, our justifications come to an end when we act on our beliefs, and not when we 
find a solid foundation for those beliefs. This is why Wittgenstein says that our talk 
(i.e., our justificatory procedures) gets its meaning from the rest of our proceeding, that 
is, it gets its meaning from our practice. Wittgenstein’s intent is to change the direction 
of analysis by giving priority to appeals to practice over appeals to theories of 
justification. We see this attempt to change the perspective from which the debates over 
justification are normally carried out in the following statement. 
 
‘We are asking ourselves : what do we do with a statement “I know…” For it is not a question of mental 
processes or mental states. 
 And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not.’ [OC 230] 
 
From this perspective the following claims also makes a great deal of sense.  
 
‘If the true if what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false. 
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For actions are not true or false, propositions are.  But the ground is the actions, not the propositions.’ 
[OC 205] 
 
Yet while it might make perfect sense for Wittgenstein to say this I suggest that this is 
not quite right. It is not practice but common sense that ultimately grounds our 
justificatory efforts. What we need is a final account of exactly what the content of 
common sense is. 
 
Given what has been said to this point it is now possible to make the claim that the 
content of common sense is provided by norms of which those identified in chapter 2 
and the Title Principle are excellent examples. Yet even though this claim does follow 
from what has been argued above it is nonetheless a complex and contentious claim and 
thus requires some clarification. Perhaps the best way to draw out this idea is to again 
turn to some of Sextus’ observations as these were taken in the preface. Recall that part 
of Sextus’ project was to poke fun at his dogmatic opponents for attempting to come to 
the defence of a common sense that did not require their support. In Sextus particular 
version of the response of ridiculing his opponents rather than debating them we find 
the idea that in the face of apparently logically sound arguments, ordinary people 
 
‘set out on journeys by land and sea, and construct ships and houses, and produce children, without 
paying any attention to the arguments against motion and coming into being.’ [PH II.244]239 
 
We should be sensitive at this point to what Sextus does not say. He does not say that 
the man of common sense believes that objects come into being or believes that 
movement is possible. Sextus says that normal people generate objects and move about. 
That is, Sextus shifts the focus from what the man of common sense (and remember 
this is supposed to include the Pyrrhonian) believes to what the man of common sense 
does. What does this change of focus tell us about the structure of the natural 
commitments that Sextus has identified? 
 
                                                 
239 Sextus may have borrowed this response from the Cynics and so it might be more accurate to describe 
this response as Cynical rather than Pyrrhonian. Either way, it is an interesting response. On should also 
keep in mind when considering this statement that for Sextus ‘ordinary’ = ‘non-philosophical’ = 
Pyrrhonian. 
 Page 200  
I suggest that Sextus’ insight at this crucial point is to suggest that the everyday 
response to apparently sound arguments against some special targets is to practice in a 
certain way. The everyday response is not to dogmatically insist that some 
commitments are known with certainty or presupposed by the original argument and 
certainly not to present countervailing arguments in support of these natural 
commitments. The first thing to note is that Sextus has shifted ground from the 
epistemic to the psychological. Being presented with apparently sound arguments 
against our knowledge claims presents us with questions over our entitlement to make 
these claims and hold these commitments, and these questions can only be answered 
with further claims of an epistemic nature, for instance by appealing to the concept of 
justification. However Sextus has no interest in making any epistemic claims. The 
claims that Sextus does make are of a psychological and pragmatic nature. That is, 
Sextus is speaking about what commitments we must adopt and what actions or 
practices in which we are forced to engage. 
 
In keeping with this shift in perspective we can take Sextus’ idea even further and 
suggest that what Sextus identifies as natural commitments are commitments to 
practice in a certain way. Further, our commitment to these practices overrides the 
effect of any arguments with which we are presented which would indicate that we 
actually have no entitlement to practice in this way. One reason why this is a helpful 
approach for us to take is that taking such a view allows us to incorporate an insight we 
earlier found in Wittgenstein, although perhaps not in exactly the sense in which 
Wittgenstein intended this to be taken. To recapitulate, in that statement Wittgenstein 
said the following. 
 
‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;- but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ [OC 204] 
 
‘If the true if what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false’ [OC 205] 
 
If our natural commitments are commitments to practice in a certain way then it is 
apparent why Wittgenstein’s statements are true. Practices, for instance, are not 
technically the kinds of things that could be either true or false. This is of course not to 
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say that practices are completely beyond the scope of examination, for while they 
cannot actually be true or false themselves they have attributes or consequences which 
are beneficial or damaging, warranted or unwarranted. Practices of a certain sort can 
even lead to outcomes that are true or false, in that there could be practices that govern 
belief formation. Practices could then be examined and critiqued in the sense that the 
consequences and outcomes of following these practices could be examined and 
critiqued. 
 
While Sextus is in a sense correct to suggest that there are certain practices to which we 
have a natural commitment, the reason we have just this natural commitment rather 
than some other commitment to so practice derives from a prior natural commitment to 
respect certain norms. While for Sextus the relevant sense of ‘natural’ is here 
something akin to ‘scientific’ we are not wedded to such a conception. It could be that 
these norms are a condition for the possibility of reason instead. Indeed, given the 
problem that were noted in the Humean/Sextan view explained in chapter 1 this would 
seem to be a better approach. 
 
It is in fact these norms which are fundamental and explain why our practices have the 
structure that they have. For instance the common practice of taking our memory to be 
reliable is engaged in out of respect for the norm which directs us to respect our 
memory. Put another way the practice is ‘trusting memory’ whereas he norms is ‘trust 
memory’.240 While practices are only one step removed from the ground they are not 
themselves the ground. Certain norms are the ground. However, like a practice, a norm 
cannot be true or false and so meets the Wittgensteinian requirement above.241  
 
But in what sense would it be appropriate to use the language of grounding when 
speaking of these norms or these practices? In what sense can a norm or a derivative 
practice, which cannot itself be true or false, be a ground for something else? If we are 
                                                 
240 That is, the difference between a practice and a norm is reflected in the grammatical form we use to 
express the two concepts. Norms are standardly expressed in statements of the form ‘you ought to do x’ 
or by a simple imperative ‘do x’. For instance one might describe a norm as introducing the injunction 
‘you ought to trust memory’ or just ‘trust memory’. Note that due to having such a form norms are 
freestanding grammatical entities, that is, they present themselves in complete sentences. Practices on the 
other hand are best expressed in participial form. For instance, one might describe a practice as ‘trusting 
memory’. As such, practices unlike norms do not take the form of freestanding grammatical entities. 
241 Like a practice though a norm can be rationally critiqued and examined, in this case in terms of the 
fitness of the practices in which we would be led to engage were we to respect this norm. 
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thinking of the ground in epistemic terms then indeed using the language of grounding 
is at best misleading. We have already seen that practices (and hence norms also, at 
least implicitly) were only introduced after an epistemic framework had been 
abandoned in preference for a psychological or pragmatic one. That we have a 
commitment to practice in a certain way does not all of itself provide us with an 
entitlement to so practice. In terms drawn from chapter 3, that we are committed to a 
given practice does not confer any epistemic merit on the outcomes of this practice, 
even if those outcomes are the kinds of things which could be true or false, such as the 
content of a belief. Given the arguments presented by Sextus so far this would not 
change if norms are brought into the picture, for the reason why we respect these norms 
is the same as that for which we engage in certain practices; psychological compulsion 
or pragmatism. However in a non-epistemic sense we could speak of norms – and the 
practices to which they lead – as being at the ground in the sense in which we cannot go 
any further than an appeal to these norms when we analyse the source and foundation 
of human knowledge. In this non-epistemic sense, we can suggest that the ground is 
that point beyond which we can carry our inquiries no further. If it turns out that this 
point confers no epistemic merit on those commitments of ours that are built on this 
ground, for instance certain practices or beliefs, then so be it. In this non-epistemic 
sense, arriving at the ground was precisely what David Hume achieved (or at least 
thought he had) in the Treatise, and it is useful here to revise his comments in the 
introduction to that work regarding this very point. 
 
‘When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; though 
we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our 
most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the 
mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most 
extraordinary phenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any further progress is enough to satisfy 
the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, 
and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their 
conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment 
and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of 
our philosophy.’ [T.xvii] 
 
Taking the ground of our commitments not to confer any epistemic merit on those 
commitments is of course a highly sceptical point to make. Such a conclusion may also 
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be deeply unsatisfying for those committed to the idea that philosophical analysis can 
tell us not just what we actually do but what we ought to do, as Hume anticipates in the 
preceding quote. Nonetheless, this dissertation did not set out to show that scepticism 
could be answered or even dissolved. Ultimately though we shall see in the final 
sections of this chapter that indeed we do have an entitlement to respect these norms. 
The problem is that respecting these norms leads us directly to Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
as chapter 2 has established. 
 
 iii) Advantages of taking the content of common sense to be norms 
 
Thinking of our natural commitments in terms of norms and norm-directed practices 
does have some advantages in addition to what might be perceived as some to be the 
disadvantages mentioned above. The main advantage is that norms are exactly the kinds 
of things that we might expect to be directly influenced by moods, in that both operate 
on the global scale and neither are limited to taking particular objects. In this respect it 
would make at least as much sense to describe a mood by listing the norms that being in 
that mood would lead you to respect as it would to describe a mood by listing the things 
that being in that mood leads us to take to be commonsensical. It is for the same reason 
that the behavioural differences to which variations in mood lead, for norms are by their 
very nature behaviour-guiding. 
 
It is clear that mood has decisive effects on the kinds of activities in which we are 
inclined to engage, even leading us to engage in activities that in other circumstances 
we would find completely unmotivated and unproductive. It is also clear that some 
activities are associated with the presence and absence of some moods. Re-examining 
Hume’s various responses as being attributed to the various moods we find in the 
Treatise alerts us to this, and is particularly noticeable when we consider why Hume 
wrote the second and especially the third book of the Treatise. To explain this we need 
to know how Hume could have any confidence that further inquiry would lead to 
anything other than further doubts. Interestingly, Hume does not seem to think that 
there is any great risk of this. At the opening of the third book Hume explains his 
confidence in the following way. 
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‘I am not, however, without hopes, that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it 
advances; and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning 
the understanding and the passions. Morality is a subject that interests us above all others; we fancy the 
peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and it is evident that this concern must 
make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is in a great measure indifferent 
to us. What affects us, we conclude, can never be a chimera; and, as our passion is engaged on the one 
side or the other, we naturally think that the question lies within human comprehension; which, in other 
cases of this nature, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without this advantage, I never should have 
ventured upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy, in an age wherein the greatest part of men 
seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing that requires any 
considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.’ [T.III.i.i. pp.455-456] 
 
Hume’s confidence here seems to derive not from any special features of discussion on 
moral topics but from the fact that we are not generally inclined to fall into a sceptical 
mood when engaged in moral reflection (or at least he is not thus inclined). As a result 
we more reliably take as commonsensical that philosophical inquiry will prove useful 
in resolving our questions when engaged with moral topics than we do when 
philosophical inquiry turns to more abstract topics.242 However, note that Hume does 
not argue that it is impossible that sceptical arguments could be presented against the 
result of moral reflection. The point is just that we are not generally inclined to take 
arguments like this seriously, which in Hume’s view is fortunate indeed as for him 
much of practical value hangs on these investigations. 
 
The second advantage of this approach is that taking the content of common sense to be 
a collection of norms is that it allows for the inclusion of both the attitudinal and 
content-based aspects of the earlier attempts at the clarification of common sense. 
Norms do have a content and it is right that specifying the content of common sense be 
given due attention. However, this content is not one that is straightforwardly true or 
false. Hence representing common sense as a series of propositions to which any 
rational agent must always give their assent is in fact a misrepresentation of common 
sense. On the reading given here there is a great difference between saying, for 
instance, the command ‘trust your memory’ and the proposition ‘that memory ought to 
be trusted’. Only the former content is commonsensical. Further, the importance of an 
attitudinal component is also clear, in that even if we can correctly specify the content 
                                                 
242 Where Hume takes it that metaphysical and epistemological topics are abstract, as are those in what 
we would not call the philosophy of mind. 
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of common sense we have not thereby explained why common sense has this content 
rather than another. To explain that we need to account for how our attitude comes to 
pick out this content, and as we have seen this is not something that can be explained 
by appealing to the content itself. 
 
The final advantage that this approach to common sense has is that taking the 
recognised content of common sense to be sensitive to mood does not require that we 
adapt the current explication of the Title Principle in any way. The Title Principle only 
requires that a proposition be recognised as a first principle of common sense. It does 
not itself explicitly state that these first principle will either be insensitive to mood or 
will be recognised to be so. Nor does taking the content of common sense to be a 
collection of norms require any modifications, and for the same reasons. 
 
With mood-sensitivity in mind we can now read the Title Principle as explaining not 
just how scepticism could be normative (if the norms upon which it is based are 
themselves genuinely normative) but also why we ought sometimes to continue our 
inquiries, if we are in an appropriate mood. The problem of course is that it turns out 
that a very wide range of commitments could have epistemic merit, if we can find an 
appropriate mood and there is no guarantee that the set of commitments that find 
epistemic merit will be consistent. However if anything can have epistemic merit then 
one wonders what kind of merit is involved here, in that being meritorious usually 
implies being better than the alternative. Yet it seems to this point that all alternatives 
are equal, in the right circumstances. So not only is speaking of epistemic merit 
misleading, it is also misleading to speak of epistemic merit. 
 
It turns out then that not only does our talk get its meaning from the rest of our 
proceeding (as Wittgenstein taught us) but our rationality itself emerges only in the 
context of the rest of our proceedings, or more correctly from the norms that govern 
those proceedings. It thus follows that a necessary condition of becoming rational is 
that we first practice in a certain way, where these practices in turn derive their 
structure from the norms towards which they are directed. Hence to say that being 
rational is a matter of having the correct beliefs or deriving the correct conclusions 
from given premises seriously misrepresents the order in which such matters need to be 
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discussed. Being rational is first and foremost being respectful of certain norms and 
exhibiting this respectfulness in practice. 
 
iv) ‘Fictional’ grounds 
 
What then is the status of those propositions that express principles such as ‘that our 
memory is reliable’, ‘that there are other minds’ etc? Clearly, such propositions cannot 
properly capture the ground of our beliefs. That ground, as we have just said, is a 
commitment to respect certain norms, which in turn leads us to engage in specific 
practices. While more shall be said about these norms and practices shortly, enough has 
been said for the moment to examine the status of principles such as ‘that there is an 
external world’ or ‘that there are other minds’.  
 
If what has previously been said regarding practices and natural commitments is 
accurate then this implies that casting our natural commitments as beliefs of the form 
‘that the external world exists’ and ‘that there are other minds’ is quite inaccurate. Such 
a form is not appropriate to accurately capture a commitment to respect certain 
norms.243 In turn this implies that propositions such as ‘that the external world exists’ 
or ‘that there are other minds’ play no grounding role in relation to our everyday way of 
interacting with our environment. That grounding role, such as it is, is played by our 
commitment to respect certain norms and hence practice in a certain way. That being 
said, we might well wonder whether we need to suppose that anyone actually has a 
commitment with a propositional content of the sort ‘that there is an external world’ or 
‘that there are other minds’. It certainly does not appear that such a commitment would 
play any significant role in our cognitive economy, which removes any necessity of 
appealing to these commitments. For instance if we are operating under a norm such as 
‘trust the senses to connect you to external objects’ then it is unclear why we would 
also need to refer to the proposition ‘that there is an external world’. Any work that 
such a proposition might do is already being done by the specified norm. Here we 
should appeal to a doxastic version of Occam’s razor and suggest that we should not 
attribute to anyone more commitments than are required to explain the functioning of 
their cognitive economy. Given that establishing the truth of commitments such as ‘that 
                                                 
243 What form would be required will be considered in some detail in a following section. 
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there is an external world’ or ‘that there are other minds’ has proven to be 
philosophically contentious it would be best if we did not suppose that propositions 
such as these form part of the content of our commitments. 
 
Accepting the claim that propositions such as ‘that there is an external world’ or ‘that 
there are other minds’ do not form part of the content of our commitments has 
implications for the coherence of refutations of scepticism directed at such propositions 
(i.e., Cartesian scepticism). If such propositions do not actually appear among our 
commitments then refuting Cartesian scepticism is uninformative of the structure of 
actual human knowledge. However, this does not prove that refuting Cartesian 
scepticism is impossible in this tightly restricted sense, as it only shows that such 
refutation would take us no distance towards a better understanding of actual human 
knowledge. Hence the motivation for refuting Cartesian scepticism remains unclear. 
Further, the history of epistemology has surely demonstrated that providing such a 
refutation is extremely difficult and I suspect that the prospects of such a proof are not 
encouraging to say the least. Nonetheless it must be conceded that nothing here implies 
that a refutation of Cartesian scepticism, understood in this restricted sense, is actually 
impossible as it only shows that such a refutation would be uninformative. 
 
At this point both a convergence and divergence can be discerned between the 
arguments presented here and those presented by Strawson. To reiterate, Strawson 
makes the following important (although subtly wrong) claim. 
 
‘The correct way with the professional sceptic doubt is not to attempt to rebut it with argument, but to 
point out that it is idle, unreal, a pretense; and then the rebutting arguments will appear as equally idle; 
the reasons produced in those arguments to justify induction or belief in the existence of body are not, 
and do not become, our reasons for these beliefs; there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold 
these beliefs. We simply cannot help accepting them as defining the areas within which the questions 
come up of what beliefs we should hold on such-and-such a matter.’244 
 
Strawson rightly thinks that there is something incoherent in attempting to refute 
scepticism by presenting justifications for certain propositions. However he is wrong to 
think that the reason that refuting scepticism is incoherent has to do with the connection 
                                                 
244 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties pp.19-20. 
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between the targets of scepticism and any reasons that might be brought forward on 
their behalf. Attempting to refute scepticism is futile, according to Strawson, because 
the beliefs for which these propositions provide the content do not take reasons. That is 
why he says that ‘there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs’. 
However the important point is not the connection between the targets of Cartesian 
scepticism and reasons, it is the connection between the targets of Cartesian scepticism 
and us. Strawson’s mistake is to suppose, incorrectly, that the sceptic has been targeting 
a commitment that we actually hold, for instance a commitment with a content such as 
‘that there is an external world’ or ‘that there are other minds’. In fact it might be 
possible (although history should teach us that it is extremely unlikely) that such 
commitments could be justified. However even if they were, such justification would 
tell us nothing about our knowledge because commitments of this sort are not our 
commitments. It is not that there is no such things as the reason for which we hold these 
commitments. It is that there are no commitments which we hold. 
 
Granted, when directed towards our actual commitments Strawson’s transcendental 
style of argument might provide us with entitlement to these commitments. Yet this in 
turn reveals a deeper point at which Strawson is mistaken, in that he supposes that 
showing that the fact that we are committed to some commitments as ‘defining the area 
in which questions come up’ is somehow an anti-sceptical claim. If the argument of this 
dissertation is correct then indeed we are committed to some natural commitments, and 
indeed these commitments do provide a context for the proper application of reason. 
However, because the content of these natural commitments can shift in such a way as 
to lead to radical Pyrrhonian scepticism appealing to these natural commitments cannot 
possibly be anti-sceptical. Pyrrhonian scepticism is internal to the commitments to 
which Strawson would appeal. But precisely because these natural commitments can in 
certain contexts lead to scepticism it cannot be said that we have any entitlement to 
these commitments. Paradoxically, appealing to these natural commitments as 
something to which we are entitled is exactly what ultimately leads us to withdraw any 
such claims to entitlement. 
  
 v) Mood and perspectivism 
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The analysis of Hume’s position as presented here has led us to the point where we 
must say that scepticism must be taken seriously, in that its believability leads to 
significant revisions being made in the structure of our commitments. This must be the 
case as we are as well entitled to scepticism as we are entitled to other more familiar 
anti-sceptical perspectives. We also must conclude that scepticism is granted 
normativity by the Title Principle. However, Hume’s position also leads us to the 
conclusion that scepticism should not be taken seriously, in that it cannot be believed 
and leads to no revision of our commitments. Nor is scepticism granted normativity by 
the Title Principle. That is, Hume’s position seems to contain a contradiction. Stated 
more technically, Hume’s position supports both of the following claims: 
 
• Scepticism is both serious and normative (asserted from a perspective shaped by 
the sceptical mood) 
• Scepticism is neither serious nor normative (asserted from a perspective shaped 
by the non-sceptical mood) 
 
Worse still, this contradiction is at the very heart of Hume’s position at it derives 
directly from the Title Principle and so cannot be dismissed as unimportant. A 
philosopher of Hume’s stature cannot have missed the presence of this contradiction, 
and hence something must be said. I believe that the best way of accounting for this 
contradiction is to follow Fogelin in suggesting that Hume supports a radical 
perspectivism when it comes to the place of scepticism in our intellectual lives.245 
 
Fogelin identifies three different ‘Hume’s’, each of which could be classified by 
appealing to what I am here calling a mood. The Gentlemanly Hume is Hume in a 
mood which inclines him to be dogmatic and uncritical, and also who flatly refuses to 
take scepticism seriously. The Wise Hume is Hume in a mood in which he recognises 
that some of our beliefs cannot be rationally justified but can be believed nonetheless. 
This Hume is critical and thoughtful, and does not accept at face value everything the 
Gentlemanly accepts. However like the Gentlemanly Hume, the Wise Hume is also 
opposed to taking scepticism seriously. Finally there is the Pyrrhonian Hume, who is 
caught in a sceptical mood and does take scepticism seriously, significantly revising his 
                                                 
245 Robert J. Fogelin, “Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy,” Hume Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 
pp.164-167. 
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commitments in the light of scepticism. In Fogelin’s judgement the Gentlemanly Hume 
takes the Wise Hume to be wasting his time in frivolous and excessive studies of no 
value. In turn the Wise Hume takes the Gentlemanly Hume to have uncritically 
accepted numerous falsehoods. A similar dynamic exists between the Wise Hume and 
the Pyrrhonian Hume. 
 
Faced with such relationships the natural question to ask is whether any of these three 
Hume’s is actually correct to judge the other Hume’s to be mistaken. Answering this 
question requires that we grant one of the moods involved here a privileged place 
relative to the other moods, and hence say that this privileged mood is the one we ought 
to occupy. But on what grounds could we make such a judgement? Certainly, the Title 
Principle does not warrant any such claim as sceptical and non-sceptical moods can 
equally be normative. As we have seen, the Title Principle takes no account of mood in 
determining which beliefs we ought to hold. However as Hume does not seem to give 
any other direction regarding how we could reasonably prefer one perspective over 
another we must conclude that an appeal to the Title Principle is his final answer on this 
topic. Hence Hume provides us with no way of answering the question of which mood 
is the right one. We are thus forced to agree with Fogelin that Hume’s position does 
lead to a radical perspectivism to which the above account of common sense is 
uncommitted because it leaves it as an open question whether there is a coherent way of 
favouring one perspective over others. In fact for all that has been said above there may 
be further as yet unspecified common sense norms that would allow one perspective to 
be favoured over others. That I cannot imagine what these norms would look like ought 
not stand against their possible existence. 
 
Recall that the potential for perspectivism can be traced to mood influencing our 
judgement in such a way that what we recognise as the first principles of common sense 
is not static. For the moment no position is taken regarding the plausibility of the move 
to radical perspectivism, as it is left an open question whether there is or is not a 
privileged perspective from which judgements of superiority can be made.246 Hence for 
the moment the only kind of perspectivism that is argued for the more modest 
                                                 
246 As it turns out, Strawson does actually embrace a version of radical perspectivism, although for 
different reasons that those described here. The point however is that such a move is not essential to 
CSN, although it is common. 
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perspectivism described at the beginning of this chapter. As will emerge shortly 
however it may not be necessary for such a privileged perspective to be found in order 
for recommendations in favour of occupying one mood rather than another to be 
coherent. 
 
 vi) Mood and rational unity 
 
Leaving aside radical perspectivism for a moment, we can observe that even a modest 
perspectivism faces some challenges if no privileged perspective can actually be 
identified. The most serious challenge concerns the reputed attributes of a rational 
individual implied in Hume’s position even given a modestly perspectivist reading. 
Recall that moods influence what we take to be first principles of common sense, and 
that the first principles of common sense structure what we take to be rational. This 
raises the possibility that someone acting rationally could come to accept contradictory 
beliefs. We have already seen how this is possible when examining the grounds on 
which we can accept and reject scepticism. Yet avoiding contradiction has traditionally 
been a hallmark of the rational individual. 
 
Granted, at no point does the rational individual pictured here actually adopt 
contradictory beliefs at the same time. However he does successively accept beliefs 
which are contradictory to each other. Hume states this quite clearly in the passage 
below, in this instance having in mind the acceptance that the objects of perception are 
both interrupted and uninterrupted. 
 
‘Another advantage of this philosophical system is its similarity to the vulgar one, by which means we 
can humour our reason for a moment, when it becomes troublesome and solicitous; and yet upon its least 
negligence or inattention, can easily return to our vulgar and natural notions. Accordingly we find that 
philosophers neglect not this advantage, but, immediately upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest 
of mankind in those exploded opinions, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue identically 
and uninterruptedly the same in all their interrupted appearances.’ [T I.iv.ii. p.216] 
 
The feature of his system which saves him from accepting a flat-out contradiction is, I 
believe, that we are never in a sceptical mood and a non-sceptical mood 
simultaneously. In fact it is difficult to comprehend what such a mood would be. The 
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closest we can come is to appeal to what Nagel has called ‘double vision’, which he 
described as 
 
‘…the fate of creatures with a glimpse of the view sub specie aeternitatis. When we view ourselves from 
the outside a naturalistic picture of how we work seems to be unavoidable. It is clear that our beliefs arise 
from certain dispositions and experiences which, as far as we know, don’t guarantee their truth and are 
compatible with radical error. The problem is that we can’t fully take on the scepticism that this entails, 
because we can’t cure our appetite for belief, and we can’t take on this attitude to our own beliefs while 
we’re having them. Beliefs are about how things probably are, not just how they might possibly be, and 
there is no way of bracketing our ordinary beliefs about the world so that they dovetail neatly with the 
possibility of skepticism. The thought “I’m a professor at New York University, unless of course I’m a 
brain in a vat” is not one that can represent my general integrated state of mind.’247 
 
However on closer inspection the view Nagel identifies is not simultaneously sceptical 
and non-sceptical. Rather, the view Nagel is here pointing us towards is a high-order 
view, or a non-mood perhaps, which recognises the coherence of both without deciding 
on which, if either, is correct. If Nagel is right then there is a perspective we can occupy 
in which we can reflect on both scepticism and non-scepticism simultaneously, and this 
looks promising in terms of rational integration. However Nagel also points out that 
this promise is deceptive, as the perspective which encompasses scepticism and non-
scepticism is rationally disintegrated and also unstable because it is unsustainable. 
 
While we may not be able to accuse the position Hume has developed with allowing a 
rational person to hold contradictory beliefs there does still seem to be some error here. 
The problem here emerges more clearly if we analyse this dynamic in terms of 
consistency rather than contradiction. As used here the term consistency cannot be 
reduced to meaning the absence of contradiction. Rather, consistency requires that we 
think of rationality in diachronic terms, and ask whether we ought to call the overall 
shape of a life lived according to the above understanding of rationality truly rational. 
One useful way of pursuing this question is to ask whether the life is pictured as 
moving to rational unity, following Carol Rovane in understanding the rationality of 
                                                 
247 Thomas Nagel, “The View from Nowhere (Selections) ” in Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, ed. 
Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 289. It is because he 
holds this highly concessive view towards scepticism that Nagel has been named as one of the ‘Neo-
Humeans’ who have done much to repopularise scepticism in recent years. 
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persons.248 Thus understood, rational unity is the result of effort and will and exists for 
the achievement of some end. This does not seem to require that we privilege one mood 
over all others any more than it requires that we spend all our time in only one mood. 
However in order for the move towards such rational unity to be possible we must be 
able to reflect on our moods in order that they be organised so as to further the 
achievement of some goal, yet this is where problems have been shown to emerge. 
 
The above analysis suggests that if we are to attain rational integration then this 
achievement will only come about through the lack of reflection. If so, then perhaps 
engaging in philosophy is not such a good idea after all, at least to the extent that 
philosophy is a reflective activity. This is a possibility that the Pyrrhonians have been 
raising for some time now and it should come as no surprise that a dissertation drawing 
inspiration directly from the Pyrrhonian tradition would at least raise such a possibility. 
For myself, I do not see any clear way of showing that this possibility cannot be 
realised, and the preceding analysis indicates that at least it might be. Perhaps the best 
we could do it adapt Hume’s ‘solution’, and distract ourselves from the problems of 
reflection and wait for a more comfortable mood to emerge. That would certainly not 
be an un-Pyrrhonian thing to do.  
 
Conclusion: the inevitability of Pyrrhonian scepticism 
  
 i) Natural commitments 
 
To summarise the argument of this thesis regarding our natural commitments, it turns 
out that we have a natural commitment to respect certain norms of behaviour, and 
particularly norms of inquiry. These norms in turn constitute part of the content of 
common sense and so partially constitute the proper context for the application of 
reason. However, the content of common sense (and thus the content of our natural 
commitments) has also emerged as being mood-sensitive. As a result a perspectivist 
account of common sense was developed. One important consequence of this is that it 
is possible that there is more than one proper context in which reason can be applied, 
where the results of this application are not guaranteed to be consistent. Such were the 
                                                 
248 Rovane, “Rationality and Persons,” pp.334-339. 
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conclusions of chapter 3. In themselves the conclusions are not actually sceptical except 
insofar as they might incline us to scepticism about the claim that only one set of 
activities correctly answers to the description ‘rational’. Chapter 2 established that 
respecting the norms that govern everyday inquiry could in certain circumstances lead 
to the development of Pyrrhonian scepticism and went some way to establishing what 
these everyday norms are. However when the conclusions of chapter 2 and chapter 3 
are taken together distinctly Pyrrhonian scepticism does emerge. 
 
Recall from the Preface that the essence of Pyrrhonism is to present a dilemma for any 
adherent of common sense who wishes to appeal to common sense as part of a broader 
anti-sceptical strategy. This dilemma runs as follows. Either we have an entitlement to 
common sense or we do not. If we do not have such an entitlement then we cannot 
appeal to common sense to refute scepticism. If we do have such an entitlement then 
this entitlement also entitles us to Pyrrhonian scepticism. So again, we cannot appeal to 
common sense to refute scepticism. So we cannot appeal to common sense as the basis 
for a refutation of scepticism. In addition to providing an account of our natural 
commitments, Chapter 3 supports the claim that indeed we do have an entitlement to 
common sense, explaining how we come to have entitlement in terms of the Title 
Principle. This rules out embracing the first horn of the dilemma, although it does raise 
further questions about which common sense we mean when we say that we have an 
entitlement to common sense. After all, Chapter 3 suggests that common sense can take 
more than one form. Chapter 2 supports the claim that an entitlement to common sense 
brings with it an entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, whether we welcome this or not. 
This means that we cannot avoid the second horn of the dilemma any more than we can 
embrace the first. 
 
 ii) A Pyrrhonian response to the Pyrrhonian dilemma 
 
What then is the Pyrrhonian response to the dilemma with which they present the anti-
sceptical adherent of common sense? I suggest that one of the more interesting features 
of Pyrrhonism is that no response to this dilemma is required and hence no response is 
given. That is, the Pyrrhonian does not as a result of the arguments presented in 
chapters 2 and 3 embrace the claim that we have both an entitlement to common sense 
and to Pyrrhonian scepticism. Nor will the Pyrrhonian claim that we actually have no 
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entitlement to common sense. For the Pyrrhonian the dilemma stands as a dilemma, 
unresolved because there is no necessity of resolution. 
 
But why does the Pyrrhonian not feel that this dilemma must be resolved, one way or 
another? Surely this is an unusual way of reacting to philosophical problems. The 
reason is that the Pyrrhonian does not adhere to the deeper position that we ought to be 
able to understand the commitments that we commonsensically take ourselves to have. 
In addition, the Pyrrhonian is certainly not committed to the idea that reflection on our 
commitments would be a productive of coming to understand either how we gained any 
entitlements we might have or why it is that we take ourselves to have entitlements that 
we do not actually have. That is, for the Pyrrhonian the structure of our entitlements 
(both actual and merely felt) is simply mysterious. Had we asked him Sextus may have 
told us that our commitments are atopos – unclassifiable. 
 
Where does this leave Common Sense Naturalism? As defined in chapter 1, CSN is 
seriously flawed precisely because it attempts to use an appeal to common sense as part 
of a broader anti-sceptical strategy. Chapter 2 has shown that such a use of common 
sense is untenable as common sense turns out to be inherently sceptical. However, CSN 
is not hopelessly flawed. It is correct that there is such a thing as a natural commitment, 
and it is also true that reasons do not connect up with these commitments in the sort of 
way that would be required for us to provide rational justification for these natural 
commitments. Recall, our natural commitments are commitments to respect certain 
norms, especially norms of inquiry and so are quite unlike commitments to propositions 
such as ‘that there is an external world’. Further, for all that has been said it is possible 
that the central tenet of CSN, that we can have an entitlement to a commitment in the 
absence of rational justification, may well be true. In fact the arguments of Chapters 2 
and 3 are predicated on the reality of entitlements that bypass rational justifications. 
Hence there is much that it true in CSN. In fact all the central claims of CSN are true 
except the claim that scepticism is never serious and the claim that our entitlement to 
common sense can be used as the basis for a refutation of scepticism. However, were 
CSN modified such that it no longer made any anti-sceptical claims we would be left 
with a viable philosophical position. 
 
 iii) Endemic Pyrrhonian scepticism 
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 If the account given above of the structure of our natural commitments is correct then 
the conclusion that radical scepticism is not a serious problem is unwarranted. In fact 
the idea that scepticism is unserious gets things quite backwards. Rather than being a 
buttress against scepticism, our natural commitments turn out to be inherently sceptical. 
This is because respecting the norms with which those natural commitments provide us 
can lead us, in certain specifiable circumstances, to Pyrrhonian scepticism. This means 
that the threat that at some time in the future we shall begin to feel the force of radical 
scepticism can never be entirely done away with, because the source of that threat lies 
within us. Whenever we ask ourselves what entitlement we have to common sense we 
court Pyrrhonian scepticism. Let us return to Hume’s central insight, with which we 
began. 
 
We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. 
 
It should now be quite clear why Hume is exactly right. Reason is false in that 
following its rules sometimes leads us onto the path to scepticism, but as these rules are 
genuinely rational we have no choice but to follow them, and so without them we 
would have no reason at all. But it is precisely because it is reason that is false that 
scepticism is both an endemic and persistent problem. Scepticism cannot be done away 
with for exactly the same reason that reason cannot be done away with. As Hume might 
have said, the uncouth monster that is the sceptic can never be killed, he can only be 
temporarily evaded, as any one of us can become the uncouth monster at but a moments 
notice. 
 
The only way to avoid scepticism would then be to commit something akin to rational 
suicide, turning our back on inquiries into the structure of our own commitments. This 
is why the theme of the untrustworthiness of reflective activity is recurrent is 
Pyrrhonian thought, and it is also why the Pyrrhonian refusal to engage with the 
Pyrrhonian dilemma can seem to be tantamount to turning one’s back on reason. It 
seems that way because it is that way. The final lesson that the Pyrrhonian teaches us is 
that while scepticism is a persistent and endemic threat, the price we pay for avoiding 
that threat is far higher than the threat itself. Rational activity may be dangerous, but it 
is better than the alternative. 
 Page 217  
 Page 218  
  Page 219  
REFERENCES 
 
Austin, J. L., and G. J. Warnock. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. 
Bailey, Alan. Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2002. 
Bett, Richard. Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
———. “Sextus' Against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism or Both?” Apeiron 27 
(1994): 123-161. 
Broughton, Janet. Descartes's Method of Doubt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002. 
Burnyeat, Myles. “Can the Skeptic Live his Skepticsm?” In The Skepical Tradition, 
edited by M. F. Burnyeat. London: University of California Press, 1983. 
———. “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed.” 
Philosophical Review 90 (1982): 3-40. 
———. “The Sceptic in His Place and Time.” In Philosophy in History, edited by 
Richard Rorty and et al., 225-254: Cambridge Univ Pr : New York, 1984. 
Cahoone, Lawrence E. “The Consolation of Antiphilosophy: Scepticism, Common 
Sense Pragmatism, and Rorty.” Philosophy Today 38, no. 2 (1994): 204-224. 
Cavell, Stanley. The Claims of Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
———. Must we mean what we say? New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
———. The Senses of Walden. An Expanded ed. San Francisco: North Point Press, 
1981. 
De Caro, Mario, and David Macarthur. “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism.” In 
Naturalism in Question, edited by Mario De Caro and David Macarthur. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
DeLancey, Craig. “Basic Moods.” Philosophical Psychology 19, no. 4 (2006): 527-538. 
Descartes, Rene, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Descartes: 
Selected Philosophical Writings. New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1988. 
Epictetus. Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and fragments / translated 
with notes, a life of Epictetus, and a view of his philosophy, by George Long. 
London: George Bell and sons, 1887. 
 Page 220  
Everson, Stephen. “The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism.” In Psychology, edited 
by Stephen Everson. New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1991. 
Fine, Gail. “Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?” Philosophical 
Review 109, no. 2 (2000): 195-234. 
———. “Sceptical Dogmata; Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13.” Methexis 13 (2000): 81-
105. 
———. “Sextus and External World Scepticism.” In Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, Volume XXIV, Summer 2003, Sedley, David (ed), 341 385. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ Pr, 2003. 
———. “Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes.” In 
Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, Miller, Jon (ed), 192 231. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Pr, 2003. 
Flintoff, Everard. “Pyrrho and India.” Phronesis 25 (1980): 88-108. 
Fogelin, Robert J. “Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy.” Hume Studies 
24, no. 1 (1998): 161-169. 
———. Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature, International Library of 
Philosophy. London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. 
———. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. New York: Oxford 
Univ Pr, 1994. 
———. Walking the Tightrope of Reason: the precarious life of a rational animal. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Frede, Michael. “The Method of the So-Called Methodical School of Medicine.” In 
Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 261-278. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987. 
———. “The Skeptic's Beliefs.” In Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 179-200. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pr, 1987. 
———. “The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of 
Knowledge.” In Essays on Ancient Philosophy, 210-224. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Pr, 1987. 
Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
———. “Reasons to act and believe: naturalism and rational justification in Hume's 
philosophical project.” Philosophical Studies 132, no. 1 (2007): 1-16. 
 Page 221  
———. “'A Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism': Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume's 
Science of Man.” In Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Sinnott Armstrong, Walter (ed), 68-
89. Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2004. 
Greco, John. “How to Reid Moore.” Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 209 (2002): 544-
563. 
———. Putting Skeptics in their Place: The nature of skeptical arguments and their 
role in philosophical inquiry, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
———. “"Reid's Reply to the Skeptic" ” In The Cambridge Companion to Thomas 
Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo, 134-155. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2004. 
Hadot, Pierre, and Arnold I. Davidson. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Translated by 
Michael Chase. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995. 
Hankinson, R. J. The Sceptics, Arguments of the Philosophers. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1995. 
House, Dennis K. “The Life of Sextus Empiricus.” The Classical Quarterly 30, no. 1 
(1980): 227-238. 
Hume, David, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd 
ed. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1978. 
Kaufman, Daniel A. “Between Reason and Common Sense: On the Very Idea of 
Necessary (though Unwarranted) Belief.” Philosophical Investigations 28, no. 2 
(2005): 134-158. 
———. “Reality in Common Sense: Reflections on Realism and Anti-Realism from a 
'Common Sense Naturalist' Perspective.” Philosophical Investigations 25, no. 4 
(2002): 331-361. 
Lewis, David. “Elusive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4 
(1996): 549-567. 
Macarthur, David. “The Seriousness of Doubt and Our Natural Trust in the Senses in 
the First Meditation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2003): 159-
182. 
Mates, Benson. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
McDowell, John. Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universiy 
Press, 1998. 
 Page 222  
McPherran, Mark L. “"Ataraxia" and "Eudaimonia" in Ancient Pyrrhonism: Is the 
Skeptic Really Happy?” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy 5 (1989): 135-171. 
Nagel, Thomas. “The View from Nowhere (selections)” In Skepticism: A contemporary 
reader, edited by Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield, 272-292. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Palmer, John A. “Skeptical Investigation.” Ancient Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2000): 351-
375. 
Politis, Vasilis. “Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato.” In Remembering Socrates, 
edited by Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis, 88-109. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
———. “Aristotle on Aporia and Searching in Metaphysics.” Boston Area Colloquium 
in Ancient Philosophy 22 (2006): 145-174. 
Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other essays. 
Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Human Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970. 
———. Works now fully collected: with selections from his unpublished letters, 
papers, notes, and supplementary dissertations. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Maclachlan 
Stewart and Co, 1849. 
Ribeiro, Brian. “Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?” Ancient Philosophy 22, no. 2 
(2002): 319-331. 
Rovane, Carol. “Rationality and Persons.” In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, 
edited by Alfred R Mele, 320-342. Oxford: Oxford Univ Pr, 2004. 
Rysiew, Patrick. “Reid and Epistemic Naturalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 209 
(2002): 437-456. 
Sextus, Julia Annas, and Jonathan Barnes. Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
Sextus, and Richard Bett. Against the Ethicists : (Adversus mathematicos XI), 
Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
———. Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians. Translated by Richard Bett. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Pr, 2005. 
 Page 223  
Sextus, and Robert Gregg Bury. Sextus Empiricus, Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, 
Mass. London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1933. 
Sizer, Laura. “What Feelings Can't Do.” Mind and Language 21, no. 1 (2006): 108-135. 
Strawson, P. F. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Woodbridge Lectures; no. 
12. London: Methuen, 1985. 
Striker, Gisela. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
———. “Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism.” In 
Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Sinnott Armstrong, Walter (ed). Oxford: Oxford Univ 
Pr, 2004. 
———. “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy.” Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie 
83, no. 2 (2001): 113-129. 
Stroud, Barry. “Scepticism, 'Externalism', and the Goal of Epistemology.” In 
Understanding Human Knowledge: Philosophical Essays, 139-154. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
———. The significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford; New York: Clarendon 
Press; Oxford University Press, 1984. 
———. “Understanding human knowledge in general.” In Understanding Human 
Knowledge: Philosophical Essays, 99-121. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
Taylor, Charles. “Rationality.” In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis, 
87-105. Cambridge: Mit Pr, 1982. 
Thorsrud, Harald. “Is the Examined Life Worth Living? A Pyrrhonian Alternative.” 
Apeiron 36, no. 3 (2003): 229-249. 
Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School. Cambridge, U.K. 
; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Williams, Michael. “Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism.” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 7, no. 2 (1999): 141-158. 
———. “Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy.” Nous Supplement 14 (2004): 456-
475. 
———. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism, 
Philosophical Theory. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, USA: B. Blackwell, 1991. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright. On certainty. 
Translated by Denis. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. 
 Page 224  
 Page 225  
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Reid on Common Sense.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Thomas Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo, 77-100. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
———. “Reid on Common Sense, with Wittgenstein's Assistance.” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 74, no. 3 (2000): 491-517. 
———. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Edited by Robert B. Pippin, 
Modern European Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
 
 
 
